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Chapter 1. The Rise of Asia:
What Implications for International Law and Global Governance?

1.1 Asia Rising, Asia Leading
Interest in the possible impact of the rise of Asia in world affairs has been
growing for a number of years.1 Asia’s emergence has become one of the most important
developments in the post-Cold War international system, and it has drawn attention from
scholars and practitioners who study the balance of power in international politics, the
process of economic growth and competition, and the acceleration of globalization.2
Although definitions of what constitutes “Asia” differ,3 there is little disagreement that
the epi-center for the rise of Asia sits in eastern and southeastern Asia, with China as the
most prominent nation in Asia’s on-going political and economic transformations.
Predictions that the 21st century will be the “Asian century” provide food for thought
about the implications of Asia’s future role in world affairs.4 Policy debates and
controversies about Asia’s significance now and in the future have many different facets,

1

D. Fidler, The Asian Century: Implications for International Law, 9 Singapore Yearbook of Int’l
L. 19 (2005) [hereinafter Fidler, Asian Century], p. 19. On the rise of Asia in world affairs, see C.
Lingle, The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century: False Starts on the Path to the Global
Millennium 3rd rev. ed. (Asia 2000); International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (G.
Ikenberry & M. Mastanduno, eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2003); Power Shift: China and Asia’s
New Dynamics (D. Shambaugh, ed., Univ. California Press 2006).
2
On the impact of globalization on the rise of Asia, see Globalization and Change in Asia (J.
Heffron, ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers 2007); M. Berger, The Battle for Asia: From
Decolonization to Globalization (Routledge 2003).
3
Experts segment “Asia” in different ways, including East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and
Western Asia. Of these regional groupings, the dynamism is most prominent in East and
Southeast Asia, with India and South Asia region frequently being mentioned as important in
Asia’s rise. Except for India, however, the South Asia (e.g., Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
and Myanmar) and Western Asia (e.g., Iran and Middle East) regions are not exhibiting signs of
dramatic gains in political and economic power as East and Southeast Asia have experienced.
4
Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 1, pp. 19-20.
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but they all point to an underlying consensus that, for 21st century international relations,
Asia will matter more than the region has ever previously done, and will matter in ways
significantly different from how Asia had political importance in earlier historical eras.
This thesis explores one aspect of this larger, vibrant phenomenon of Asia’s rise to
global prominence—the potential impact of Asia’s political and economic transformation
in world affairs on international law and global governance. This thesis argues that the
outlines of an Asian perspective on international law and global governance can be
detected through analysis of aspects of the Asian philosophical tradition, the Asian
historical experience, and Asia’s contemporary importance. More specifically, this Asian
perspective reflects Asia’s historical exploitation at the hands of Western imperialism,
insights and values captured by Asian philosophical traditions, especially Confucianism,
and the potential impact that the growth in Asian political, economic, and military power
may have on international relations. In short, philosophy, politics, and power are the
main drivers of an Asian perspective on international law and global governance.

1.2 From Westphalia to Eastphalia
Past and future international systems are frequently described as Westphalian or
post-Westphalian.5 These terms refer to the structure of the international political system
created by the Peace of Westphalia concluded in 1648 to end to the bloody Thirty-Years
War in Europe.6 The attributes established for inter-state relations in the Peace of
5

A. Cassese, International Law 2nd ed. (Oxford Univ. Press 2005), pp. 22-25. On the postWestphalia, see R. Falk, Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia, 6 J. Ethics 311
(2004).
6
On the historical development of international law after the Peace of Westphalia in general, see
W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (M. Byers trans., Walter de Gruyter 2000), pp. 279424.

2

Westphalia, particularly the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the
domestic affairs of other states, became the fundamental working principles for
international politics for the next 350 years. The modern system of international law also
emerged from the Westphalian structure for international politics.7 Changes in
international relations that have created political conditions or developments that
challenged the basic tenets of the Westphalian system are often dubbed postWestphalian,8 to indicate their divergence from the central structuring principles that had
long dominated relations among states and peoples.
Whether an international system in the past was Westphalian or post-Westphalian,
the driving forces behind its dynamics were predominantly Western countries and
Western ideas. The 19th century was the “European century” because European nations
dominated international relations and, through imperialism, make the Westphalian model
universal in its scope and application.9 The 20th century was the “American century”
because the United States emerged over the course of the century as the most powerful
political, economic, and military power the world had ever seen.10 The United States
played the decisive role in the three great wars of the 20th century—World War I, World
War II, and the Cold War—and brought Western ideas of democracy, human rights, and
economic interdependence to bear on the international relations in ways that challenged
key Westphalian assumptions and moved thinking into post-Westphalian realms.

7

Cassese, supra note 5, pp. 46-68. See also, A. Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations,
and the Westphalian Myth, 55 Int’l Org. 251 (2001).
8
See R. Falk, Law in Emerging Global Village: A Post-Westphalian Perspective (Transnational
Publishers 1998).
9
Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 1, pp. 21-22.
10
Id., pp. 22-25.
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The influence of Europe and Untied States in world affairs in the 19th and 20th
centuries put the “West” in “Westphalian” in ways most sharply felt by nations that
developed outside the Euro-American traditions of politics, philosophy, governance, and
law. Asia was one of the non-Western regions of the world that was brought within the
Westphalian world through European imperialism and the geopolitical needs of the great
powers and superpowers of the 19th and 20th centuries. Compared to the surging power
of the West, Asian countries were politically fragile, economically vulnerable, and
militarily weak, and, hence, did not exert independent influence on how international
relations operated. The inability of Asian countries to leave their mark on international
relations extended to international governance mechanisms, facilitated by a system of
international law designed by Western states to serve their global interests.
The rise of Asia over the course of the past 20 years creates a different dynamic
than the one that dominated the experiences of Asian countries within the Westphalian
system. This rise has occurred simultaneously with the emergence of a new phase of
globalization, dramatically catalyzed by the triumph of the United States and its liberal,
democratic allies in the Cold War. This triumph, and efforts made by Western countries
to promote their ideas and interests in the post-Cold War environment, permeated every
continent and region of the world. Only in Asia, however, did the world begin to see
large-scale political and economic developments that both successfully integrated many
Western ideas and practices and revealed perspectives and approaches indigenous to the
experience of a non-Western region. In the face of the onslaught of Western ideas and

4

interests in the post-Cold war period, many in Asia began to push back and to claim an
independent foundation for Asian political action in this new world order.11
This thesis examines what this independent Asian framework might entail. What
are the components of this “Eastphalian” perspective on international relations, and from
where did these components come? How do these components shape an Eastphalian
approach to international law and global governance in the early part of the 21st century?
Attempting to answer these questions has proved daunting because these questions
encompass a diverse geopolitical region and a bewildering variety of issues that range
from the deeply philosophical to the strictly practical. The analysis in this thesis perhaps
raises more questions than it answers, but the effort to tackle such big questions has been
worthwhile because it reveals basic aspects of an Asian perspective on international
relations and international law and identifies the challenges Asian countries face if they
wish to see Asia influence the future of world affairs in ways commensurate with the
power and importance Asia has now and will have in the future. Whether historians look
back on the 21st century as the Asian century may well depend on whether Asian
countries individually and collectively meet the challenges that making Eastphalia a
beacon for global efforts to improve the human condition entails.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis analyzes the potential implications of an Asian perspective on
international law and global governance in two substantive parts. The first part looks
backwards at the experiences of Asian countries with Western imperialism and
11

This pushback was most famously seen in the “Asian values” debate, which Chapter 5 analyzes
in detail.

5

international law, while the second part examines the contemporary features of an
Easthphalian approach to international relations and international law. This mixture of
historical and contemporary materials provides a rich and complex collection of
influences, ideas, and issues to explore.
The first chapter in Part I (Chapter 2) analyzes the Asian worldview prior to the
forcible incorporation of Asia into the Westphalian system. The impact of Western
imperialism was so significant that the process of incorporation has obscured nonWestern concepts of international order and international law that existed in Asia.
Chapter 2 sketches the foundations of a pre-Westphalian perspective in Asia on
international order, and these foundations involve the influence of Confucianism as a
political philosophy and the importance of the Sinocentric system that functioned in East
Asia prior to the arrival of Western imperialism. The collapse of the Sinocentric system
occurs when the Western great powers begin to determine the course of events in Asia,
and this period also sees the importation and application of Western international law in
Asia. As a weaker part of an international system with global scope, Asia follows in the
wake of the great events that shape the course of international law, and the loss of an
Asian voice in world affairs becomes more profound.
Chapter 3 focuses more specifically on the important relationship between
international law and concepts of civilization. The Western imperial powers justified
their discriminatory treatment of Asian governments and peoples under the “standard of
civilization,” which privileged civilized countries over uncivilized nations.12 Asian
countries were uncivilized under international law and, therefore, unworthy of enjoying
12

See, e.g., G. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Clarendon Press
1984); Globalization and Civilization (M. Mozaffari, ed., Routledge 2002).
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the full rights of the Westphalian international legal system until they became civilized
(i.e., Westernized) states. Chapter 3 describes the mechanisms through which Western
countries applied the standard of civilization, namely the system of capitulations and the
use of unequal treaties. Although the period of decolonization after World War II is
believed to have expunged the standard of civilization from international law civilizationcentric features of international law continue to appear in the post-Cold War world. The
triumph of the United States and its allies in the Cold War gave globalization a very
particular ideological edge,13 which powerfully influenced international law and its use.
What has emerged in the post-Westphalian era is a new standard of civilization, the
standard of global civilization, which influences international law in many of the same
ways the old standard of civilization informed the law of nations. It is this new standard
of global civilization that the rise of Asia confronts and perhaps may start to shape in the
early part of the 21st century.
Chapter 4 of the thesis reviews attempts to analyze critically the biased and
discriminatory evolution of modern international law experienced in Asia and other nonWestern regions of the world. The focus of this analysis is on a school of international
legal theory called “Third World Approaches to International Law,” or TWAIL. The
TWAIL school of thought represents the best-known critical deconstruction of the history
of international law, which reveals international law to have largely functioned as an
instrument of imperialism, racism, and oppression against non-Western peoples. In many
13

A prominent example of this ideological edge was the so-called “Washington consensus” that
influenced how major international economic and financial institutions (e.g., World Trade
Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund) approached economic reform in
developing countries. On the Washington consensus, see C. Gore, The Rise and Fall of the
Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries, 28 World Development 789
(2000); M. Naim, Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or
Washington Confusion? 21 Third World Q. 505 (2000).
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ways, TWAIL provided a theoretical approach for non-Western experts to expose
injustices not highlighted by standard methodologies for analyzing international law.
Chapter 4 explores the strengths and weaknesses of TWAIL, especially how these
strengths and weaknesses relate to the search for an Asian perspective on international
law and global governance.
Part II of the thesis turns its attention toward contemporary times and works to
elucidate the features of an Eastphalian outlook on present-day international relations and
international law. One of the problems with Asian critiques of international law is that,
like TWAIL, they tend to dwell too heavily on the past and simply recycle the “Asia as
victim” story. But Asia’s rise in political power and prominence means that any
Eastphalian perspective has to reflect not only the past but also a forward-looking,
constructive worldview. Asian countries can no longer be satisfied with narrative that
reflects only complaints about the bad old days of Western imperialism.
Thus, Part II begins with Chapter 5’s analysis of the famous “Asian values”
debate and controversy that emerged in the 1990s, just as the post-Cold War international
system was taking shape and globalization was accelerating. Chapter 5 takes a critical
look at the assertion made by Asian leaders that the ideas and values of the West, being
pushed aggressively through the processes of globalization, were not superior to or
adequate substitutes for the values and traditions Asian countries possessed. This debate
connected with philosophical issues raised by Confucianism and stimulated questions
about what “Asia” meant for this method of pushing back against Western influence. The
“Asian values” debate also has significant implications for key aspects of post-Cold War
international relations and international law, such as the promotion of democracy and the
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protection of human rights, and Chapter 5 spends a significant amount of time exploring
complex human rights issues the “Asian values” debate raised. In sum, the “Asian
values” debate provides an important window into aspects of an Asian perspective on
international law and global governance.
Chapter 6 engages in a detailed case study of the Asian perspective on one of the
most important and controversial areas of contemporary international law—the
international legal rules on the use of force by states. This chapter describes the existing
rules on the use of force and identifies the controversies with these rules concerning the
scope of the right to use force in self-defense and whether states have a right to use force
in humanitarian interventions. With this background in place, the chapter then explores
the Asian perspective on the use of force by states. This exploration involves looking at
Confucian ideas on the use of force, self-defense, and humanitarian intervention, as well
as the policy approaches to the use of force generally taken by Asian states in
contemporary international relations. Chapter 6 particularly probes how Asian countries
perceive humanitarian intervention. This chapter also looks in detail at how the Asian
perspective on the use of force, self-defense, and humanitarian intervention relates to the
emerging normative concept in international law and global governance of “human
security.” The chapter concludes by analyzing the “China factor”—how the growth of
Chinese power and influence in Asia and beyond may affect the Asian perspective on
human security and international law.
The last chapter (Chapter 7) provides an overview of the major arguments and
conclusions of the thesis in order to clarify the emerging outlines of an Eastphalian
perspective on international law and global governance. It describes the main influences

9

informing the Eastphalian perspective, and these influences reflect the importance of
Confucian philosophy, the historical experiences of Asian countries, and the relevance of
Asian power, especially Chinese power, in the current international system. The chapter
considers what the impact of the Eastphalian outlook on international law and global
governance might entail, which involves looking closely at the strengths and weaknesses
of this perspective. The thesis concludes with some critical analysis on the question
whether the Eastphalian perspective gives Asia the opportunity to be a laboratory for
policy reforms that can improve human security in Asia and beyond. Will other countries
and regions of the world look to Asia and the Eastphalian template for guidance on how
to meet the pressing challenges of an increasingly globalized world? Although an
Eastphalian perspective is discernable, whether it will guide international law and global
governance in the 21st century remains subject to significant doubt.

10

PART I. ASIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, AND CRITICAL THEORY

11

Chapter 2. An Asian Perspective on International Order:
Rise and Fall of a Philosophical and Political Framework

2.1 Introduction
Before analyzing how Asian countries may affect the future of international law,
pausing to consider philosophical and historical aspects concerning international law in
the Asian region will be helpful for understanding whether and how Asian factor may
shape international law in early 21st century.
This chapter examines the philosophical and political framework of international
relations developed in Asia before the arrival of Western imperialism, with an emphasis
on Confucian thinking and the operation of a Sinocentric international system. The
chapter then describes how Western imperialism destroyed this framework and
incorporated Asia into the European-dominated Westphalian system of international
relations and international law. Opportunity for a distinctive Asian voice did not emerge
strongly during the Cold War’s bipolar balance of power competition and ideological
battles between liberalism, communism, and anti-imperialism. The post-Cold War
“triumph” of the United States and its version of globalized liberalism moved
international law into a new post-Westphalian phase that reflected Western interests as
strongly as the European-dominated system of international law did in the 19th and first
half of the 20th centuries.
The background provided by this chapter is important in understanding not only
the history of Asian countries’ relationship with international law but also the present
context in which the rise of Asia is occurring. As later chapters elucidate, the heritage of

12

Confucianism and Western exploitation of Asia discussed in this chapter still factor
significantly in the Asian perspective on international law and global governance
emerging in the early 21st century.

2.2 The Westphalian Shadow: Obscuring the Origins of Non-Western Perspectives
on International Order and International Law
The history of humankind has involved continuous efforts to create and operate
mechanisms that maintain societies and help them flourish. For functional societies,
authoritative decisions, also known as law, have always played an important role in
structuring and harmonizing the values and goals of societies. Law is one of the most
significant constituent elements of society. The Latin maxim “Ubi societas ibi jus”—
where there is society, there is law—clearly reflects the paramount importance of law in
any society.
With the growth of populations and the material power of societies, and with their
geographical expansion, humankind confronted the need to have authoritative norms that
regulated the relationships between independent societies. This need fuelled the
development of conceptions and systems of inter-society rules that pre-dated the
emergence of the European Westphalian system in the 17th century. The rise of the
Westphalian international order, and its subsequent universal application through
European-dominated international law, has obscured important non-Western ideas and
practices concerning inter-society relations. Understanding whether the political and
economic rise of Asia in the early 21st century is contributing to the development of an
“Eastphalian” perspective on international law and governance requires consideration of
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the controversial impact of the Westphalian system on non-European regions and ways of
thinking.
The Westphalian system is based on a state-centric model of international
relations and reflects predominantly the European perspective, and has great importance
in the fields of international law and international relations. The seminal date for the
emergence of modern international law and international relations—1648 —is the same.1
Werner argues that 1648 marked the death of a pre-modern feudal order, an order
subsequently replaced with the modern system of international law and international
relations. This modern system takes as its starting point the principle of sovereignty for
territorial states.2
The European origins of the Westphalian system meant, not surprisingly, that
European countries structured and shaped modern international law in ways that reflected
their interests and ideas.3 European countries’ tremendous influence on every aspect of
international law meant that international law developed, generally speaking, as the
“Public Law of Europe.”4 This historical dynamic has echoes in Asia because, as

1

P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 7th rev. ed. (Routledge
1997), p. 9. On the historical development of international law after the Peace of Westphalia in
general, see W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (M. Byers trans., Walter de Gruyter
2000), pp. 279-424; A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations rev. ed. (Macmillan
1958), pp. 115-290. For a concise introduction to the Westphalian system, see D. Fidler, Revolt
Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of
International Law, 2 Chinese J. Int’l L. 29 (2003), pp. 34-37.
2
W. Werner, “The Unnamed Third”: Roberta Kevelson’s Legal Semiotics and the Development of
International Law, 12 Int’l J Semiotics of L. 309 (1999), p. 319.
3
R.P. Anand, “Attitude of the Asian-African States Towards Certain Problems of International
Law,” in Third World Attitudes Towards International Law: An Introduction (F. Snyder & S.
Sathirathai, eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987), p. 6.
4
D. Fidler, The Asian Century: Implications for International Law, 9 Singapore Yearbook of Int’l
L. 19 (2005) [hereinafter, Fidler, Asian Century], p. 21. On the European character of
international law, see C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth—In the International Law of the Jus
Publicum Europaeum (Telos Press 2003).
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discussed below in more detail, the Asian understanding of rules governing the relations
of independent societies reflected the characteristics and cultures of the Asian region.
The shadow of the Westphalian system extended, however, beyond Europe through the
global scale of European imperialism. The European character of international law’s
substance and spread gave the impression that only European countries were involved in
the creation of international law.5 Fidler points out that “[T]he European century’s most
distinctive mark on international law was its universalization as an instrument of
international governance. The universalization of international law was a by-product of
European imperialism and other forms of European projection of superior power in nonEuropean parts of the world.”6
The leading role European countries undoubtedly played in the development of
the modern system of international law seems unchallengeable because non-European
parts of the world, especially Asia, Africa and Latin America, did not make a substantial
contribution to the formulation of international law during the period of European
imperialism. European supremacy in international law’s evolution also influences the
study of the history of international law. Works by Western scholars trace the history of
international law back to antiquity.7 However, Western scholars’ interest in the history of
international law generally has a relatively narrow scope of actors, places, and events
directly connected to the formation and operation of the Westphalian system.

5

General work on the relationship between European imperialism and development of
international law can be found in A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of
International Law (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
6
Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4, p. 21.
7
See Grewe, supra note 1, pp. 37-139; Nussbaum, supra note 1, pp. 1-16. For general works on
international law in ancient times, see D. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2001).
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Yasuaki argues, for example that the study of international law tends to regard the
history of modern European international law as the history of international law itself.8
Moreover, references to antiquity or the medieval period generally focuses on Greece and
Rome as the birthplace of European civilization, and refers to the Just War doctrine,
natural law doctrine, and legal practice of medieval Europe. This Westphalian bias
means that the history of non-European regions and peoples with managing inter-society
relations has been neglected.9
From the perspective of the Westphalian system, the term “international law”
cannot be separated from the origins of the modern, territorial state system. In other
words, historical practices in pre-Westphalian eras are not, strictly speaking, inter-state or
international relations as those concepts were understood in Europe and, thus do not
inform analysis of modern international law.10 Older systems of inter-nation relations,
such as developed by China, India, and Egypt, are not perceived as relevant to modern
understandings of international law, even with respect to similarities in principles.11
Efforts to reach back to these non-European, pre-Westphalian systems of rules
have been criticized by scholars of the history of international law. For example,
Miéville has questioned approaches by scholars who elevate the significance of the preWestphalian and non-Western origins of international law: “[W]e cannot understand prestate relations ‘without scrutinizing … the form, substance and nature of their norms
8
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regulating relations among independent groups.’ Labelling them ‘international law’ does
not do this. The claim that such law existed in ancient India, or Africa, is sometimes
adduced without argument, simply by reference to the existence of international
polities.”12
Scholars, particularly from the Third World, continue to challenge the exclusively
European spin on the development of modern international law.13 Even though political
entities in non-European parts of the world were not often regarded as states by the
Westphalian system, the fact that different types of states existed in non-European parts
of the world before and after the Peace of Westphalia is self-evident. Furthermore, these
political entities had active relations among themselves before and after the emergence of
the Westphalian system.14 The Westphalian system was deeply rooted in the relations of
European countries, and, thus, “international law” arising from the Westphalian system
did not reflect rules and principles used in non-European parts of the world, making
modern international law less “international” than it could otherwise have been.
Yasuaki attacks the European bias informing the history of international law.
Yasuaki claims that narrow Eurocentric views on international law have considerable
12
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trouble facing questions about non-European versions of international relations.15
Orakhelashvili also criticizes the assumption that non-European were incapable of
understanding international law as an example of prejudice. Eurocentric views on
international law ignored the cultural and intellectual heritage of non-European nations,
which included the use of ideas closely related, if not identical, to Westphalian concepts
of international law.16
The relations of independent nations and societies can be easily found in the preand post-Westphalian historical records of non-European civilizations.17 These records
contain evidence of rules and principles that are familiar even from the Westphalian
perspective. For example, the ruler Eannatum of the city-state of Lagash and the state of
Umma concluded a boundary treaty in Mesopotamia in about 3100 B.C. This example is
just the tip of the iceberg concerning the active relations among independent societies in
non-European regions.18 Non-European versions of the Westphalian rules concerning the
sanctity of treaties, inviolability of ambassadors, principle of humanity in conducting
wars, and rules of the law of the sea can be found in Kautilya’s Arthasastra and the Code
of Manu. Ancient India recognized one of the fundamental laws of war—distinction
between combatants and non-combatants.19 Ideas for inter-state organizations also
existed, as evidenced by Confucius’ proposal for a Grand Union of Chinese States.20
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Although the attack against Westcentrism in international law has drawbacks,21
the critique sheds light on how we might re-conceptualize and re-contextualize
perspectives of international law and international relations in the age of 21st century
globalization. The growing political, economic, and cultural influence of Asia in
contemporary world politics heightens the need to understand potentially different
perspectives on international relations and international law connected to Asia’s past and
present.22

2.3 Foundations of an Asian Perspective on International Order: Confucianism and
the Sinocentric System in East Asia
It makes little sense analyzing European international law without considering the
underlying influence of Christianity.23 The Christian Just War doctrine influenced, for
example, international law on the use of force and provides a good example to illustrate
the relationship between Christianity and the European origins of international law.24
Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism are commonly known as three religions in
the Asian region. In fact, these religions are more correctly known as the three
“teachings.”25 According to Chen, Confucianism lacks the essential characteristics of a
21
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religion. He notes that “[C]onfucianism does not advocate a belief in a deity, nor does it
have an accepted doctrine of salvation, nor does it use sacred stories to aid propagation.
While it does employ rituals and have a ‘code of conduct,’ the attendant perspectives are
non-religious in character.”26 Despite its non-religious character, Confucianism has
played an important role in shaping Asian perspectives on international order, including
international law.
China was the hegemon in the Asian region before its subordination to European
imperialism in the 19th century. Before being forced open by European countries, China
had formulated normative frameworks regulating the relationship between countries in
Asia and countries in other regions.27 Although Confucianism is not a religion, it guided
philosophically the direction of China’s domestic and foreign policies. Given China’s
status as the historic hegemon in the Asian region, Confucianism has been an important
philosophical view on governing the relations between countries in the Asian region.
Thus, Confucianism in the Asian region is the counterpart to Christianity in the European
region.
Far reaching studies on the philosophical character of Confucianism are beyond
the scope of this thesis. For this chapter’s purpose, understanding the impact of
Confucianism on normative frameworks for relations between countries in Asian region
is the objective. The focus is on how the characteristics of Confucianism produce a
different perspective on international order and international law than what developed in
Europe under the Westphalian system.
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Chen explores the features of Confucianism that are important for understanding
its impact on international order in Asian region, and he identifies five important
elements: (1) its postulation of a goal, a world governed by Ping (平)—literally “peace”;
(2) the Confucian conception of community—the world as Tian-Xia; (3) the Confucian
conception of order, especially the non-differentiation of legal and moral orders; (4)
minimum order, which includes three core ideas—the absence of unauthorized coercion
or violence, disappearance of litigation, and authorized use of force; and (5) maximum
order, which means the greatest production and widest distribution of human values.28
These five elements of a Confucian perspective on international order have
similarity with aspects of the European perspective on international order. For example,
under the minimum order perspective, the unauthorized use of force is strictly prohibited
and humanitarian intervention is justified on the condition that certain requirements (e.g.,
necessity and proportionality in the force used) be clearly satisfied.29
The Confucian perspective on international order differs from the Westphalian
approach because Confucianism supported the existence of a hegemonic power in the
Asian region embued with a strong sense of superiority over other countries and
nations.30 The Westphalian system largely operated under a balance of power dynamic
involving a number of great powers considered civilizational and cultural equals, rather
than under the influence of a morally superior hegemonic power.
In general, under Confucian thinking, the ideal international order in the Asian
region should be governed by a sole hegemon, which was historically China, which had
28
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responsibility for putting into practice lessons from Tian (天)—literally “Heaven.”
Confucians see the world as Tian-Xia (天下)—literally “all under Heaven.” Tian-Xia can
be narrowly or broadly interpreted. In a narrow sense, Tian-Xia refers to the kingdom of
ancient China, known as Eastern Chou, which is regarded as the ideal kingdom in
Chinese history. In a broad sense, Tian-Xia is extensive enough to comprehend the entire
world.31 In addition, Tian-Xia is understood as a harmonious political order without state
boundaries and governed by a sage through virtue, without any coercive power at all.32
Because Tian is understood as the perfect source rules and guidance, the judgments of
Tian should be respected by everyone in Tian-Xia under all circumstances.33 With
China’s vast territory, massive population, huge economic capabilities, sophisticated
culture, and highly developed legal rules and institutions, Chinese emperors thought of
themselves as Tian-Zi (天子)—literally “the Son of Heaven.”34 The sacred role of TianZi was to implement the requirements of Tian in Tian-Xia.
Although Tian-Xia could have an expansive scope, the Confucian perspective on
international order in application was a closed system of international relations based in
Asia and centered on China as the politically and culturally superior nation. This
perspective clashes with the development, at least within Europe, of the Westphalian
norms of sovereign equality and the opposition to the presence of any hegemonic
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power.35 The strong sense of the superiority of China in Confucian thinking results in
Sinocentrism. Because Tian-Zi is the sole messenger of Tian, there is no relationship
based on the equality between Tian-Zi, the Chinese emperor, and other rulers in TianXia.36
Tian-Zi did not have to consider the cultural perspectives of other rulers because
these other rulers were, in general, regarded as representatives of barbarian political
entities.37 Thus, the relationship between ancient China and other countries was carried
out through a sophisticated culture of highly educated officials schooled in Chinese
poetry and classical knowledge.38 Tian-Zi did not have any sense that the relationship
between China and other countries was regulated by a separate legal order. In terms of
relations between China and other nations, Tian-Zi emphasized protocols, or ritual
customs, when engaging in relations with other (barbarian) countries. These protocols
were, without question, governed by the domestic law of China39 not by a separate body
of law between nations.
The fundamental philosophy underlying the Sinocentric system was rule by virtue
through Tian. The virtue-oriented Sinocentric system did not leave room for tolerance of
“uncivilized countries.” This aspect of the Confucian perspective plays a critical role in
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making the Sinocentirc system a closed system of international relations, particularly
compared to the more open and expansive European system of international relations.
In Confucian thought, Tian-Zi has a sacred duty to enlighten uncivilized people so
that they understand the virtue of Tian and send a tributary mission to barbarians to share
in Tian-Zi’s virtuous rule. When barbarians turned a deaf year to the virtue of Tian-Zi,
Tian-Zi just excluded ignorant barbarians from the realm of ideal Tian-Xia as the natural
sanction. From the view of Tian-Zi, the worst sanction for uncooperative barbarians is to
let them continue in an uncivilized state. Tian-Zi would then isolate the uncooperative
country politically and economically. In this way, the Sinocentric system functioned on
the basis of the system’s recognition of the superior position of Tian-Zi in the greater
political order.40
The various aspects of Confucianism significantly influenced a Sinocentric Asian
perspective on international order. However, by applying Confucianism’s teachings too
rigidly, paying too much emphasis to the superiority of China, and disregarding the
existence of other cultures and civilizations, Sinocentrism became a closed, uninformed
and vulnerable system of international relations. When the “Western barbarians with
yellow hair and blue eyes” appeared, the Sinocentric system collapsed in the face of
European imperialism.
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2.4 Collapse of the Sinocentric System: Western Imperialism and the Process of
Universalization of International Law
The processes of imperialism provided for the universalization of the Westphalian
system and its system of European-derived international law. The law of nations as
developed in Europe recognized its universal potential through, for example, the use of
natural law as a source of law,41 but, in practice, international law remained largely the
public law of Europe through the 18th century.42 The European character of international
law came into sharper relief in the 19th century as European powers began to expand their
commercial and imperial interests across the globe. The spread of European power and
influence ensured that the 19th century would be the “European century” for purposes of
international law.43 In the period of international law’s universalization, perspectives
from non-European countries and regions did not factor into this development.44
Expanding the geographical reach of the public law of Europe was not the sole
goal of Europe’s universalization of international law. The European project to
universalize international law included the “standard of civilization” through which
European countries sought to transform non-European countries into states that could
operate within the Westphalian system.45 Almost identical to the Sinocentric cultural and
civilizational superiority, the arrogant sense of superiority of European civilization over
non-European civilizations can be explicitly extracted from writings of European scholars.
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These views are seemingly rooted in cultural and racial prejudices.46 Similar to the
cultural and civilizational superiority in the Sinocentric system, the European standard of
civilization devalued non-European civilizations through cultural and racial prejudices.47
Lorimer’s argument provides a good example of the attitude contained within the sense of
European civilizational superiority. He argued in the heyday of 19th century European
imperialism that “[E]ven now the same rights and duties do not belong to savage and
civilized man.”48
Unlike the Sinocentric system, the European powers transformed the public law
of Europe into a body of international law that justified the global scope of European
imperial endeavors. In the 19th century, European states used international law to give
legitimacy to outright conquest of non-European nations and to the system of
capitulations, which gave European powers the rights to operate in non-European
countries on the basis of European laws.49 Through these mechanisms, non-European
political, economic, social, and cultural systems were overthrown, destroyed, or
marginalized to make way for the European standard of civilization and the
universalization of the Westphalian image of international law and relations.50
When confronted by the demands of the European countries to enter into political
and economic relations, China was not prepared for this clash of civilizations. The
Chinese did not understand the ways of Westphalia and looked down on the European
46
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barbarians for failing to observe and appreciate the highly ritualistic rules Tian-Zi
expected barbarians in Tian-Xia to obey.51 The 1842 Treaty of Nanking between Great
Britain and the Ch’ing dynasty was the prelude to the total collapse of the Sinocentric
system and world view. The Ch’ing dynasty’s Sinocentrism prevented it from
understanding the contents of treaties with Europeans. For example, in accepting the
system of capitulations in treaties with European powers, China viewed these privileges
as Tian-Zi’s benevolence towards Western barbarians in Tian-Xia. The length of time it
took for China to understand what was happening reveals how deeply Sinocentrism was
rooted.52 The use of force by European countries, as in the Opium Wars, shattered the
traditional world view of the Chinese and demonstrated that China was part of an entirely
different system of rules, prejudices, and power.53
Ironically, the transformation of Japan into a European-like state in the decades
after the Meiji Restoration helped bring the Sinocentric system to an end. Unlike China,
Japan made vigorous efforts to learn how the Westphalian system worked and changed
itself into a member of this system.54 Japan’s ability to break free from the Sinocentric
mindset and adapt to the new European-made world order made the rigidity and
incomprehension of China’s reactions all the more telling.
In sum, the European conquest of Asian and the destruction of the Sinocentric
system should not be understood in the narrow scope of the disappearance of the Ch’ing
dynasty. European imperialism and the universalization of the Westphalian system of
international law also represented the loss of an indigenous Asian perspective on
51

Yasuaki, supra note 8, p. 29.
Id., p. 53.
53
Id., pp. 30-32. On the Chinese transition from the Heaven Empire to a state incorporated into
European civilization, see Gong, supra note 36, pp. 130-163.
54
Yasuaki, supra note 8, p. 52.
52

27

international order. Having no counterpart system to the European international system
and no material means to resist European power, non-European regions of the world were
forced to accept the European system. These changes allowed the myth of the superiority
of European civilization, and the inferiority of non-European cultures, to be perpetuated
on a global scale.

2.5 Loss of an Asian Voice in International Law: The Rise of Ideology in
International Law
Unlike the 19th century, which was dominated by grand narratives of European
superiority, the 20th century can be regarded as a competition among different ideologies
promoted by rival great powers. This competition largely pitted Europeans against
Europeans and saw the rise of new countries to the status of great powers, countries built
on ideological rather than dynastic premises—the United States and the Soviet Union.
The ability of the United States to compete and eventually prevail in the 20th century’s
ideological struggles marks this century as the “American century.”
Fidler’s analysis of the American century helps conceptualize how this century
brought about a radical paradigm shift in the science of international law and how this
change affected Asian voice in international law.55
Fidler highlights that “[T]he end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union
in the late 1980s and early 1990s left the United States as the dominant country politically,
economically, militarily, technologically and culturally. From the vantage point of the
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United States’ victory in the Cold War and its resulting hegemony, the 20th century
certainly takes on an American sheen.” 56
The image of European superiority from the 19th century was dismantled by the
rise of American power and eventually hegemony in the 20th century. This process was
marked, however, by fierce ideological competition among various ideologies, such as
liberalism, communism, fascism, anti-colonialism, and anti-imperialism. These
competing ideologies each promulgated a blueprint for desirable model of international
governance.57
This issuance of President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points in 1918
was one of the first indications that ideology would play a greater role in thinking about
international law and international relations in the 20th century.58 The Fourteen Points
laid the cornerstone for the American liberal philosophical perspective on international
relations.59
The Fourteen Points communicated that it was a duty of the United States to
enhance and spread liberalism through the world. This imperative of American liberalism
posed a dramatic challenge to traditional Westphalian understandings of international law
and its legitimacy,60 especially the principle of non-intervention into the domestic affairs
of other states. The ideological view of American liberalism makes protection and
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promotion of the rights of life, liberty, and property inalienable and universal rights
available to everyone in every country.61
The American liberal ideology did not, however, occupy the field unchallenged.
Liberalism was only one of many ideologies that competed for the hearts and minds of
peoples around the world, and these ideologies included communism, fascism, and antiimperialism. This ideological competition stood in stark contrast to smug assumptions of
European superiority that fuelled the universalization of the Westphalian system and its
set of international legal rules. The heart of the ideological struggle was in Europe, but
the ideologies, particularly liberalism and communism, claimed universal application,
making the struggle global in scope.
The ideological ferment and turmoil in the 20th century left its marks on
international law. Fidler terms this phenomenon as the “triumph of ideology” in
international law in 20th century. He argues that various ideologies provided international
law with new concepts and rules of international law, which renovated or sometimes
discarded the conventional assumptions and practices in international law.62 However,
the “triumph of ideology” in international law in 20th century should not be understood to
mean that the United States monopolized the ideological competition that affected
international law. Rather, until its victory in the Cold War near the end of the 20th century,
the United States was only one of the main players in making international law reflect a
new kind of ideepolitik in international relations.63
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The ideepolitik of the American century had significant impact on Asian countries.
In general, the 20th century can be regarded as an open-market competition among
various ideologies. However, the ideologies that came from the Third World, including
Asia, did not have much market share. Power politics still played a role in forcing
weaker states to accept a certain type of ideology.64 Although Asian-African countries
comprise a majority of the globe, they did not construct their own views and use them to
challenge or even change international law. Ideological ferment in the Third World
tended to follow in the wake of the American/European ideological movements, such as
seen in Asian and African adaptations of anti-imperial perspectives seen in liberalism
(e.g., India’s leadership in the non-aligned movement) and of socialist views taken from
communism (e.g., communism in Mao’s China).
Many reasons explain why ideepolitik in international law and international
relations affected Asian countries as it did in the 20th century. The absence of a distinct
Asian voice in the ideepolitik of the 20th century can be explained by analyzing the
process of decolonization, the inflexible bipolar superpower system of the Cold War, and
the post-Cold War “End of History” phenomenon.
The decolonization process in Asia and the inflexible bipolar system that
prevailed during the Cold War period largely prevented Asian countries from crafting
their own perspective to compete with other ideologies, such as liberalism and
communism, and from suggesting an alternative blueprint of international governance in
the 20th century. During the decolonization process, Asian and African countries’ fierce
social resistant movements against former colonial powers directly contributed to anti64
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colonial and anti-imperial perspectives affecting the content and practice of international
law. These “revolts against the West” brought new attention to various areas of
international law, such as the principle of self-determination, non-intervention in the
domestic affairs of other states, rules on foreign direct investment, special and differential
treatment under international trade law, the law of the sea, and the movement to create a
New International Economic Order.65 Initiatives from Asian and African countries tended,
however, to be subsumed within the larger bipolar struggle for power between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Similarly, newly independent countries in the Asian and African regions needed to
restore and reconstruct their political institutions and economies. These two urgent goals
could not be achieved without the aid of the United States or the Soviet Union and the aid
came with ideological and political strings attached. Asian and African countries had
little choice but to try to work within the power structure controlled by the United States
and the Soviet Union.66 In this context, there was little room for advocating an
65

On the concept of the “revolt against the West”, see D. Armstrong, Revolution and World
Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Clarendon Press 1993), pp. 158-198. On
the Third World’s effort to change the conventional rules and principles of international law, see
Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 1, pp. 39-48; T. Elias, New Horizons in International Law 2nd rev. ed.
(M. Ssekandi, rev. ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publisers 1992), pp. 29-43; S.P. Sihna, “Perspective of
the Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International law,” in Third World
Attitudes Towards International Law: An Introduction (F. Snyder & S. Sathirathai, eds., Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 1987), pp. 23-31; M. Sarin, “The Asian-African States and the Development of
International law,” in id., pp. 33-51; B.S. Chimni, “Towards a Third World Approach to NonIntervention: Through the Labyrinth of Western Doctrine,” in id., pp. 73-75; S. Chowdhury, “The
Status and Norms of Self-Determination in Contemporary International Law,” in id., pp. 87-99; S.
Agrawala, “The Emerging International Economic Order,” in id., pp. 379-391; S. Asante,
“Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transnational Investment Process,” in id., pp. 693-711;
T. Koh, “Negotiating a New World Order of the Sea,” in id., pp. 715-735; and A. Pardo, “The
Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Preliminary Appraisal,” in id., pp. 737-749.
66
From the point of the “triumph of ideology” in international law in the 20th century, the trend of
ideepolitik could not be made in one country or bloc of states. Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4,
p. 24. However, in reality, Asian countries did not have a full chance to make an independent
ideological contribution to international law under the heavy stress provided by the competition

32

indigenous Asian ideology of international law and international politics, which could
exist outside the ideological and power competition between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Despite the activities of the Group of 77 on behalf of developing countries,
which proclaimed the policy of non-alignment, these activities remained subsumed
within the geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.67
The two regional powers of East Asia, China and Japan, did not make significant
contributions to heralding Asian voices in international relations. Although China had a
conflict with the Soviet Union over Marxism,68 this Sino-Soviet conflict was not a
conflict between an independent Asian perspective and communism in international
relations. In terms of Japan, its defeat and political reconstruction by the United States
after World War II made this re-emerging regional power a close ally of the United States
rather than a source of independent Asian thought and practices.69
The lack of distinct Asian voices in international law is also explained by the
emergence of the United States as the winner of the Cold War and as the post-Cold War
hegemon in international politics. Even though skeptics abound concerning the triumph
of liberalism and the “end of history,”70 such as Huntington’s pessimistic dystopia of the
looming “clash of civilizations,”71 the U.S. victory in the Cold War allowed the United
States to advance its political and ideological agenda globally with essentially no
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
67
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competition. The U.S. version of ideepolitik sets the new “standard of civilization” for
the era of post-Cold War globalization, and this version of ideepolitik had significant
influence on the post-Westphalian version of international law emerging in the post-Cold
War period, influence not much different from the old European standard of civilization
that characterized international law in the 19th century.
The first direct challenge to the hegemony of the American version of ideepolitik
came from radical Islamist groups willing to attack the United States, as happened on
September 11, 2001. The nature of the U.S. response to the global terrorist threat placed
even more pressure on countries to ally themselves with the interests and ideas of the
United States. In short, the global war on terrorism divided the world simplistically into
faithful friends or evil enemies of the United States.72 In the eyes of critics, the United
States’ unilateralism became a rogue force in international relations, leading to the blatant
distortion of established rules and principles of international law.73 Thus, in this context,
the United States may very well be unreceptive to the emergence of new perspectives on
international relations and international law that do not accord with the paradigms of the
global war against terrorism and U.S. hegemony.
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2.6 Conclusion
The absence of a distinctly Asian voice in the ideepolitik that has characterized
international law through the 20th century and into the 21st century connects to the
historical and philosophical developments analyzed in this chapter. A region that once
had its own identity and normative framework for inter-nation relations became forcibly
incorporated into the universalization of the Westphalian system and then the
globalization of the post-Westphalian vision of the United States. Asia merely became
another part of a Western-centric political structure and mindset, which were clearly
reflected in the rules of international law developed to facilitate the expansion of the
power and ideas of the West.
The story of the loss of an Asian perspective on international relations and
international law is important in its own right but the story is not just of historical interest.
Debate about whether the 21st century will be the “Asian century” reflects an
understanding that the material power and influence of Asia in the next few decades may
have a profound effect on international politics. This understanding identifies a sense
that Asia may be shedding the subordination it has endured for close to 200 years. The
transformation of Asia’s place and prominence in international politics invites
considerations of what Asia will bring to the next phase of ideepolitik in international law.
As Fidler has argued, Asia’s growing significance potentially makes it the next critical
laboratory for global governance.74 How Asian countries respond to their emerging
power and prominence and what they will contribute to the theory and practices of
international law in the process are now important questions that deserve analysis. In
74
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their respective centuries, the European and American left their clear marks on
international law. What marks Asians may leave on international law in the 21st century
is the question taken up by the subsequent chapters in this thesis.
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Chapter 3. International Law as Civilization-Centric:
The Role of the Standard of Civilization in the Making of the Modern International
Legal System

3.1 Introduction
One of the features emerging from the historical experience of Asian countries
with modern international law is how heavily this experience was marked by concepts of
“civilized” and “uncivilized” nations. As Chapter 2 noted, Western imperialism in Asia
and other non-European regions included the use of a “standard of civilization” in
making international law function outside its original European context. This chapter
explores this standard of civilization in more detail in order to probe how dramatically it
affected the manner in which Asian countries were incorporated into the modern system
and how this system operated, namely through the use of unequal treaties and the system
of capitulations.
The chapter also looks at how a new standard of civilization may be influencing
international law in the post-Cold War era. This analysis further deepens the conceptual
importance in thinking about civilizations, especially powerful ones, when thinking about
how international law operates. The new standard of civilization has features similar to
and different from the old standard, and this chapter takes a look at both to provide an
overview of how Western ideas continue to shape international law profoundly. More
specifically, the chapter considers the position of Asian countries with respect to the new
standard of global civilization. This new standard will be an important part of the context
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in which the Asian perspective on international law and global governance is emerging
and will be something against which the Asian perspective will be measured.

3.2 The Standard of Civilization as the Main Engine for Justification of WesternCentric International Law
The concept of civilization, especially European civilization, played a significant
role in the development of international law. European civilization guided and directed
how European powers conceived of and applied international law, especially in
subordinating non-Western countries to the interests of European powers during the
period of European imperialism. The relationship between civilization and international
law captures the effort to transplant the Enlightenment of 18th century Europe into the rest
of the world. The transplantation of European civilization through international law
represents one of the most important features of international law’s history. The
association of international law with European ideas of civilization drove both
international law and European civilization to gain universal scope. As Cox noted,
“[T]he civilizing process was conceived as a universal phenomenon characterizing the
Enlightenment of eighteenth-century Europe, at one with universal reason and natural
laws applicable in the physical sciences, economics, laws, and morality. The finality of
the process was civilization in singular.”1
The process through which European countries spread their conception of
civilization through international law produced the original “clash of civilizations”
because the spread of European ideas beyond Europe confronted many, diverse
1
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civilizations and cultures. In these civilizational encounters, European nations developed
the “standard of civilization” to provide their ideas and power legitimacy through the
system of international law. Through the standard of civilization, the European powers
judged what societies were worthy of being considered civilized and uncivilized.
Through this process, non-European civilization and their concepts of social structure and
behavior became targets for denigration and transformation.
The standard of civilization required civilizational diversity to operate in the
manner it did. The standard had little if any significance in the relationships among
European countries. European countries generally shared a common perspective on
philosophy, religion, morality, political systems, and economics.2 These shared
civilizational elements did not, of course, mean that European countries lived together in
peace and harmony. Inter-European relations required rules to regulate cooperation and
conflict, and the process of making and applying these rules became the source for
modern international law. International law among European nations did not produce
difficulties of a civilizational nature. In fact, the law of nations was often referred to as
the “Public Law of Europe,” a name that reveals the common civilizational foundations
shared by European countries.
The first sustained confrontations between civilizations occurred on a global scale
from the late 18th to the early 20th centuries as European expansion into the non-European
world accelerated and deepened.3 This period witnessed the transformation of the
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Christian-European family of nations into a global society of civilized nations.4 With the
expansion of the European powers, laws and practices generally accepted by European
countries took an increasingly global and explicitly juridical character as the international
system developed.5 To justify the spread of European ideas, the standard of civilization
developed during the period of European imperialism.
Initially, natural law doctrine, which was based on Christian notion of universality,
was used to govern the relationship between European powers and non-European
countries and other civilizations.6 Natural law doctrine, however, gave way to more
scientific approaches to international law, as seen in the rise of positivism in international
law.7 Under the influence of positivism, fundamental and basic concepts of international
law, such as sovereignty of states, non-intervention in domestic affairs, and the
inviolability of diplomatic missions, emerged in the relations among European nations.
Among these, the concept of state sovereignty became the most complex issue with
regard to the relationship between civilized European countries and uncivilized nonEuropean countries.
Under the standard of European civilization, European powers could not enter
into any international legal relationship with uncivilized non-European countries because
these countries did not enjoy sovereignty under international law. Although the lack of
4
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sovereignty of non-European countries conveniently gave European powers opportunities
to conquer and exploit non-European countries, the lack of sovereignty of non-European
countries brought about difficult questions for European powers. The problems involved
how to protect European nationals in non-European countries and how to guarantee nonEuropean countries’ compliance with international legal instruments without formal legal
relations based on international law.8 European powers needed to create mechanisms to
address these problems. European devised the standard of civilization to govern relations
with non-European countries because the standard provided a way to deal with nonEuropean countries under international law.
Gong pointed out that the standard of civilization developed to solve practical and
philosophical problems that arose as European influence expanded into non-European
countries.9 First, to address the practical problem of protecting European life, liberty, and
property in sometimes hostile non-European countries, the standard of civilization sought
to guarantee European nationals certain basic rights, the observance of which, at least in
relation to foreign nations, was expected from civilized states. Second, in response to the
philosophical problem of determining which countries deserved legal recognition,
personality, and sovereignty under international law, the standard of civilization provided
a doctrinal rational for limiting recognition in international law to those countries that
European states, rightly or wrongly, regarded as being civilized.10
To participate fully in international law, non-European countries had to transform
their political, economic, and legal systems to meet the demands of European imperial
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powers. Fidler notes that European powers used the standard of civilization to mandate
the reordering of non-European countries’ politics, laws, economics, and societies in the
image of the West.11 Non-European countries had to become Europeanized states that (1)
guaranteed basic rights, as understood in the West, for European nationals; (2) had an
organized political bureaucracy with the capacity to run governmental functions and
organize the country for self-defense in the model of European countries; (3) had a
Western-style domestic system of law, with courts and written codes of law, that
administered justice fairly within its territory; (4) had diplomatic resources and
institutions to allow the state to engage in international relations; (5) abided by
international law; and (6) conformed to the customs, norms, and mores accepted in
Western societies.12 In brief, these requirements that non-European countries faced
shifted the basis of recognition from the objective test of state existence to subjective
tests based on concepts of civilization.13
This mandate created by the standard of civilization contributed to the
development of some non-European countries in the directions emphasized by the
standard. Societal developments in non-European countries related to the standard of
civilization also directly served the interests of the European powers. The reordering
process of non-European governments, laws, economics, and societies protected
European nationals in non-European countries and their economic activities and interests.
According to the tenets of the standard of civilization, successful transformation meant
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that non-European countries, such as Japan, could eventually be recognized as civilized
countries and begin to have international legal personality under international law.14
However, Japan’s successful adaptation to the European standard of civilization
was an exceptional case in Asia prior to World War II. The more common case,
unfortunately, was the loss of the opportunity for non-European countries to participate in
the system of international law without having to abandon their own civilizational
heritages. To make matters worse, the efforts of European powers to bring true
civilization to the uncivilized non-European countries frequently involved brutal threats
of military force, a lesson non-European countries did not forget.15
Ironically, Japan, the most developed country in Asia from the viewpoint of the
European standard of civilization, resorted to military aggression and threats of violence
to establish its Dai To-A Kyoei Ken (大東亞共榮圈)’—literally “Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere.” Japanese scholars generally understand the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere as a rejection of Western universalism through the assertion of a vision
of Asian regionalism. For other Asian countries subject to Japan’s military aggression,
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere represented the continuation of imperial
domination, but this time with an Asian face.16
In addition, European application of the standard of civilization intentionally
deprived non-European countries of opportunities to make contributions to the substance
and operation of an international law reflecting diverse civilizations. The standard of
14
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civilization merely strengthened and refined the Western-centric system of international
law, a system that legitimized and sustained Western imperialism. In sum, from the nonWestern perspective, the European standard of civilization represented little more than
the stigma of being “uncivilized” as a matter of law and of power.

3.3 Neglect of Non-Western Civilizations in the Course of Promoting Western
Imperialism
Fidler emphasizes that the standard of European civilization should be understood
as the standard of Westphalian civilization because the concepts and mechanisms
imposed on non-European countries were not just the domestic adoption of European
civilization by non-European countries. The standard of civilization also sought to bring
non-Western societies into the Westphalian system of international politics, a system that
originated and evolved within Europe from the 17th century. Whether a state was
sufficiently able to comply with binding commitments under international law and
whether it was able and willing to protect adequately the life, liberty, and property of
Westerners were criteria for non-European countries to become a civilized country under
international law.17 The standard of Westphalian civilization propelled non-European
countries into the Westphalian system and its system of international law. This section
describes in more detail how this process of incorporation occurred.
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3.3.1 Unequal Treaties
The phenomenon of “unequal treaties” provides an example of how the standard
of Westphalian civilization used international law against uncivilized nations. Western
imperial powers would force non-European nations to sign and implement one-sided
treaties. Compliance with these unequal treaties became a test in deciding whether the
uncivilized nation was becoming more civilized, and thus able to honor treaty obligations
under the international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda (i.e., treaty commitment
shall be honored in good faith). Thus, a treaty that signified a non-European nation’s lack
of sovereignty and international legal personality could become the instrument for
civilizational redemption and for equal status in the law of nations. The entire dynamic
established by an unequal treaty reflected a rejection of the non-European country’s
interests, values, and aspirations arising from its own heritage and civilizational context.
Without the standard of civilization to justify these agreements, the unequal
treaties appear manifestly unjust in substance and process.18 Procedurally, unequal
treaties often resulted from threats of or actual uses of force by imperial powers.
Substantively, these treaties were grossly unfair in demanding far more from the nonEuropean country than the European power. Generally, unequal treaties all established a
system of extraterritorial jurisdiction known as capitulations (see more below) and fixed
tariff duties at specified levels, both of which were non-reciprocal and benefited only the
interests of the European country. Unequal treaties also included most-favored-nation
clauses, which gave a European country access to the best treatment any other imperial
power received under any unequal treaty. Unequal treaties also often contained
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concession provisions that enabled foreign enterprises to receive benefits in mining,
railways, and shipping. In some cases, unequal treaties even granted the cession or lease
of territory to foreign powers.19 The Treaty of Nanking provides a good example of the
unfairness and unjustness of unequal treaties. First, the Treaty of Nanking was concluded
under a Western threat to bombard Nanking. Second, China was forced to accept very
unfavorable terms, including provisions governing low tariff rates and extraterritorial
jurisdictions inside China for Western countries.20

3.3.2 The System of Capitulations
A closer look at the system of capitulations often imposed through unequal
treaties proves revealing with respect to the depth of the rejection of non-European
concepts of law, justice and government found in the standard of civilization. In brief,
the system of capitulations was a system of extraterritorial jurisdiction and power wielded
by Western powers in the territories on non-Western countries.21 The basic function of
the system of capitulations was to provide a Westernized foundation for facilitating
economic interaction between civilized and uncivilized nations. Capitulations allowed
this economic interaction to penetrate non-Western societies more deeply, permitting a
wider scope for Western intervention into the affairs of uncivilized nations. Fidler
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provides one description of how capitulations worked between the United States and
Japan in the 19th century:

Under the 1858 treaty between the United States and Japan, the two countries
agreed to open American consular courts to Japanese creditors of Americans
and open Japanese courts to American citizens with claims against Japanese
nationals. The different American and Japanese rules on breach of contract
were not harmonized under capitulations, but Americans could not be subject
to the compulsory jurisdiction of Japanese courts in connection with civil
claims against them by Japanese nationals. Japanese nationals wanting to
pursue claims against Americans had to learn the rules and procedures
required under the American law applied by the consular court.22

Beyond the reach of civil and criminal law of non-Western countries,
capitulations established extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Western country within the
uncivilized state.23 The standard of civilization justified this extraterritorial jurisdiction
because the merchants and business enterprises of European states could not be subject to
the legal systems of uncivilized countries, even within the territory of the uncivilized
nations. Thus, the Western powers planted a bit of civilization in the uncivilized country
until that country became civilized.
As between unequal treaties and capitulations, capitulations had the sharper
civilization edge because through capitulations Western countries rejected the application
22
23
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of legal and judicial concepts alien to European civilization. Unequal treaties reflected
unequal power. Unequal treaties containing the system of capitulations reflected the
perceived inferiority of non-Western law and concepts of justice. Becoming civilized by
complying with unequal treaties meant, in the long run, changing legal and justices
systems comprehensively in the image of the West.
Capitulatory regimes began the process of introducing the basic rules and
principles of Western legal systems to non-Western countries. This introduction
represents an early version of global legal harmonization. However, such a
harmonization process deprived non-Western countries of the opportunity to make their
voices heard in formulating what Yasuaki calls an “intercivilizational” approach to
international law.24 This history of unequal treaties and capitulations has made many
non-Western countries suspicious about international law because unequal treaties and
the capitulatory system were created and imposed under the name of international law.
From the viewpoints of non-Western countries, international law was regarded as a
weapon of a powerful and greedy Western civilization seeking to impose its interests and
influence on non-Western countries. Non-Western countries could not regard
international law as a forum for facilitating the interactive and cooperative exchanges
among different civilizations.

3.3.3 The Aftermath of the Standard of Civilization
As implemented through techniques such as unequal treaties and capitulations, the
standard of civilization played a significant role in helping the system of international law

24

Yasuaki, supra note 20, p. 1.

48

inflict on many non-Western societies feelings of humiliation, injustice, and inferiority.
Part of the aftermath of the standard of civilization in international law is a lingering
failure to embrace international law fully by those countries once labeled and treated as
uncivilized. This failure is historically understandable, but it has consequences for not
only understanding the past but also shaping the future of international law. The next
section of this chapter explores the lingering legacy of the standard of civilization in
today’s world and today’s attitudes towards international law. This legacy keeps the
relationship between international law and concepts of civilization alive and pertinent,
even if the relationship no longer appears as prominently and provocatively as it once did.

3.4 The Legacy of Western-Centric Civilization in the Age of Globalization: The
Standard of Global Civilization
3.4.1 Emergence of a New Standard of Civilization?
The standard of civilization, which once prevailed in the period of colonialism,
seems to have disappeared during and after the decolonization process. During this
process, non-Western countries made robust attempts to crowd out the legacy of the
standard of civilization in international law. Non-Western countries took an active part in
suggesting new concepts of international law, such as permanent sovereignty over natural
resources and the New International Economic Order. The efforts of non-Western
countries to accommodate their interests bore fruit in United Nations (UN) resolutions
affirming the interests and perspectives of non-Western countries.25 Using their majority
25
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in the UN, developing countries challenged the rules and principles of international law
designed to favor Western countries and took the initiative to re-shape new international
law to reflect more appropriately the interests of Third World countries.26
As a result of these and other developments, the standard of civilization in
international law appears to have evaporated. Unequal treaties and the system of
capitulations have become relics of the past. Under the fundamental rules and principles
of contemporary international law, treaties cannot be created through coercion or that
contain racial and ethnic prejudices. Every state, regardless of its region, culture, and
civilization, stands equal before international law as a member of international society.
The standard of civilization in international law, which once justified the treatment of
societies as uncivilized seems to have been abandoned.
However, believing that the standard of civilization can only be found in the
history books may be premature. If we look closely at contemporary developments in
international law and international relations, we can discern something like the old
standard of civilization at work within the processes of globalization. Through
globalization, many of the same countries and peoples that endured the old standard of
civilization now face a potentially new standard—the standard of global civilization.27

International Economic Order (Holmes & Meier 1979). The New International Economic Order
was advanced through a number of key UN General Assembly resolutions and declarations
including the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA Res. 3281, 29 GAOR,
Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030, p. 50 (1974), and the Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, UNGA Res. 3201, 6th Spec. Sess GAOR, Supp 1. U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974).
26
Analysis of The Third World countries’ various efforts to bring in fresh air to existing rules and
principles of international law can be found in D. Fidler, Revolt Against or From Within the West?
TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of International Law, 2 Chinese J. Int’l L.
29 (2003) [hereinafter Fidler, TWAIL], pp. 34-38. See also the analysis of these efforts in Chapter
4 of this thesis.
27
Fidler, Return of Standard, supra note 11, pp. 146-147.

50

Although different in many respects, Western imperialism and globalization share
some common characteristics. The extension of trade and economic intercourse is to
Western imperialism what the dominance of neo-liberal economic policies is to
emergence of globalization.28 Neo-liberal economic policies gradually became the global
norm after the Cold War and accelerated the spread of capitalism. Like unequal treaties
and the capitulation system in the period of Western imperialism, virtually every type of
socio-political policy of developing countries has come under hegemonic scrutiny from
the West.
From the perspective of many Third World countries, neo-liberal political and
economic pressure to reform social, economic, and political structures in the image of the
West appear as the resurrection of Western predatory imperialism.29 The use of
international law to imbue globalization with neo-liberal political and economic policies
and strategies has been undertaken by major international organizations, such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).30 Amin argues, for example, that globalization can be understood as another stage
of Western imperialism which has in common with its predecessors the goals of
achieving control of expanding markets, the looting of the world’s natural resources, and
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the super-exploitation of the labor reserves found in the Third World countries.31 More
specifically, Chimni critically highlights:

The threat of re-colonization is haunting the world. The process of
globalization has had deleterious effect on the welfare of third world peoples.
International law is playing a crucial role in helping legitimize and sustain the
unequal structures and processes that manifest themselves in the growing
north-south divide … Indeed, international law is the principal language in
which domination is coming to be expressed in the era of globalization.32

The standard of global civilization suggests a potentially more radical and farreaching post-Westphalian vision than the old standard of Westphalian civilization. Like
the old standard, the new standard of global civilization pushes Third World countries to
satisfy political, economic, and legal requirements in how those countries function.
These requirements constitute the elements informing the standard of global civilization,
such as strengthening free trade, establishing good governance and the rule of law, and
protecting human rights.33 The most important requirements of the standard of global
civilization can be summarized into two parts: good governance through democracy and

31

S. Amin, Imperialism and Globalization, 53 Monthly Rev. 6 (2001), p. 9.
B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto,” in The Third World
and International Order: Law, Politics, and Globalization (A. Anghie, et al. eds., Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 2003), p. 47.
33
Fidler, Return of Standard, supra note 11, p. 147. See also, K. Jayasuria, Globalization, Law,
and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergency of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 Ind.
J. Global Legal Stud. 425 (1999); D. Shelton, Symposium: Globalization & The Erosion of
Sovereignty in Honour of Professor Lichtenstein: Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World,
25 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 273 (2002).
32

52

human rights, and economic prosperity through market-based, globally oriented
economic strategies.
First, good governance has become a powerful norm globally applicable to all
peoples and societies. The radical changes triggered by globalization have brought about
extensive debates about how the basic issues of governance within countries and among
them—accountability, transparency, participation—may be resolved in the context of the
global political economy.34 From the perspective of international law, good governance
involves the establishment of democratic, open, accountable and transparent governments
that respect and promote human rights and the rule of law.35 The emphasis on democratic
governance as legitimate and good governance highlights a particular understanding of
human rights. After the Cold War, this perspective on human rights claims to provide an
authoritative and universal understanding of human rights, as illustrated by the famous
“End of History” thesis.36 This understanding of human rights represents foremost the
Western ideas of individual liberty and representative, constitutional democracy.
Second, many developments since the end of the Cold War highlight the triumph
of Western ideas about the best way to achieve economic growth and prosperity. These
developments include the large-scale transitions of formerly socialist economies to
34
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market-based economies, the expansion of the liberal international trading system
through the establishment of the WTO, and the controversial application by international
financial institutions of structural adjustment policies on developing countries. These
phenomena collectively represent structural and political forces that rival the old system
of capitulations.
Although globalization operates differently from imperialism, the new standard of
global civilization exists as a way to determine the level of the political and economic
development of human societies. The criteria used to inform this determination largely, if
not exclusively, emanate from a Western understanding of democracy, governance,
economic developments, and human rights. Moreover, this Western understanding
proclaims its universality because it applies to all peoples and societies. This view
disregards social, economic, and political differences between Western developed
countries and non-Western countries. In addition, the Western view does not allow much
tolerance or a margin of appreciation for the non-Western view on what qualities as
acceptable for human and social development.37
This situation is not conducive to non-Western perspectives on these governance
and economic questions, and this climate echoes to same degree the reality under the old
standard of civilization. What fundamentally differs today, however, is that not all nonWestern regimes of the world are poor and without power vis-à-vis the West. In this
regard, the acknowledged rise of Asia to political and economic prominence provides a
context not witnessed during the period of Western imperialism. Considering Asia’s rise
37
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with respect to the new standard of global civilization proves, therefore, to be an
important and interesting analytical task.

3.4.2 Asia and the Standard of Global Civilization
The economic success of many Asian countries has brought these countries
material importance qualitatively different from the material significance of Asia to
Western imperialists. Yet, Asian economic progress is perhaps not sufficient for many of
these countries to satisfy the new standard of global civilization, especially with respect
to democracy, good governance, and human rights. Lack of confidence in Asia’s
economic and political progress appeared in reactions to the 1997 financial crisis in Asia.
Western notions of good governance were frequently offered as the solution to preventing
a similar crisis in the future, and here we can see the fingerprints of the standard of global
civilization. Anghie sensed these tensions and observed:

The attack on these Asian system of governance, through the arguments
relating to ‘democratic governance’ and ‘legitimate governance’ was seen,
then as an attempt to undermine the conditions that had resulted in this Asian
success, which challenged the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union
decisively established the universal and enduring validity of the Western
liberal-democratic system.38
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Similarly, when it comes to protecting and promoting human rights, more
complex problems arise. Specifically for Asian countries, the core problems concerning
human rights improvements center on the debate concerning “Asian values.”39 Asian
countries generally assert that human rights discourse tends to emphasize universal
application of the Western understanding of human rights and marginalizes significant
differences between Western and other understanding of human rights.40 Although
human rights advocates emphasize the interdependence of two different kinds of human
rights—civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights—the realization
of human rights still heavily depends on the material capabilities of each country. Some
countries pay more attention to civil and political rights than economic, social, and
cultural rights, while others take economic, social and cultural rights more seriously than
civil and political rights.
Under the influence of Western liberalism, particular understandings of human
rights that prioritize civil and political rights become influential and authoritative globally.
These understandings tend to emphasize the importance of democracy, and democracy
becomes the pre-condition for enjoying other human rights in every country. In this
context, alternative understandings of human rights that emphasize social, economic, and
cultural rights over civil and political rights face scrutiny within the dominant Western
perspective on priorities in human rights protection. The economic success Asia
experienced did not immunize Asian countries from harsh judgments in the aftermath of
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. These judgments provoked controversies familiar from
39
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the debates about structural adjustment programs international financial institutions
forced on transition economies and developing countries. The attempt to reform
economic structure in transition and developing countries through structural adjustment
policies has been severely criticized by anti-globalization movements.41 Much of the
criticism highlights that the reach of structural adjustment policies is not limited to
matters of economic reformation. Implementing structural adjustment policies requires
changes in the social and political realms as well. For example, deregulation,
privatization, and trade liberalization advanced by structural adjustment policies cannot
be achieved without modifying or revising laws relating to a vast area of government
policy. Strictly speaking, the request of the World Bank for countries to reform social,
political and economic policies deviates from its competence. The World Bank is
prohibited by its Articles of Agreement from interfering in the political affairs of a
recipient state.42 However, the scope of the impact of structural adjustment policies is
justified to realize the multidimensional elements of achieving good governance. Anghie
argues that “[B]y asserting that economic development depends on good governance, on
the political system of a country, the World Bank can justify formulating an entirely new
set of initiatives that seeks explicitly to reform the political institutions of a recipient state,
on the basis that such reform is necessary to achieve development, the central concern of
the World Bank.”43
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In the eyes of critics, structural adjustment polices have created many problems,
such as producing more poverty in some developing countries.44 For purposes of this
chapter, the manner in which structural adjustment policies imposed a Westernized
perspective on politics and economics on developing countries is a primary concern.
Structural adjustment policies to a large degree encroach upon the sovereignty of
developing countries, in the Westphalian sense of sovereignty. The economic plans of
Third World countries are restricted within narrow limits allowed by structural
adjustment policies. In addition, structural adjustment policies produce many problems,
such as distortions of the labor market, increases in the gap between rich and poor, and
suffering among the working class. Chimni criticizes structural adjustment policies for
their repressive and selective characteristics. Under structural adjustment policies, the
political struggles of the working class are regarded as movements that should be
suppressed.45 Thus, only protection of liberal civil and political rights is allowed, and
room for promoting economic, social, and cultural rights is reduced. This selective
approach to human rights contributes to distortions in priorities accorded to different
kinds of human rights.
By emphasizing neo-liberal economic reformation, structural adjustment policies
do not pay attention to traditional aspects of economic structures of non-Western
countries. From the perspective of neo-liberal economic reformation, the traditional
structures in Asian economies, such as support for life-time employment, and an
emphasis on family-based business management, are the source of inefficiencies and
44
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corruption and should, thus, be changed. The proponents of neo-liberal economic
reformation explicitly pointed out that the origins of the Asian economic crisis in 1997
were found in traditional economic structures of Asian countries.

3.5 Conclusion
The standard of global civilization, which is represented by the post-Cold War
emphasis on good governance and structural adjustment policies, is not as overtly harsh
on non-Western countries as the old standard of Westphalian civilization. The standard of
global civilization does not resort to the racism that influenced unequal treaties and the
system of capitulations to realize its objectives. However, as noted earlier, substantial
similarities exist between the old standard of Westphalian civilization and the new
standard of global civilization. These similarities appear in the common approach of
selecting Western ideas of governance, economics, and law as the standards against
which other countries and societies are measured. The process through which countries
are measured is different, with the old standard of civilization driven by imperialism and
the new standard of global civilization propelled by globalization. These different
processes do not undermine the fact that transition and developing countries are measured
globally by standards largely Western in origin. As under the old standard of civilization,
the new measurement process makes extensive use of international law.
Although less violent and racist, the advent of the standard of global civilization
does not necessarily mark the emergence of an inter-civilizational understanding of
international law. Through globalization, societies are, willing or not, being brought
together increasingly as one civilization, but the standard for that civilization does not
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necessarily reflect the diversity of civilizations that still inform government policies,
social dynamics, and individual behavior today. Whether moving towards an
international law that reflects a civilizational dialogue as opposed to a Westernized
monologue is feasible is explored in the remaining chapters of this thesis, with Asia as the
case study.
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Chapter 4. Critical Theory and International Law:
The Emergence and Importance of Third World Approaches
to International Law (TWAIL)
4.1 Introduction
The problem identified in Chapter 3 of a lack of impact on international law from
non-Western countries and cultures has contributed to the development of an entire
school or approach to studying international law called Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL). This chapter focuses on TWAIL because this set of
approaches constitutes the most important critical theoretical work focused on
international law relevant to analyzing whether an Asian perspective on international law
and global governance is emerging. This thesis’ exploration of the possibilities of
bringing on an “Eastphalian” approach to bear on international law must consider the
conceptual critiques of past and present international law by TWAIL writers because
these critiques focus on why Western ideas and interests have dominated the development
of international law. As this chapter argues later, the TWAIL approach is not without
problems that limit its utility, particular its utility in plotting out strategies for the future
operation of international law. Nevertheless, the Asian-specific focus of this thesis must
grapple with the most prominent theoretical arguments critiquing the historical and
contemporary nature of international law largely from the perspective of the developing
world.

61

4.2 TWAIL: Challenging History, Changing Theory
TWAIL is an international law methodology and joins other approaches, such as
positivism, policy-oriented jurisprudence, International Legal Process, Critical Legal
Studies, international law and international relations, feminist jurisprudence, and law and
economics.1 Mutua ascribes TWAIL as a “broad dialectic of opposition to international
law” that resists the illegitimate, predatory, oppressive, and unjust regime of international
law.2 Gathii notes that “[T]hird world positions exist in opposition to, and as a limit on,
the triumphal universalism of the liberal/conservative consensus in international law.”3
However, the critical attitude of TWAIL to the prevailing system of international law is
not a new phenomenon in international legal analysis. Fidler indicates that “[T]WAIL
1
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rejuvenates the opposition to aspects of international law expressed by Third World states
and intellectuals during the process of decolonization and attempts to sharpen such
opposition in the era of globalization.”4
For the purpose of opposition to existing forms of international law, TWAIL
embraces various arguments criticizing the Western domination of international law.
TWAIL links with other international law methodologies, such as Critical Legal Studies,5
feminist jurisprudence,6 Critical Race Theory,7 and Marxism8 that also criticize existing
rules and principles of international law. Although the diversity of ideas informing
TWAIL gives rise to a question of the approach’s internal coherence,9 TWAIL has its own
distinct qualities as an international legal methodology. Although scholars working under
the name of TWAIL do not necessarily share similar political, economic, or ideological
beliefs,10 TWAIL scholars tend to align their arguments to demonstrate the vulnerability
of Third World countries and peoples to the power politics perpetrated by the great
powers.11
4
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Okafor notes that “[T]WAIL scholars are solidly united by a shared ethical
commitment to intellectual and practical struggle to expose, reform, or even retrench
those features of the international legal system that helps create or maintain the generally
unequal, unfair, or unjust global order”.12 The sensitivity of TWAIL to the effects of
power politics flows from the traumatic experience of non-Western countries to
colonialism and imperialism. TWAIL scholars commonly emphasize that this historical
perspective should be taken seriously to gain a correct understanding of the current
features of, and debate about, the international system. According to Okafor, TWAIL is
concerned to expose the continuities and discontinuities in the historical development of
international legal norms, structures, claims, or rules for the purpose of better
understanding the ways in which they facilitate the serious advantages that Third World
peoples suffer.13
Moreover, TWAIL pays considerable attention to relations among the great
powers and the ways in which international rules or institutions actually affect the
distribution of power between states and peoples.14 Indicating that the interests of Third
World countries and peoples have been sacrificed for the interests of Western powers,
TWAIL stresses the equality of Third World countries and peoples. TWAIL demands that
international law and international relations should take seriously the position that Third
World countries and peoples deserve no less dignity, no less security, and no less rights or
benefits from international action than do citizens of Western countries seriously.15
TWAIL is suspicious the notion of “universality” or “common humanity,” which Western
12
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perspectives on international law often claim. From the TWAIL perspective, Western
countries emphasis on the universality of international law is another guise that facilitates
and justifies the marginalization and exploitation of Third World countries and peoples
for the interests of Western countries.
In the age of globalization, fearing the resurrection of Western domination over
the world through neo-liberalism, TWAIL strongly suggests achieving solidarity among
Third World countries to oppose the development of yet another unjust global order.16
For this purpose, Mutua explains TWAIL’s three basic objectives:

The first is to understand, deconstruct, and unpack the uses of international
law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy of
international norms and institutions that subordinate non-Europeans to
Europeans. Second, it seeks to construct and present an alternative normative
legal edifice for international governance. Finally, TWAIL seeks through
scholarship, policy, and politics to eradicate the conditions of
underdevelopment in the Third World.17

Associating the impact of globalization with Western hegemony, TWAIL scholars
seek to foster and spread a new perspective on international law. The efforts of TWAIL
scholars to fight against the perceived Western hegemonic perspective on international
law can be categorized in two parts. First, TWAIL scholars seek to criticize the use of
international law to solidify and perpetuate Western domination over the world. Second,
16
17
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TWAIL scholars seek to identify, promote, and establish the grounds for a posthegemonic global order which reflects the interests of Third World and its peoples.18
For theses reasons, TWAIL is important to study for purpose of this thesis.
TWAIL’s objectives echo issues analyzed in Chapter 3 associated with the impact of
standard of civilization on international law. TWAIL seeks to identify the injustices
perpetrated through international law in the past, to prevent the resurrection of this past
history, and to change international law so that it is not monopolized by Western concepts,
power, and hegemony.
As this chapter explores more below, the TWAIL approach to international law
generates as many questions as insights. TWAIL’s strength is an ability to identify unjust
practices, policies, and principles in the past and present. This strength makes TWAIL
powerful in opposing inaccurate understandings of history and complacency about the
status quo. TWAIL is, however, less impressive where guidance about the future is
required. At times, TWAIL writings can seem so hostile towards the interests and
behavior of Western countries that collaborative dealings with the West in the future seem
hopeless. TWAIL’s oppositional attitude also often makes TWAIL criticism appears
reactive and “backwards looking” rather than proactive and prescriptive about realistic
strategies for heightening the voice of the Third World in international law. The fastmoving nature of globalization highlights how TWAIL appears at times to be lagging
behind the cutting edge of global politics and international law’s role in it.
When TWAIL thinking does achieve forward-looking analysis, the results are
often much less impressive than its oppositional critiques of existing problems. This type
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of prescriptive weakness is not peculiar to TWAIL, but the weaknesses weigh heavily on
TWAIL because TWAIL writers believe they and others have a duty not only to right past
wrongs but also to establish a new post-hegemonic international law and global order that
reflects greater cultural and civilizational pluralism.

4.3 The Third World’s Revolt Against the West: A Vision of Pluralism in
International Law
Technically speaking, “TWAIL” refers to a deliberate movement among
international legal scholars and activists that formally began in the 1990s. Of course,
critiques of international law from Third World perspective extend back at least to the
period of decolonization. These earlier Third World critiques of international law did not
refer to TWAIL on any overarching name, but these critiques reflect the same objectives
of the later TWAIL movement – to identify past and present injustices and to seek a more
equitable system of international law that reflected Third World interests and values.

4.3.1 Third World Critiques of International Law from the Period of Decolonization
According to Anghie and Chimni, Third World critiques during decolonization
paid considerable attention to formulating strategies to fight against the dominant
Western perspective on international law. First, recalling the tragic experiences of Third
World countries and peoples under Western colonialism and imperialism, Third World
writers and thinkers highlighted how the colonial characteristics of international law
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legitimized the West’s subjugation and oppression of Third World countries and
peoples.19
Second, these advocates attempted to rectify Western countries’ assumptions that
pre-colonial Third World countries were strangers to norms and principles of
international law. Third World scholars analyzed historical records and revealed nonWestern countries’ using their own forms of “international law” within their non-Western
“international relations” before the arrival of Western imperialism.20
Third, Third World critics stressed that the contents of international law should be
transformed to take into account the needs and aspirations of the peoples of the newly
independent states. For the purpose of transforming international law to reflect the
interests of Third World states and peoples, advocates focused on the United Nations
(UN), specifically producing UN General Assembly resolutions, to foster the changes
necessary to make a more just world order.21 These uses of UN General Assembly
resolutions brought about new debates on the sources of international law.22
Fourth, given the fear of domination by the Western powers and the need to build
up newly independent states, Third World proponents strongly relied on the fundamental
principle of the Westphalian system – state sovereignty. The emphasis on state
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sovereignty raised the importance of the principles of sovereign equality of states and
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states.23
Fifth, Third World advocates stressed the importance of the economic
development of Third World states. They argued that political independence did not
guarantee true liberation of Third World countries from the Western powers. In addition,
they kept a critical eye on the prevailing inequalities between the North and South. These
economic efforts bore fruit in the principles of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources, changes to the international law on foreign direct investment, and the push for
the New International Economic Order (NIEO).24

4.3.2 Components of the “Revolt against the West”: Procedural and Substantive
Initiatives by Third World Countries
Fidler observed that the efforts of Third World writers on international law
connected to a larger political phenomenon of decolonization, what Hedley Bull called
the “revolt against the West.”25 According to Fidler, the revolt against West sought the
pluralization of the existing Westphalian civilization.26 Third World strategies to
incorporate a more pluralistic vision in international law focused on procedural and
substantial aspects of international law. Procedurally, developing countries sought to
change the hegemonic process through which the Western powers historically made and
implemented international law. Procedural reformation of international law was backed
up by Third World countries’ growing quantitative presence in international organizations,
23
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such as the UN. The numerical majority enjoyed by Third World countries in
international organizations prevented the great powers of the West from making
international law in those organizations for the interests of Western powers and provided
a means to promote the interests of Third World countries.27
In addition to this procedural pluralization, Third World advocates attempted to
undertake a paradigm shift in the substantive content of international law in a number of
important areas. The prevailing Western perspective on international law came under
fierce Third World attacks. Substantively, these attacks sought to generate more
pluralism into the norms and principles of international law, which had always been
designed by and for Western countries. Third World efforts at pluralism of existing
norms and principles of international law can be found in various areas of international
law, such as the principle of self-determination, the prohibition of intervention in
domestic affairs of other states, international law on foreign direct investment,
international trade law, the law of the sea, and the establishment of the NIEO.28

Principle of Self-Determination
Although the principle of self-determination existed before the process of
decolonization,29 the Third World emphasized the importance of the principle as a shield
against social, economic, and political neo-colonial influences of Western powers.30
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Before Third World emphasis on the principle of self-determination, this principle was
understood as the insistence that the government be responsible to the people. Woodrow
Wilson, former president of the United States argued that self-determination was the
logical corollary of popular sovereignty. He argued that the principle of selfdetermination was synonymous with the principle that governments must be based on
“the consent of the governed.”31 Emphasizing the autonomy of Third World countries to
establish their governments in ways reflecting the interests of their peoples, the Third
World had a powerful legal and moral weapon to block Western influence and create
political, economic, legal, and cultural space for the states and peoples of the Third World
to determine their own destinies, not destinies determined by colonial powers and
civilizational prejudice.32 In addition, Third World countries played a significant role in
elevating the principle of self-determination to the status jus cogens in international law.33
The main focus within the principle of self-determination was changed by the Third
World countries from the establishment of responsible governments reflecting interests of
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the governed to protection of Third World countries’ sovereignty from the influences of
Western powers.
Third World countries’ arguments for self-determination were not sufficient to
guarantee their social, economic and political independence from Western domination.
Reinforcing and elevating the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of
other states was also needed to promote the independence of Third world countries from
the influence of the Western powers.34 Although the purposes of non-intervention and
self-determination originated in European ideas about international law, Third World
efforts to embrace, re-orient, and apply these principles to suit the needs of Third World
states universalized and pluralized them for the benefit of Third World countries and
peoples.35 Affected by the efforts of Third World countries, the scope of the principle of
non-intervention was substantively expanded. Third World countries’ efforts to expand
the scope of the principle of non-intervention were well illustrated in UN General
Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations.36 Third World countries efforts to
emphasize the principle of non-intervention make this principle a powerful shield against
the advocacy of humanitarian intervention, specifically unilateral intervention through the
use of force.37
34
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International Law on Foreign Direct Investment
Third World efforts to change international law appeared in many specific areas,
especially in areas that touched upon economic sovereignty and economic development.
The efforts of Third World countries to change the international law on foreign
investment are recognized as a good example of Third World countries’ attack on the
Western domination of international law.38 From the Third World’s perspective, the
international law on foreign investment allowed Western developed countries to
subordinate the economic sovereignty of Third World countries to the interests of Western
developed countries and corporations. Third World countries rejected the customary
international law on foreign direct investment that gave extensive protection to foreign
investments of capital-exporting countries. By giving extensive protection to capitalexporting states, Third World countries argued that traditional international law on
foreign direct investment undermined the effective exercise of their sovereignty in the
economic realm. For the purpose of exercising their economic sovereignty, Third World
countries particularly attempted to change rules and principles concerning nationalization
and expropriation. Third World countries’ emphasis on “permanent sovereignty” over
economic resources undermined traditional international law on foreign direct investment,
which was designed for the economic interests of developed countries. This attempt of
Third World countries resulted in replacing and narrowing the scope of the Hull Doctrine
of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriation.39 Through the
attempts of Third World countries to change the rules of international law on foreign
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direct investment, the host government, generally of Third World countries, had more
latitude in assessing the appropriate level of compensation and determining the necessity
of foreign direct investment for their own interests rather than those of capital-exporting
countries. By redirecting the focus of international law on foreign investment from the
interests of capital-exporting countries to the interests of host countries, Third World
countries succeeded in changing characteristics of international law on foreign direct
investment.

International Trade Law
In addition to changing international law on foreign investment, Third World
countries also worked to change international trade law, especially as embodied in the
major body of such law found in the General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Originally, GATT did not pay much attention to the needs of developing countries
because key GATT rules (e.g., the most favored-nation (MFN) principle) applied without
regard to the economic conditions of contracting parties. In other words, GATT rules
have non-discriminatory characteristics because they applied equally to all contracting
parties, which as sovereign states had equal rights and duties under international law.
However, this legal formality of GATT confronted the reality that Third World countries
did not have the same economic power and level of development compared with
developed countries. This formality of GATT was affected as more Third World
countries became GATT contracting parties.
In particular, Third World countries began to attack the formality of GATT and to
suggest special and differential treatment for developing countries within GATT. The
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request for special and differential treatment meant creating an exception for the MFN
principle, one of the core obligations of GATT. The efforts to incorporate special and
differential treatment into GATT bore fruit when the contracting parties added Part IV on
“Trade and Development” to GATT in the mid-1960s, under which developed GATT
countries agreed to permit special and differential treatment for trade in goods originating
in developing countries.40 Third World countries’ efforts to make an exception for the
MFN principle resulted in enacting a ten-year waiver of the MFN principle in 1971 to
exempt Generalized Systems of Preference (GSP) efforts from the application of this
principle, a waiver the GATT contracting parties made permanent in 1979 by adopting
the Enabling Clause. Supported by the Enabling Clause, which provides much greater
leeway for developed countries to discriminate in favor of developing countries,41 Third
World leaders succeeded in incorporating special and differential treatment into
international trade law and achieved substantive pluralization of international law by
allowing the rules to reflect levels of economic development rather than just reflecting
the formal legal equality of states.42

Law of the Sea
Third World countries also launched initiatives to transform the substantive
content of the law of the sea, an area of international law long dominated by Western
maritime powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States. In this area of
40
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international law, Third World countries supported two new concepts for the law of the
sea – the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)43 and the common heritage of mankind
(CHM).44 Through the EEZ and CHM, Third World countries brought pluralism to the
content and the process of the law of the sea.45 The main impetus of Third World
countries’ advocacy for the EEZ and CHM can be found in their desire to have access to
the resources in EEZ and CHM and to prevent their monopolization by more powerful
developed countries.46
Prior to the emergence of the EEZ concept, living and non-living resources
beyond the limits of the territorial sea were exploited extensively by Western developed
countries because (1) the law of the sea held that these living and non-living resources
fell under the principle of the freedom of the high seas, meaning that any nation was free
to exploit the resources; and (2) Western countries generally had more resources and
better technology to harvest or access such resources. Thus, developing coastal states’
access to living and non-living resources beyond the limits of the territorial sea was
affected by the way the law of the sea governed these resources. However, after the
emergence of the EEZ concept, and by declaring under this concept exclusive jurisdiction
over economic resources out to 200 nautical miles from the coast, developing coastal
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states gained control over resources in their EEZs and succeeded in gaining jurisdiction
over activities of Western developed countries in their EEZs.47

New International Economic Order
In many ways, Third World efforts to establish the NIEO captured the many facets
of the movement to bring pluralism to the substantive rules and principles of international
law. Under the NIEO, Third World countries sought to transform the way in which
international law regulated economic intercourses between states. Fidler indicates that
“[T]he various efforts on this issue converged in the NIEO, which laid out an alternative
vision for economic relations between states that stressed strong principles of sovereignty
and non-intervention, national control over foreign investment, and the need to have
economic policy recognized the development challenges faced by developing
countries.”48 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which is regarded as
one of the key NIEO documents, embraces the efforts of Third World to change existing
rules and principles of international law.49 The principle of self-determination is
emphasized as the governing rule for economic and political relations among states.50
Stressing every state’s right to choose its economic, political, social and cultural system
based on the will of its people without outside interference, the Charter of Economic
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Rights and Duties of States clearly indicates the importance of the principle of nonintervention.51
With regard to foreign direct investment, the Charter of Rights and Duties of
States highlights the national jurisdiction of host countries for regulating foreign direct
investment, including the issue concerning compensation.52 Emphasizing the necessity of
extending, improving and enlarging the system of generalized non-reciprocal and nondiscriminatory tariff preferences to the developing countries, the Charter of Rights and
Duties of States clearly supports special and different treatment for developing countries
in international trade relations.53 With respect to law of the sea, the Charter of Rights and
Duties of States describes the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the area, as the common
heritage of mankind.54

International Human Rights Law
With regard to human rights, Third World countries’ efforts to incorporate
economic, social, and cultural rights into the realm of international human rights can be
regarded as another attempt of Third World countries to achieve the pluralization of
international law. Under the Western liberal perspective on human rights, the importance
of economic, social, and cultural rights was not stressed as much as civil and political
rights. The Western subordination of economic, social, and cultural rights reflected the
problems associated with these rights, such as questions about their justiciability, the
51
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vagueness of the substances of these rights, and the problems with creating international
mechanisms to facilitate their implementation.
The Western perspective human rights came under attack by Third World
countries for its distorted emphasis on civil and political rights. With supports of the
countries from the Soviet bloc, Third World countries exerted influence to elevate the
importance of economic, social, and cultural rights.55 Third World countries’ efforts to
highlight the importance of economic, social, and cultural rights were asserted in
international forums and these efforts included requests for extensive assistance from
developed countries for enhancing the conditions of developing countries to fulfill
economic, social, and cultural rights. For instance, Third World countries stressed the
imperative need for multilateral cooperation and assistance in implementing the socioeconomic development programmes of the non-aligned and other developing countries.56
Informed by the perspective of cultural relativism, Third World countries also
attacked the Western perspective on human rights based on liberalism by arguing that
communitarian values should be taken more seriously.57 Third World countries criticized
the perspective on the universality of human rights supported by Western countries,
which disregards the substantial differences among countries across social, economic,
political and philosophical dimensions. This attempt of Third World countries to attack
the Westernized spread of the universality of human rights is well demonstrated in the
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Bangkok Declaration on human rights. The preamble of the Bangkok Declaration which
was the result of a regional conference in preparation of the World Conference held prior
to a major world conference on human rights, states explicitly that states needed to stress
“the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of all human rights and the need to avoid
the application of double standards in the implementation of human rights and its
politicization.”58
In addition, Third World countries made a contribution to elevating the
importance of the right to development in international human rights law. Although
neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights nor the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights expressly contains the right to
development, many of the principles and rights specified in those treaties relate to the
right to development.59 Although Third World countries stressed the importance of
economic, social, and cultural rights, in reality, they confronted great obstacles in
fulfilling the tenets of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights owing to their low levels of economic development. This reality encouraged
developing countries to articulate the right to development, and the responsibilities of
developed countries to provide assistance under the right. Western developed countries
were strongly opposed to this new principle of international human rights law on the
ground that development was an economic objective and political aspiration; it did not
belong within the realm of human rights law.
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Despite the opposition of the Western developed countries, the UN General
Assembly adopted in 1969 the Declaration on Social Progress and Development which
listed the main conditions of social progress and development.60 The numerical majority
enjoyed by Third World countries in the UN brought about the elaboration and
development of the right to development through UN instruments. At the heart of these
efforts was the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD)
by the UN General Assembly in 1986.61 UNDRD is widely considered as a successful
attempt to define the right to development. Since the adoption of UNDRD, a series of
follow-up activities have been undertaken. These efforts finally bore fruit in the World
Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993.62 At this conference, states
reaffirmed that the right to development is a universal and inalienable human rights and
an integral part of the corpus of fundamental human rights.63

Summary on Pluralization Efforts by Third World Countries
Through these and other efforts, Third World countries and legal advocates
succeeded in forcing the international society to acknowledge that international law and
international relations cannot function effectively without considering the preferences the

60

See UNGA Res. 2542 (XXIV), Declaration on Social Progress and Development, available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/256/76/IMG/NR025676.pdf?OpenEleme
nt (last visited Aug. 8, 2008).
61
See UN Doc.A/RES/41/128 (1986), The UN Declaration on the Right to Development,
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2008).
62
A. Rosas, “The Right to Development,” in Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Textbook
(A. Eide, et al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995), p. 249.
63
See para. I/10 of UN. Doc.A/CONF.157/23 (1993), The Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action—The World Conference on Human Rights, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En (last visited Aug. 8,
2008).

81

interests, values, and cultures of Third World countries.64 The impact of these Third
World initiatives on international law during and immediately after the period of
decolonization was substantial, but, as explored later in this chapter, whether this impact
has proved lasting is a different question. Indeed, this question is what has created
difficulties for those doing TWAIL scholarship and advocacy during the post-Cold War
period.65

4.4 Withering Pluralism: Challenges of Globalization to TWAIL
The TWAIL movement in the 1990s reflected concerns about the structure and
dynamics of post-Cold War globalization from the perspective of Third World countries.
Indeed, despite the proliferation of TWAIL analyses, some TWAIL scholars have a
pessimistic view on the direction of TWAIL.66 This pessimism reflects a sense that
Western dominance in international law again has the upper hand and is promoting the
homogenization of the international society on the basis of Western neo-liberalism. This
homogenization directly threatens the heterogeneity favored by Third World pluralism in
international law. The impact of globalization helps obscure international law’s history
and promotes a new version of Western dominance justified through the language of the
“end of history.” According to Fidler, the difficulties TWAIL confronts are driven by the
intensified homogenization of Westphalian civilization through the increasing penetration
of Western liberal, democratic philosophical perspectives. These dynamics directly
64
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challenges Third World and TWAIL interests in having international law embody
procedural and substantive pluralism.67
Even the prominent TWAIL scholar Chimni believes that TWAIL has neither the
capacity to critique the emergent neo-liberal international law nor the ability to suggest an
alternative perspective on international law.68 Moreover, the scale and speed of
globalization, which resonates with the neo-liberal perspective increasingly affects the
daily lives of peoples around the world, including Third World peoples. In this context,
the attempts of TWAIL to highlight the distinctiveness of perspectives from Third World
countries and peoples rapidly lose their relevance because they cannot compete with the
homogenization liberalism fosters through globalization.69 Under the impact of this
homogenization, the very meaning of the term “Third World” has now been
destabilized.70 This section explores the travails of TWAIL and Third World perspectives
on international law in light of the post-Cold War emergence of globalization and the
return of Western hegemonic influence in world affairs.

4.4.1 Pluralization Lost?
As noted earlier in this chapter, both Third World critiques of international law
during decolonization and TWAIL aimed to increase the voice of the Third World in how
international law is made, interpreted, and applied. Although developing countries
continue to outnumber developed states, the post-Cold War period has stimulated new
67
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fears about the lack of effective Third World participation in international governance.
This lack of participation reduces the likelihood that Third World countries can influence
the procedural and substantive contexts of international law. The grand strategy of
bringing procedural and substantive pluralism to international law is in jeopardy in this
era of globalization. Evidence for this assertion can be found in what has happened to the
results of the push during decolonization and after for more procedural and substantive
pluralism in international law, a pluralism more aware and respectful of the interests,
ideas, and cultures of non-Western peoples.
During the period of Cold War, Third World countries used the principle of selfdetermination and the principle of non-intervention as shields against the power of
Western countries. For the purpose of excluding the influence of former colonizers, these
principles stressed the external characteristics of self-determination. In other words,
Third World countries used the principle of self-determination to focus on “external selfdetermination,” or freedom from foreign rule or control.71 Similarly, Third World
countries emphasized the principle of non-intervention to protect the supremacy of state
sovereignty. Given the history of colonialism and imperialism, the manner in which
Third World countries stressed their sovereignty through the principles of selfdetermination and non-intervention makes sense, but these positions proved ill-equipped
to deal with the changes that occurred after the Cold War and as globalization accelerated.
These two developments increasingly focused attention on what has happening inside
states, and the use of iron-clad principles of external self-determination and nonintervention no longer had the political traction they did during the Cold War.
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For example, too much emphasis on state sovereignty only increased scrutiny of
many problems inside developing countries. Under the propaganda of decolonization,
state building and respect for state sovereignty, authoritarian or dictatorial governments in
Third World countries engaged in the often brutal repression of their peoples. The desire
of Third World peoples to enjoy good governance reflecting their cultural preferences
was often ignored by governments that resorted to violence and authoritarianism.72
Large-scale human rights violations by authoritarian or dictatorial governments of Third
World countries could not be concealed or justified by incantations of the principle of
self-determination and the principle of non-intervention.
At the same time, new demands arose that called for the self-determination
principle and non-intervention principle to reflect the realities produced by the end of the
Cold War and the impact of globalization. Specifically, the manner in which
globalization penetrates domestic societies, the reinvigorated human rights movement,
and the strength of demands for democratic governments all over the world challenged
the very the foundation of the self-determination principle and non-intervention principle
as articulated by the Third World decades before. The principle of self-determination in
the age of globalization now appears to have legitimacy only if it embraces internal selfdetermination, which links directly to a human right to democratic governance.73
Economically, similar developments meant that attitudes about economic development in
the Third World included the acceptance of seeking radical internal governance changes
in Third World countries, as evidenced by the development and use of structural
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adjustment policies.74 The principle of non-intervention proved no obstacle to these
types of efforts to stimulate economic development in Third World countries after the
Cold War.
Other post-Cold War developments also challenged the Third World versions of
the principles of self-determination and non-intervention. One such development
involved the emerging preference for more international legal recognition of
humanitarian intervention, perhaps most famously embodied in the new responsibility to
protect doctrine.75 The increasing sense of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention, and
the promulgation of the concepts of a responsibility to intervene in the domestic affairs of
states, opened many Third World governments to intense scrutiny and potential military,
political, and economic interference from the Western great powers. In addition to the
challenges to Third World versions of the principle of self determination and the principle
of non-intervention, the pluralistic perspective on international law promoted by Third
World countries and TWAIL in many areas of international law has rapidly withered.
Globalization’s facilitation of Western-based homogenization in politics, governments,
economics and law accelerates the loss of pluralization in many areas of international law.
To return to initiatives pushed by the Third World, the EEZ, the CHM, and the NIEO,
once regarded as revolutionary Third World achievements in bringing pluralism and
diversity into international law, have lost their importance or disappeared entirely in the
post-Cold War period.
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For example, despite the strong belief of Third World countries, the EEZ does not
make a considerable impact on the fundamental redistribution of the ocean’s resources
because many coastal developed countries benefited enormously by claiming EEZs.76 In
addition, some African, Caribbean, and Middle Eastern countries came off badly because
their EEZs are poor in resources.77 The CHM was the main reason why the entry into
force of UNCLOS was delayed. It took over a decade to enter into force because
developed countries opposed the CHM concept, namely Part XI in UNCLOS. A
significant amendment to Part XI of UNCLOS occurred because of the opposition of
developed countries to Part XI. This amendment reflected the views of developed
countries on how resources in the deep sea-bed area should be exploited.78 Fidler notes
that “[O]n both the substantive rules on exploitation of deep sea-bed resources and the
economic benefits deep sea-bed mining would generate for developing countries through
international wealth redistribution, the Third World lost”.79
The NIEO is also regarded as a failed endeavor of Third World countries to bring
substantive pluralization to international law. The main elements of the NIEO strategy,
such as external self-determination, non-intervention, transformed rules on foreign direct
investment, special and differential treatment in international trade law, and exploitation
of resources of the deep sea-bed for the benefit of developing countries, turned out to be
irrelevant for advancing the interests of Third World countries and peoples.80
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The Third World’s accomplishment of embracing special and differential
treatment into international trade law has also lost much of its former luster. Trade
experts question whether special and differential treatment under GATT and other WTO
agreements really provides developing countries with any sustained economic benefits.
The move from GATT to the WTO has simply increased the pressure in developing
countries to abide by the rules established by the major trading nations. With many more
obligations under the WTO, special and differential treatment for developing countries
has a very different texture than when GATT was the main agreement. Under the WTO,
Chimni points out that “[E]quality rather than difference is the prescribed norm. The
prescription of uniform global standards in areas like intellectual property rights has
meant that the Third World State has lost the authority to devise technology and health
policies suited to its existential conditions.”81
The efforts of Third World countries to highlight the different perspective on
human rights based on cultural relativism provoked harsh criticism from Western
countries and human rights advocates. In the age of globalization, the universality of
human rights remains a powerful idea that confronts pluralization strategies with
difficulties. With the support of the human rights movement, there is a growing argument
that democratic government should be established in all countries in order to achieve the
full realization of human rights, and this “right to democracy” privileges civil and
political rights over economic, social, and cultural rights.
As witnessed in Asian values debates explored in Chapter 5, Third World
countries have not demonstrated themselves as unquestioned champions of economic,
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social, and cultural rights. Although Third World countries claim to embrace economic,
social, and cultural rights, these arguments are often made to justify oppression in terms
civil and political rights. Put differently, Third World countries not only subordinate civil
and political rights but also sacrifice economic, social, and cultural rights for the sake of
speedy and stable economic growth and development. For the purpose of achieving such
economic growth, Third World countries, including many Asian countries, often argue
that democratic government are not universally required to fulfill economic, social, and
cultural rights. Authoritarian governments may achieve considerable economic growth
and raise the standard of living of their peoples.
However, this kind of economic development cannot make a contribution to
enhancing the indivisible relationship between civil and political rights and economic,
social, and cultural rights proclaimed in international human rights law. In short, Third
World countries’ emphasis on economic, social, and cultural rights over civil and political
rights and communitarianism over liberalism based on the cultural relativism has lost
some of its strengths as human rights perspective in the acceleration of human rights
revolution stimulated by globalization.
The changed environment for Third World countries also appears with respect to
issues on which they have had some success. As Fidler observed, developing states
maintained sufficient solidarity to contribute to the demise of the proposed Multilateral
Agreement on Investment, the blocking of any linkage between WTO agreements and
labor standards, and the preservation and expansion of safeguards on compulsory
licensing under the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property

89

Rights.82 In each of these instances, however, developing countries were defending the
status quo against reform ideas pushed by the Western great powers. The initiative was
no longer in the hands of the Third World, as it once often was during the Cold War.

4.4.2 TWAIL Troubles
The many examples of the demise or decay of Third World attempts to pluralize
the procedural and substantive nature of international law also connect with problems
with TWAIL’s theoretical framework for opposing Western domination and the rise of the
standard of global civilization discussed in Chapter 3. TWAIL has an inherent weakness
because its foundation is rooted in the basic structure of the Westphalian civilization
forced on non-Western peoples during the age of imperialism.83 The more pluralistic
world TWAIL seeks cannot come into being without social, political, and economic
assistance from Western developed countries, which will impose conditions on such
assistance that promote homogenization on Western terms. This context is not conducive
to building the more pluralistic world desired by TWAIL but is favorable to the process of
deepening the level of homogenization achievable in Westphalian civilization. Further,
increasing the heterogeneity of the economic, political, social and cultural development
of Third World countries weakens them in taking collective actions to challenge Western
dominance. It is almost impossible for Third World countries today to develop and
maintain a single and unified global Third World perspective embracing the diversity of
the cultures, politics, governance and legal systems, and economies of Third World
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countries.84 Ironically, the traditional adherence of many Third World countries to a
strong sense of state sovereignty hampers their collective ability to articulate common
policies needed to address not only the resurgence of Western power but also the effects
of globalization.
The growth of global civil society is regarded as one of characteristic features of
globalization and the emergence of forms of global governance.85 The growth of global
civil society challenges the state-oriented perspective on international relations, including
the state-oriented approach of TWAIL. The Third World emphasis on state sovereignty
has potential negative implications for Third World countries in the era of globalization.
First, the prominence given to state sovereignty obscures the growing governance roles
played by non-state actors domestically and globally. State sovereignty exists in a very
different environment in globalization than it did during the Cold War. Second, the
emphasis on state sovereignty prevents Third World countries from utilizing global civil
society effectively to promote their interests and desires in international relations. The
realm of global civil society is, thus, effectively monopolized by Western interests and
Western actors.
This problem is reflected in a growing recognition of the need to use local and
transnational social movements to reform the Third World and international law.86 This
resistance-oriented perspective on international law seeks to use local and transnational
social movements to criticize the imperial characteristics of the Western liberal
84

Y. Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: the Asian Debate, 15 Australian Yearbook of Int’l L.
1 (1994), p. 1.
85
On the concept of global civil society, see M. Kaldor, “Global Civil Society,” in The Global
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (D. Held & A. McGraw,
eds., 2nd ed. Polity 2003), pp. 559-563.
86
See Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 2.

91

perspective on international law, by focusing, for example, on structural adjustment
policies of international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. This
resistance-oriented perspective on international law relies on social movements of Third
World peoples, sometimes in alliance with Western civil society groups, to criticize both
the imperial attitude of Western countries and the impotence of Third World governments
under the impact of globalization. This approach does not rely on the old foundations of
state sovereignty, external self-determination, and non-intervention. In fact, Third World
governments are often the target of these resistance-oriented transnational civil society
efforts, often in the areas of human rights.
The statist-approach that informs TWAIL turns out to be ineffective in addressing
global problems, such as environmental degradation, extreme poverty and hunger, the
spread of infectious diseases, and even effective responses to natural disasters. These
problems undoubtedly need global governance that requires the cooperation of states and
non-states actors. Many countries in the Third World are not only the epicenters of these
problems but they also often do not have any capabilities to address these problems
effectively. Assistance from Western developed countries and global civil society groups
becomes indispensable. The imperative of such assistance increases the pressure on
Third World countries to harmonize their policies according to the desires of the Western
donor governments and civil society actors, which further marginalizes the possibility of
the Third World informing the contemporary development of international law and global
governance.
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4.5 TWAIL and an Asian Perspective on International Law and Global Governance:
Moving Forwards, Looking Backwards
From the viewpoint of Asian countries, the emergence of the standard of global
civilization described in Chapter 3 might be considered another attempt to continue
Western domination over Asian countries. Owing to past experiences with Western
colonialism and imperialism, Asian countries have a strong tendency to worry about the
return of hegemony, specifically coming from Western countries. Asian countries tend to
be suspicious of new initiatives that originate in Western concepts and power, such as
establishment of democratic government, radical economic reform, and human rights
movements. Asian suspicions reflect, in many ways, the skepticism and opposition
reflected in Third World critiques of international law during decolonization and in
TWAIL analyses.
The emergence of the new standard of global civilization, and the role of Western
powers in this emergence, should not, however, cause Asian countries to see in the
challenge of globalization only the possibility of conflict and tension with the West
concerning the use and development of international law. The question for Asian
countries is not how much to oppose the standard of global civilization but rather how
much do Asian countries have to contribute to addressing global problems most countries
face. Given how Asia has developed, especially economically, the countries of this
region occupy a unique place in global affairs. As Fidler has argued, Asia represents an
exciting and vital laboratory for 21st century global governance.87
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In this context, an Asian perspective on international law and global governance
must not only remember and criticize the Western imperialism of the past but also create
a forward-looking alternative perspective on international law and global governance for
this globalized age that draws on ideas and practices informed by the distinct cultural,
political, and philosophical legacies of Asian countries. Formulating such an alternative
Asian perspective on international law is not an easy task, especially the challenge of
offering Asian-informed approaches to global problems.
The foundations for such an Asian perspective can draw on Third World critiques
from the period of decolonization and from insights developed by TWAIL, but the search
for an Asian perspective cannot dwell too much on the past and its injustices. Such a
perspective cannot react to the standard of global civilization in an entirely hostile way
because Asia encounters this standard from a completely different position than when
Asian countries were forced to accept unequal treaties and the humiliation of the system
of capitulations. Unlike the Asian societies dominated by the European great powers,
Asia today represents a microcosm of global realities because the Asian region contains
the best of the First World and the worst of the Third World, and everything in between.
As a microcosm for the age of globalization, Asian countries have an opportunity to craft
an “Eastphalian” approach to compliment and supplement the Westphalian heritage of
international law. What this Eastphalian approach may contain and how it might emerge,
are addressed in the following two chapters.
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PART II. FINDING THE EASTPHALIAN OUTLOOK:
ELEMENTS OF AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
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Chapter 5. The “Asian Values” Debate:
Myths, Truths, and Their Implications for an
Asian Perspective on International Law

5.1 Introduction
As analyzed in previous chapters, the philosophical, political, and cultural
preferences of Western nations significantly affected the substance and process of
international law. In considering the potential contributions of Asian nations to
international law in the 21st century, the debate over so-called “Asian values” becomes
important to examine. In general, proponents of Asian values seek to restore to
prominence Asian philosophy, culture and civilization, which Western colonialism and
imperialism denigrated and damaged. The end of the Cold War and the acceleration of
Western-oriented globalization stimulated the push back from advocates for Asian values.
This push back involved an interesting mixture of traditional Asian hostility
toward Western hegemony and growing pride in Asia’s emerging importance in
international affairs. Advocacy for Asian values became a way for Asians to stand
against aspects of Western-oriented globalization and to advance agendas informed by
Asian philosophy, culture and civilization. Moreover, with Asia’s growing significance in
global politics, Asian values offered a potential basis for new forms of global governance
applicable beyond the Asian region, and thus perhaps constituted a challenge to Western
normative dominance in international law and governance.1
1

General works on the features of Asian values include W.T. de Bary, Asian Values and Human
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This optimistic, forward looking perspective has, however, generated criticism
and arguments that question the capability of Asian values to serve as a foundation for the
management of global problems. Critics pointed to governance failings in the Asian
region, such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the long-time absence of regional
human rights organizations and instruments, and the existence of authoritarian
governmental regimes in Asian countries. These pessimistic views on Asian values
argued that Asian values would only play a relatively trivial role in blazing new paths for
international law and global governance.2
This chapter explores the implications of the debate about Asian values for
international law and Asia’s future role in shaping this body of rules. The optimistic and
pessimistic sides of this debate about Asian values have been vigorously argued
especially in the context of human rights.3 However, the heated debates about Asian
values contain misconceptions and misunderstandings about Asian values on both sides.
The Asian values debate too often reflects a crude dualism between West and East. For
instance, in the realm of human rights, this dualism often prevents those engaged in the
debate from recognizing common ground between Asian and Western countries on
human rights issues.4 Thus, to understand the implications of the Asian values debate for

The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization (Routledge, 2004).
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3
On the debates about Asian values, specifically related to human rights issues, see D. Bell,
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Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 291 (1999-2000).
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the possibilities of an Eastphalian perspective on international law and global governance,
a better grasp of Asian values and the controversies they have provoked is need.

5.2 Emergence and Evolution of Asian Values and Their Implications for
International Law and Global Governance
5.2.1 Asian Values Emerge in International Relations
The idea of Asian values derives its appeal because it offers an alternative to the
dominance of Western ideas, which have driven the international mechanisms of human
rights, economics, and politics.5 According to Tatsuo, the proclamation of Asian values
expresses the desire of Asian peoples and countries to enhance their self-confidence and
to challenge Western hegemony in international norm-making.6 Beyond highlighting
injustices made by Western hegemony in international relations, Asian values require that
Western countries should pay due respect and attention to Asian voices.7
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, and Mahathir Mohammed, Prime
Minister of Malaysia, launched the Asian values debate by strongly supporting China’s
issuance of its White Paper on Human Rights in 1991.8 The Chinese government stated
that, “Despite its international aspect, the issue of human rights falls by and large within
the sovereignty of each state.”9 This White Paper treated rights to subsistence and
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development as taking precedence over civil and political rights.10 The White Paper also
stated that “the evolution of the situation in regard to human rights is circumscribed by
the historical, social, economic and cultural conditions of various nations and involves a
process of historical development. Owing to tremendous differences in historical
background, social system, cultural tradition and economic development, countries differ
in their understanding and practice of human rights.”11
The White Paper and support for it by prominent Asian leaders contributed to the
promulgation of the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, which is widely recognized as the
manifesto of Asian values. The Bangkok Declaration recognizes that “while human
rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural, and religious
backgrounds.”12 It also reiterates “the need to explore the possibilities of establishing
regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights in Asia.”13
As the content of the Bangkok Declaration indicates, Asian values concentrated
on human rights and sovereignty issues, such as the priority of economic, social, and
cultural rights, absolute sovereignty over domestic affairs, and the compatibility of Asian
religions such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Islam with democracy. The scope of
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Asian values was not, however, limited to political and human rights issues.14 Economic
issues were intertwined with Asian values’ perspective on politics and human rights. For
rapid and stable achievement of economic growth, Asian values suggested that the nature
of a government should be chosen foremost with consideration of the social, economic,
and political conditions of Asian countries and peoples in mind, a choice that would not
always lead quickly to democratic governments. This notion raised the question whether
Asian authoritarian regimes or Western democratic regimes were best suited for
achieving continuous economic growth and political stability.15
Viewed from the various angles of Asian values’ propositions on economic, social,
and political issues, Asian values’ advocates were supporting an effort to project the
superiority of Asian values as a basis for governance mechanisms: when needed, a
relatively more authoritarian government was the best foundation for economic
development and human rights promotion, which reflected Asian communitarian
perspectives on social, economic, political, and cultural relations.16

5.2.2 The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and Its Aftermath
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 created a challenge for the arguments claiming
the superiority of Asian values over Western ideas as a basis for governance
mechanisms.17 This crisis ignited a second round of debate on the importance of Asian
values in the era of globalization. The opponents of Asian values argued that features of
Asian societies, such as authoritarian governments and the Asian style of business
14
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operations, were the main reasons for the Asian financial crisis. In addition, opponents of
Asian values asserted that the crisis demonstrated the inability of Asian countries to
achieve economic growth and stability without Western support and intervention.18
For their part, the advocates of Asian values argued that certain features of the
Asian economic system, such as restrictions on “Western-style” labor rights, deep
reliance on social networks, and group-based business cooperation were indispensable to
a speedy recovery from the Asian economic crisis and the revitalizing of Asian
economies.19 Furthermore, advocates of Asian values indicated that Western-centric
solutions to the Asian financial crisis, such as establishment of liberal market economic
structures and the deregulation of business activities, actually proved irrelevant to
responding to the crisis, if not actually very damaging to Asian societies. In fact,
structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank inflicted social, economic, and political problems on Asian countries, such as
increasing the gap between rich and poor, destruction of family-based businesses, and
rendering domestic industries very vulnerable to foreign capital investment.20 These
problems not only increased the hostility of Asian countries and peoples toward the
Western perspective on economic and political development but also fuelled the desire
for an alternative perspective on political and economic development informed by the
values of Asian countries and peoples.
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5.2.3 The Democracy and Human Rights Questions in the Debate on Asian Values
The continued push for an Asian perspective on development again raised the
question of what kind of government model, a democratic government or an authoritarian
government, best supports the need for rapid economic growth in Asian countries.21
Advocates for Asian values often consider a strong authoritarian government as the best
choice for rapid economic growth, which, in turn, will provide the basis for the
emergence of more democratic forms of governance. In order to achieve the economic
growth rates required for Asian development, active and broad intervention by a strong
authoritarian government into private economic activities is needed for Asian countries
and peoples.22 Generally, direct intervention by an authoritarian government into
economic activities often triggers human rights concerns, specifically human rights issues
concerning Western-inspired labor law and law on property rights. Although the Asian
values perspective recognizes the importance of human rights, it places more weight on
rapid economic development rather than on protecting individual human rights.23 Thus,
the Asian values perspective directly called into question the need for Western-style
democracy and human rights principles with respect to promoting the political and
economic development of Asian peoples.

5.2.4 The Asian Values Debate Broadens Beyond Politicians’ Arguments
As the debate about Asian values intensified in the wake of the Asian financial
crisis of 1997, experts began to perceive the debate evolving in important ways.

21

Peerenboom, supra note 3, pp. 45-50.
Bell, supra note 3, p. 260.
23
Id., pp. 260-266.
22

102

Although the rhetoric of politicians did not show much discernable difference after the
crisis, Peerenboom argued that the two phases of the debate did exhibit different
features.24 The most discernable difference appeared in the expansion of the debate from
the propaganda of politicians to the more expansive engagement of academics and
intellectuals.25 The Asian values controversy attracted the attention of scholars and
thinkers in various fields, including political science, law, economics, human rights, and
philosophy. At the center of this expanding dialogue was the compatibility of Asian
values with the hallmarks of Western modernity, such as capitalism, liberalism,
democracy, rule of law, and human rights26—the very concepts informing the standard of
global civilization identified in Chapter 3.
Informing this interest in compatibility was the impact of globalization on
international relations and its governance. The Asian values debate highlighted the
relationship between globalization and processes of political, economic, and social
homogenization. The concern raised by proponents of Asian values is that these
homogenizing processes impose Western-defined modernity on non-Western countries
and peoples.27 In this sense, Asian values connected with the rise of identity politics,
multiculturalism, and neo-nationalism as response against the homogenizing features of
globalization.28 In addition to the emergence of the Asian values movement, major global
24
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identity-based turbulence appeared in the post-Cold War world in ethnic cleansing in the
Balkans, tribal conflicts and genocide in Africa, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.29
Asian values belong, therefore, to a phenomenon broader than the concerns of
Asian countries and peoples, a phenomenon that put culture and cultural differences close
to the heart of understanding how international relations operate, especially in the postCold War world. The tendency of Western approaches to ignore local characteristics and
cultural differences turned out to be a source of global problems rather than a solution to
them.30 Proponents of Asian values argued that these values provided a stronger
foundation for global cooperation in an age of political, economic, and cultural
differences than Western-led homogenization. In essence, the Asian values perspective
challenged the notion that core Western ideas, such as the market economy, democracy,
the rule of law, and human rights, were superior bases for creating mechanisms for
governing international relations in a world of deep cultural differences. It then followed
that Asian values perhaps offered a different model and approach to governance and
globalization that would allow Western and other cultural viewpoints to establish a more
tolerant and stable system of global governance.31

29

Peerenboom, supra note 3, p. 65.
R. Klein, Cultural Relativism, Economic Development and International Human Rights in the
Asian Context, 9 Tuoro Int’l L. Rev. 1 (2001); S. Lawson, “Global Governance, Human Rights
and the ‘Problem’ of Culture,” in Global Governance: Critical Perspectives (R. Wilkinson & S.
Hughes, eds., Routledge 2004), pp. 75-89; J. O’Hagan, “Conflict, Convergence, or Coexistence?
The Relevance of Culture in Reframing World Order,” in Reframing the International: Law,
Culture, Politics (R. Falk, et al. eds., Routledge 2002), pp. 198-200.
31
Peerenboom, supra note 3, pp. 65-66.
30

104

5.2.5 Asian Values and Confucianism
As part of the critique of Western-led globalization, advocates of Asian values
argued that the teachings of Confucianism should be taken seriously in thinking of
improved ways to manage global problems.32 This argument directly challenged the
fundamental basis of post-Cold War Western globalization: liberalism.33 Pointing out the
undesirable effects of Western liberalism, such as breaking the necessary solidarity
between individuals and society, increasing the gap between rich and poor, and
marginalizing the interests of minority groups,34 advocates of Asian values suggested
that the communitarian perspective enshrined in Confucianism should be a philosophical
basis for global governance mechanisms.35 Proponents of Asian values argued, for
example, that the main reason for the speedy recovery of Asian countries to the 1997
financial crisis could be found within the dynamics of “Confucian capitalism.” The
Confucian emphasis on a strong authoritarian government, education and self-cultivation,
frugality and thrift, hard work and labor discipline, social networks and group-orientation,
social civility, and the role of intellectuals provided the main engine for a speedy
recovery and stable growth of Asian economies.36
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5.2.6 Asian Values and International Law
The emergence and evolution of the Asian values debate have great relevance for
international law, even if the debate did not concentrate on international law as a direct
topic of controversy. As demonstrated in earlier chapters, international law reflects
philosophical and cultural preferences and norms, typically those of the leading powers
of whatever historical age. The rise of Asian values reflected not only non-Western
perceptions about society and its governance but also the emergence of Asia and Asian
countries as increasingly more powerful and important actors in international relations.
This mixture of power and ideas contains the potential to affect how states perceive
international law as a governance mechanism and how states operate international law in
addressing global problems.

5.3 Values or Power? The Challenges of Asia and Critical Evaluation of Asian Values
and Asian Power
Unfortunately, the Asian values debate often remains mired in a crude dualism
between East and West, in which both sides of the controversy partake.37 Generally,
opponents and advocates of Asian values are reluctant to find and share common ground.
For instance, when it comes to human rights, opponents of Asian values often limit their
focus to civil and political rights and the individualistic character of human rights, such
as freedom of speech and the right to democratic government. Conversely, advocates of
Asian values emphasize the collective character of human rights and thus, stress the
37
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importance of economic, social and cultural rights more than civil and political rights.38
These different emphases are not reconciled through the usual human rights mantra that
both types of rights are interdependent and indivisible because preferences remain strong
and deeply embedded in the two perspectives in this debate. Similar fault lines appear on
other issues, such as sovereignty and the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other
states.39

5.3.1 The Non-History of Pan-Asianism
In addition to Western skepticism about Asian values as a theoretical basis for
international law and global governance, scrutiny of Asian values, on their own terms,
reveals important problems and issues to consider. First, throughout history, a shared
conception of “Pan-Asianism” representing major Asian philosophies and cultures has
never really existed, except as a way of masking the exercise of power. Although Japan
tried to justify its actions in the 1930s through the concept of the “Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere,” this idea was merely propaganda to justify Japanese domination of
other Asian countries.40 In terms of responses to Western imperialism, Asian countries
never developed a strong sense of common Asianism in responding to their exploitation.
The closest phenomenon was the “Bandung Spirit” that emerged from the Non-Aligned
Movement’s opposition to the post-World War II continuation of colonialism.41 The
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Bandung Spirit crystallized the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which were
declared in the Preamble of the Agreement between China and India on the Trade and
Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India.42
The ten principles of the Bandung Spirit asserted the equality of all races and
nationalities in Principle 3.43 Principle 6 affirmed that the use of arrangements of
collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers or any
(1967), pp. 149-169; D. Wilson, China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung (Part II), 31 China Q.
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pressure by any countries should be avoided.44 The Bandung Spirit may be understood as
a unified Asianism designed to stand against Western imperialism and colonialism.45
However, linkage between the soaring rhetoric of the Bandung Spirit and each Asian
country’s relationship with decolonization are very weak. Similarly, critical analysis of
Asian values should ask whether each Asian country’s experience of globalization
actually reflects the rhetoric used to support and advance the idea of Asian values,
however they are manifested.

5.3.2 What is the “Asia” that Informs Asian Values?
Advocacy for Asian values often skates over an obvious problem with this
perspective and for identifying an Asian perspective on international law and global
governance more broadly—the difficulty of identifying what “Asia” means and, thus,
what values should be associated with that concept. As Fidler argued, “[F]or some, Asia
means East Asia, especially, China, Japan, Taiwan, and Korean peninsula. Others talks of
Asia more broadly, as encompassing East and Southeast Asia, stretching from Burma in
the west to Japan in the east, and Russia in the north to Australia in the south. A third
perspective stretches Asia from India in the west to Japan in the east and everything in
between.”46 The geographical ambiguity of “Asia” raises the question whether Asian
countries actually share something that unifies them politically, economically, and
culturally in ways that are seen, for example, in Europe and between Europe and the
United States. The influence of Confucianism certainly does not resonate as deeply in
44
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India, which has it own ancient philosophical and cultural traditions, as it might in East
Asia.47
Beyond such geographical vagueness, Asian countries experience huge
differences in levels of economic, political, and social development.48 According to
advocates of Asian values, a strong authoritarian government, Asian-style capitalism, and
emphasis on collective human rights, such as economic, social and cultural rights, are the
main characteristics that make Asian approaches different from Western political,
economic, and social perspectives.49 However, significant differences with regard to
economic, political and social conditions among Asian countries suggest that Asian
values do not operate consistently or effectively across Asia, which raises questions about
why such variance exists. Why has South Korea emerged as a developed economy with
democratic institutions while North Korea and Myanmar have become pariahs in the
international system? Can Asian values provide any insights to such a question?
Similarly, aspects of the Asian values critique of Western ideas can be applied to
question the Asian values project itself. For example, advocates of Asian values often
criticize the Western homogenization agenda for ignoring important differences in Asian
countries, including different levels of political, economic, and social development.
Advocates of Asian values strongly argue that such differences should be taken seriously.
However, the importance of respecting differences seems to be limited to the Asian
values debate between West and East.50 The Chinese may embrace authoritarian political
actions that South Koreans would not tolerate, and the government of Myanmar behaves
47
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in ways that would be unacceptable in both China and South Korea. Further, the
proclaimed tolerance of Asian countries for differences might well prove empty in the
event that a struggle for dominance and hegemony develop in the region between, for
example, Japan, China, and India.51

5.3.3 Human Rights Complexities with the Asian Values Perspective
Other concerns about Asian values arise in the controversies over human rights.
In general, advocates of Asian values emphasize economic, cultural, and social rights and
tend to regard civil and political rights as a threat to economic development in Asian
countries.52 Whether this emphasis on economic, cultural, and social rights represents
simply a reaction to Western emphasis on civil and political rights or connects to
something particularly “Asian” is open to question. The significant levels of disparity
among Asian countries concerning economic, cultural, and social rights, combined with
the emphasis on strong notions of sovereignty and non-intervention, suggest that any
Asian-specific concept of human rights is very limited in content and scope.
The sheer difficulty of transforming Asian countries from exploited colonies to
independent states may have played a larger role in the emphasis on economic, cultural,
and social rights than “Asian values.” Despite gaining political independence from
former Western colonial powers, most if not all Asian countries faced very difficult socioeconomic problems, such as underdevelopment and extreme poverty. These socioeconomic problems threatened the political stability of newly independent states in Asia.
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Thus, achieving economic growth was a critical concern of Asian countries. In this sense,
many Asian countries employed strong state-driven economic policies for achieving
economic growth and stability, even though their effects were often, at best, short-term.53
For pursuit of this kind of economic development, lack of interest in civil and political
rights could be justified as economically inefficient. Thus, particular infringement of
civil and political rights may be tolerated for the sake of rapid economic development.54
Under this perspective, the subordination of civil and political rights to economic growth
and political stability encouraged by Asian values is justified.55
By their very nature, economic, social and cultural rights are largely dependent on
the levels of social, economic and political development of states. In general, state
parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
undertake legally binding commitments to take steps to the maximum of their available
resources to achieve progressively the full realization of the economic, social, and
cultural rights contained in the ICESCR.56 Therefore, as advocates of Asian values assert,
the economic growth of Asian countries will be a cornerstone for the full realization of
the economic, social and cultural rights of Asian people.
However, the emphasis on economic growth of the state itself should not be
confused with the realization of economic, cultural, and social rights of individuals, as
required by the ICESCR and other international human rights instruments. Even though
53
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aggregate economic growth of a state can be increased dramatically by strong statedriven economic policies, the benefits from such economic growth may not be delivered
to individuals equitably if there is no fair redistribution of wealth. In addition, although
many Asian countries have claimed that their economic policies were designed to
enhance the conditions of economic, cultural, and social rights, empirical studies have
shown to the contrary that many Asian governments sacrifice economic, social, and social
rights under the name of rapid economic growth to the contrary.57 For instance, labor
rights are often curtailed by governments because strong labor unions may play a
powerful role in furthering their special interests over the perceived needs and interests of
the country as a whole.
The Asian values emphasis on economic, social, and cultural rights often mirrors
the Western fixation with civil and political rights. Both perspectives stubbornly refuse
to accept the human rights approach that both kinds of rights are crucial for individual
dignity and social progress.58 Thus, full realization of economic, cultural, and social
rights cannot be achieved without protecting civil and political rights, and vice versa. In
addition, the significance of civil and political rights cannot be determined by their
statistical contribution to the rapidity of economic development. Sen indicates that the
case for democracy and civil rights cannot be based on their likely positive impact on
economic growth, nor can the case for democracy and civil rights be demolished by their
likely negative effect on economic growth.59
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Realization of civil and political rights contributes to the security of society,
which is indispensable to economic growth and stability. The desirable level of security
largely hinges on the levels of social communication and discourse, which attempts to
strikes a balance between competing interests. Without civil and political rights, people
cannot securely and robustly express their needs and demand appropriate public action.
Sen argues that “[W]hether and how a government responds to needs and sufferings may
well depend on how much pressure is put on it, and the exercise of political rights can
make a real difference.”60
In this sense, the Asian values approach to human rights seems defective in the
same way Western preoccupation with civil and political rights is defective. Further,
despite the marginalization of civil and political rights in thinking about Asian values,
there is little empirical evidence that civil and political rights conflict with economic
growth.61

5.3.4 Asian Values and Authoritarian Governments
The favorable disposition of Asian values towards authoritarian governments also
deserves critical scrutiny. The basic justification for this position is that Asian countries
needed strong governments because they faced many social, economic, and political
problems after decolonization. Some relatively authoritarian governments in Asian
countries, such as South Korea, Singapore, and China, achieved impressive rates of
economic growth. However, other authoritarian governments have not proved successful
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at promoting economic growth.62 It is a false generalization that an authoritarian
government is indispensable to the rapid economic development of Asian countries.
When it comes to economic development, the type of government is not the sole factor in
determining conditions for economic growth.63 There are various important factors that
determine whether a country experiences economic growth. For example, without export
markets in other countries, a high level of literacy, and various incentives to encourage
economic and entrepreneurial behavior, economic development is not possible.64 Sen
argues that “[T]he temptation to see the positive role of authoritarianism seems to be
based on taking the post hoc to be also propter hoc; it is not really founded on any
systematic establishment of cause and effect relations.”65
Furthermore, an authoritarian government may pay little attention to conditions
for the realization of human rights, even economic, social, and cultural rights. There is
nothing inherent in the authoritarian form of government that ensures respect for any kind
of human rights. All too often, authoritarian governments wrap the personal interests of a
handful of political leaders and elites in the rhetoric of serving the needs and rights of the
people. Under authoritarian governments, the people have little to no ability to influence
the behavior of those who pursue “enlightened despotism.” Donnelly points out that
“[A]uthoritarian rule more often than not has been used as a masquerade for kleptocracies,
bureaucratic incompetence, and worst of all, for unbridled nepotism and corruption.”66 In
this context, an authoritarian government that readily sacrifices either civil and political
62
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rights or economic, social, and cultural rights to development cannot be regarded as a
perfectly desirable form of government. 67

5.3.5 Asian Values and Confucianism Revisited
Problems also arise with the Asian values embrace of Confucianism as a
philosophical basis for new global governance mechanisms. While pointing out the
failure of Western liberalism as a foundation for global governance, advocates of Asian
values claim that the communitarian characteristics enshrined in Confucianism can
inform response to the global challenges the international community faces in the 21st
century.
Comprehensive analysis of Confucianism is not needed to identify problems with
how Confucianism is used by advocates of Asian values. First, whether and how much
Confucianism actually influences the behavior of Asian governments is hard to determine.
Identifying Confucianism as an independent variable in state behavior within Asia is very
difficult from a social science perspective, and much more difficult than demonstrating
the effect of democracy and liberalism on the behavior of Western states. Even though
Asian peoples still preserve some Confucian traditions, such as complicated rules on
rituals, Westernization on many levels has seriously encroached on Confucian traditions
from the individual level to the society level.68 Since the collapse of the ancient
Sinocentric system under the impact of Western imperialism, no Asian countries have
paid any attention to Confucian protocols or ritual customs when they engage in relation
67
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with other countries, including Asian countries. The template for such relations is
Westphalian not Confucian.
In terms of the impact of Confucianism on economic development, some
Confucian factors which are relevant to economic development concerns are only
selectively embraced. Confucianism supports the role of an authoritarian government
and its broad interventions for social welfare, education, and preservation of the grouporiented social system.69 However, the darker side of Confucian thinking for economic
development, such as the repression of human creativity and social diversity, moral
disdain of commerce and industry, and the rigidity of social stratification, does not inform
Asian economic development strategies.70
The teachings of Confucianism seem to be emphasized by the advocates of Asian
values mainly for highlighting the virtue of communitarianism and the failure of Western
liberalism.71 The advocates for Asian values often manipulate Confucianism to justify
the necessity of authoritarian regimes for protecting and promoting communitarian values
in Asian countries. In order to escape criticism for defending authoritarian governments,
advocates of Asian values resort to Confucian perspectives on the strict hierarchical
relationship between the governed and the governing. According to Confucian teachings,
people should obey the king as children should obey their father because, from a
Confucian perspective, the state is an expanded, societal unit based on family
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relationships.72 Thus, the communitarian perspective enshrined in Confucianism helps an
authoritarian government make dictatorial social, economic, and political policies that
may conflict with interests and needs of the people. Further, the emphasis on
communitarian values is not unique to Asian countries and peoples. Western scholars
have produced considerable studies on communitarian perspectives on human rights in
Western countries, and Western governments pay much attention to communitarian
values in trying to harmonize the various interests of individuals.73
Whether in the West or the East, putting too much emphasis on communitarian
values easily leads into the negation of the human rights of individuals. To support their
arguments on communitarian values, advocates of Asian values often resort to the
Confucian perspective on human rights. Under Confucianism, the discourse on human
rights cannot be developed without reference to communitarian values. Under the
Confucian perspective on human rights, being human is not sufficient for individuals to
be the subject of human rights.74 According to Confucianism, individuals as individuals
cannot be regarded as the subject of human rights until they perform their societal roles
and duties successfully as social beings.75 This duty-oriented or role-based human rights
perspective is dangerous from a human rights perspective grounded in the inherent
dignity of the individual as a human being. Undoubtedly, responsible, socially oriented
72
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individuals are needed to maintain healthy societies. However, the duties and roles
assigned to individuals for maintaining a healthy society should not be the sole criteria
that determine how governments treat individuals. The raison d’être of human rights
should be found in the effort to protect human dignity, which is independent of, and prior
to, socially constructed duties and roles of individuals in society.76

5.4 Conclusion: The Asian Values Debate, International Law, and the Future of
Global Governance
As analyzed in this chapter, the development and elaboration of the “Asian
values” concept, and its connection with Asian cultural and philosophical traditions, such
as Confucianism, presented a challenge to the existing dominant Western paradigms
informing globalization, international law, and emerging forms of global governance.
The breadth and bitterness of the debates over Asian values reveal the severity and
seriousness of the challenge to the Westernized status quo. From the perspective on
international law, advocacy of Asian values had direct implications for basic principles of
international law, such as sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of
states, and for leading international legal regimes concerning international peace and
security, economic development, and the protection of human rights. Most broadly, these
implications also touched upon how states and non-state actors might utilize international
law in global governance mechanism across a spectrum of issues facing the international
community.
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Critical analysis of the Asian values perspective reveals numerous problems that
raise questions about this perspective’s ability to provide a foundation for an Asian
approach to international law and global governance. Such questions do not eliminate the
possibility of an Asian approach because similar concerns can be identified with respect
to Western influences on international law. What this chapter asserts, however, is that the
incantation of “Asian values” is not sufficient to advance an Asian perspective on
international law as it currently exists and as it may operate in the future. Weaknesses
with the Asian values idea do not diminish the growing importance of Asia in world
politics, so the views of Asian nations will, in all likelihood, continue to be increasingly
influential as the 21st century progress. To have a broader, more global impact on
international law, an Asian perspective will need to go beyond the insular and
inconsistent use of the Asian values perspective. An Asian perspective on international
law will need to show how the Asian values debate reveals ways in which Asian
approaches to governance questions provide a possible basis for thinking about global
governance within and beyond Asia. The next chapter examines whether Asian
approaches to issues of international law and international and human security provide
such a basis for Asia and beyond.
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Chapter 6. Eastphalia, International Law, and Security:
Case Study on the Asian Perspective on the Use of Force,
Humanitarian Intervention, and Human Security

6.1 Introduction
The proposition that an Asian perspective can or should influence the future
direction of international law and global governance requires examining what this
perspective has to tell us about issues on the cutting edge of international relations in the
early 21st century. This chapter examines whether an Eastphalian perspective exists with
respect to international law and the pursuit of national, international, and human security.
Without question, security issues remain at the forefront of the concerns of states,
regional alliances of states, and multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations
(UN). As previous chapters have discussed, Asia’s growing importance in global affairs
includes many areas, including security concerns (e.g., concerning North Korea,
Myanmar, and the China-Taiwan problem); but this chapter pushes beyond analyzing
security problems in Asia to explore whether Asian countries have a shared perspective
that can influence the development of international law and global governance in the
security arena. Criticism of the West’s approach to global problems in light of Asia’s
rise1 opens opportunities to explore what, if anything, Asian countries have to contribute
to governing security threats and the use of force differently.
In short, the challenge is to ascertain whether Asian ideas accompany Asia’s
growing power and importance. This task requires looking at whether and how Asian
1
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countries differ with respect to their positions concerning traditional topics of
international law and security, such as legitimacy of the use of force by states (especially
with respect to humanitarian intervention) and emerging ideas of global governance, such
as the human security concept.

6.2 The Existing International Legal System on the Use of Force and International
Security
6.2.1 International Law on the Use of Force and International Security: Brief
Overview
The most important provision of the UN Charter concerning regulation of the use
of force is Article 2(4).2 Article 2(4) prohibits UN member states from threatening or
using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.3 Although Article 2(4)
specifically emphasizes territorial integrity and political independence, this emphasis
does not restrict the all-embracing prohibition on use of force inconsistent with the
purposes of the UN. Thus, the correct interpretation of Article 2(4) is that any use of
inter-state force by UN member states for whatever reason is banned, unless explicitly
allowed by the UN Charter.4
The UN Charter contains four explicit exceptions to the prohibition found in
Article 2(4), only the first two of which remain relevant today: (1) force used in selfdefense (Article 51); (2) force authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Chapter
2
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VII); (3) force undertaken by the five major powers before the UNSC is functional
(Article 106); and (4) force undertaken against the “enemy” states of World War II
(Article 107 of the UN Charter)5. The UN Charter also implicitly recognizes, as an
extension of the principle of sovereignty, that a state may invite another state to use force
within its territory to deal with an internal armed conflict or rebellion.
As the most important exception to the prohibition on the use of force, the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in the Article 51 has to be
understood in conjunction with Article 2(4).6 Gazzini notes that “[R]egardless of its
admittedly too frequent violations, the very fact that states invariably invoke exceptions
to the prohibition on the use of force—and especially self-defense—to justify the
recourse to military measures confirm their legal conviction on the existence of such
prohibition.”7 Self-defense is traditionally understood as the permissible military
reaction by a state to an armed attack carried out by another state8 but the reactions of the
UNSC, other international organizations (e.g., NATO), and individual states to the
terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 indicate that states may
legitimately invoke the right to use of force in self-defense when attacked by non-state
actors. The right of self-defense in Article 51 is an inherent right that states have, and the
right includes not only the right to respond individually to an armed attack but also to
participate in collective self-defense actions in alliance with another state that is the
victim of an armed attack.
5
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The right of self-defense can arise under Article 51 only “if an armed attack
occurs,” which means that the use of force in self-defense is legitimate only if an armed
attack has taken place, is taking place, or is imminently about to occur.9 In addition, any
use of force in self-defense must be proportional to the threat the state confronts.10 These
rules in the UN Charter on the prohibition on the use of force and the scope of the right to
use force in self-defense are widely considered to be the rules in customary international
law as well.
Article 51 also requires that any use of force in self-defense should be reported
immediately to the UNSC, and that the state must cease using force once the UNSC has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. However,
according to Aust, this provision does not mean that the state must stop using force as
soon as the UNSC adopts measures; the measures have to be shown to be effective in
restoring peace and security to the attacked state.11
The other exception to the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) involves
the authority the UNSC has to authorize military action to address threats to international
peace and security. This authority forms part of the UN’s system of collective security.
The collective security system permits the lawful use of force by the international
community against threats to international peace and security.12 The authority to operate
the collective security system is enshrined Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the power
to authorize the use of force belongs exclusively to the UNSC. In Article 24(1), UN
member states “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
9

Dinstein, supra note 4, p. 182.
J. Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge Univ. Press
2004), pp. 148-179.
11
A. Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005), p. 229.
12
Dinstein, supra note 4, p. 278.
10

124

maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”13
The important provisions of the UN Charter concerning the collective security
system are contained in Chapter VII. Under Article 39, the UNSC shall determine the
existence of any threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. The
UNSC’s determination is binding on member states, even if the UNSC subsequently
proceeds to adopt a mere recommendation for action.14 In addition, the UNSC shall
make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore
international peace and security in accordance with Articles 41 and 42.15 Article 41
authorizes the UNSC to impose non-military sanctions on offending states. If the UNSC
deems such peaceful sanctions under Article 41 to be insufficient, it can order military
actions in accordance with Article 42.16
Besides granting the UNSC the authority to order military sanctions, Chapter VII
also envisages a mechanism for the UNSC to use to impose these sanctions. Chapter VII
addresses two main issues concerning how the collective security system should
practically operate: the availability of military forces and the means for the coordination
of the use of these forces.17 Article 43 provides that all members of the UN should
conclude special agreements with the UNSC through which they would make available to
the UNSC certain contingents of their armed forces.18 For the purpose of coordinating
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the use of these forces, Article 47 calls for the establishment of a Military Staff
Committee.19

6.2.2 Beyond the UN Charter: Claims for Broader Rights to Use of Force under
International Law
The UNSC’s authority to order military sanctions and the individual and
collective right of self-defense are express exceptions to the prohibition on the use of
force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Much debate in this area of international law
concerns, however whether international law supports the right to use force in contexts
not explicitly captured by the UN Charter’s rules. In short, there has been pressure on the
UN Charter’s rule to include or recognize expansion of the legitimate bases on which
states can rely in using force in their international relations. This pressure tends to
concentrate on effort to broaden the scope of the right to use force in self-defense (e.g.,
the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense) and to permit the use of force for purposes of
addressing humanitarian suffering and grave and systematic abuses of fundamental
human rights (e.g., the doctrine of humanitarian intervention).20 Less frequently and
more controversially, arguments for an international legal right to use military force to
promote or restore certain forms of governments, such as democracy, have been made.
Debates about the scope of the right to use force in self-defense under the UN
Charter have been present since the Charter’s adoption in 1945. States that have used
force in controversial contexts typically try to justify their actions by linking them to the
right to use force in self-defense. These justifications have stretched the scope of the
19
20
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right of self-defense beyond what Article 51 of the UN Charter can reasonably bear,
especially claims of a broad right of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense. At the
same time, the frequency of these arguments suggests that states have not been willing to
accept a very narrow reading of Article 51. A fundamental reason for the historic and
contemporary exploration of a broader scope for the right of self-defense has been the
failure of the UN collective security system to operate effectively and consistently. In
short, state practice has implicitly linked the elasticity of the right to use force in selfdefense with the efficacy of the UN collective security system, and that system’s failings
have produced claims of broader rights to use force in self-defense.
Calls for a robust right to use force for humanitarian intervention flow from the
impact of the human rights revolution in international law. Under the influence of this
revolution, many international lawyers have argued that the use of force to prevent or
stop massive violations of fundamental human rights is legitimate under international
law.21 Although nothing in the UN Charter substantiates a unilateral right of a state to
take military action against another state under the guise of securing the implementation
of human rights, the advocates of humanitarian intervention stress the necessity of
forcible humanitarian intervention to promote and encourage respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms under the purposes of the UN Charter.22
Under this perspective, in order to employ force for the purpose of humanitarian
intervention, states should satisfy the following criteria: (1) there must be a compelling
and urgent situation of extreme humanitarian distress which demands immediate relief;
(2) the state most directly involved must either not be willing or able to deal with it; (3)
21
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there is no alternative to the use of force because the UNSC is either unable or unwilling
to authorize intervention; and (4) the action must be limited in scope and time to what is
necessary to relieve the distress.23 The push for a doctrine of forcible humanitarian
intervention also reveals skepticism that the UN’s collective security system can function
properly in terms of protecting fundamental human rights from massive and systematic
abuse. This human rights-inspired skepticism about the UN’s collective security system
requires the existence of an international legal right to use force not dependent on either
the right to self-defense or the UNSC’s authorization of military action to restore
international peace and security.
If Article 2(4) is strictly interpreted, using force to undertake humanitarian
intervention is prohibited. In that situation, the only options left are the right to selfdefense, which in some situations of humanitarian crises is not applicable even in its
broadest interpretation (e.g., NATO’s use of force to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo),
or authorization by the UNSC, which is often not forthcoming because of vetoes (or
threats of vetoes) from permanent UNSC members (e.g., Russia’s threatened veto of
UNSC action to authorize intervention in Kosovo). However, according to Franck,
neither the institutional history of the UN nor the record of state practice categorically
precludes or endorses humanitarian intervention. Rather, the history and practice witness
a more nuanced reconciling of the pursuit of peace and justice through protection of
human and humanitarian rights.24 Thus, despite serious controversies, advocating for the
legality of forcible humanitarian intervention not only challenges traditional
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interpretation of Article 2(4), but also heightens the importance in international law of
enhancing the fulfillment of fundamental human rights, which the UN Charter’s rule on
the use of force and collective security system often cannot achieve.25

6.2.3 Problems concerning International Law on the Use of Force and International
Security
As the efforts to push international law beyond the rules on the use of force found
in the UN Charter suggest, the international system has experienced, and continues to
experience, serious controversies about the scope and substance of the international law
on the use of force. Although states and scholars generally agree that the prohibition on
the use of force is a critical rule in international law, there are heated debates with respect
to the scope of the prohibition on the use of force.26 The central question in this debate is
whether the prohibition is interpreted broadly (thus eliminating more expansive readings
of the right to self-defense and any doctrine of humanitarian intervention) or narrowly
(thus opening possibilities for broader readings of the right of self-defense and the
development of a right of humanitarian intervention). Connected to the debate about the
scope of Article 2(4)’s prohibition is the question of the effectiveness of the UN’s
collective security system. Does the ineffectiveness of this system mean that states can
read Article 2(4) more narrowly than if the system actually worked?
Other questions have proliferated in this context. Does Article 2(4) prohibit a use
of force that aims not to overthrow the government or seize the territory of another state
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but rather that attempts to uphold the purposes of the UN?27 In other words, is it possible
to use force in the territory or another state in such a way that it does not affect the
territorial integrity or political independence of that state or in any other way transgresses
the purposes of the UN?28 Facing this problem, many U.S. scholars tend to argue that
Article of 2(4) should be read narrowly to facilitate the use of force to uphold the
principles and purposes of the UN.29 For instance, as part of its justifications for its
invasion of Grenade in 1983, the United States suggested that Article 2(4) should
interpreted with consideration of other values contained in the UN Charter, such as values
as freedom, democracy, and peace.30
As noted above, attempts to limit the scope of the prohibition on the use of force
directly relates to debates concerning the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.
Arguments are frequently made that forcible measures to protect the victims of violations
of human rights can be undertaken without affecting the territorial integrity of the target
state and challenging the target state’s political independence.31 According to Aust, a
limited use of force for the sole purpose of relieving extreme human distress, to stop
genocide or ethnic cleansing or other serious violations of international law, is not a
violation of Article 2(4) because this use of force is necessary for realization of the
promotion of human rights and addressing humanitarian problems, values which are
contained in Article 1(3) of the UN Charter.32 He also argues that “[W]hen the upholding
of the Purposes comes into acute conflict with the sovereignty of a state that is the very
27
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obstacle to achieving them, respect for its territorial integrity or political independence
has to give way to the overriding needs of humanity.”33
Most scholars who favor humanitarian intervention tend to avoid the terminology
of self-defense and insist that the forcible measure taken are legitimate, not by virtue of
compatibility with Article 51 of the UN Charter, but as a result of being compatible with
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.34 This position, at the end of the day, interprets Article
2(4) narrowly in order to allow states to use force more frequently, which ends up
essentially at the same point as those that seek to expand the scope of the right to use
force in self-defense. Article 2(4) is, thus, subject to a two-pronged pincer movement to
shrink its range of application.
However, many scholars question the legality of humanitarian intervention
without legitimate authorization of the UNSC. Concerning this question, Dinstein argues
that “[N]o individual state (or group of states) is authorized to act unilaterally, in the
domain of human rights or in any other sphere, as if it were the policeman of the
world.”35 Under this perspective, although unauthorized humanitarian intervention may
seek to protect human rights, it violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In the Nicaragua
case, the International Court of Justice rejected the argument that the United States could
employ force against Nicaragua in order to ensure respect for human rights in that
country.36 This perspective reads the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) more
broadly and robustly than do the advocates for humanitarian intervention.
33
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Undoubtedly, only the UNSC is empowered to authorize forcible military action
against a state that is in breach of its international obligations to respect human rights
under the law of the UN Charter. This authority is, however, very hard to exercise
because of inevitable disagreements among the five permanent members of the UNSC
about whether intervention by force is appropriate. Thus, that exception to Article 2(4)
provided by Chapter VII of the UN Charter does not provide advocates of humanitarian
intervention with a foundation for legitimizing the use of force to protect and respect
fundamental human rights.
Another problem with respect to humanitarian intervention can be found in its
subjective and selective character. Dinstein indicates that there can be contradictory
subjective opinions as to whether a course of action is just, and there is too much room to
abuse the law in the name of justice through a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.37
Advocates of humanitarian intervention justify unilateral use of force by a state on two
grounds: (1) just cause, and (2) the legitimacy of the governments taking action.
However, there is a critical problem concerning the legitimacy of the state taking action.
The criteria of legitimacy of the states seem to hinge on the existence of a democratic
government. Thus, from the perspective of humanitarian interventionists, a state is
illegitimate if the government is not democratic, or if a democratic state is being
challenged by non-democratic forces. These situations allow fairly unrestrained
unilateralism with respect to the use of force.38
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Opponents of humanitarian intervention also point out that proponents emphasize
human rights too much and tend to ignore collateral motives of intervening states.
Hidden collateral motives of the intervening states influence the selection of the target
state of humanitarian intervention. Advocates of humanitarian intervention for
establishing democratic government have a hard time resolving the subjective and
selective problems of humanitarian interventions driven by hidden collateral motives of
the intervening states. For instance, why there is no plan for the United States and other
democratic states to undertake humanitarian intervention against friendly and unfriendly
regimes that systematically violate fundamental human rights?39
With respect to the use of force in self-defense, the notion of anticipatory selfdefense has been the source of much controversy among international lawyers. Arend
and Beck raise the question about the possible necessity of anticipatory self-defense:
Does the reference to a state’s right to respond in self-defense “if an armed attack occurs”
indicate that a would-be victim must actually wait for the other side to strike first before
it can respond? Would the soon-to-be aggrieved state be unable to respond until the
troops actually crossed the border or the bombs stated failing?40 Alexandrov indicates
that “[T]he basis for the argument in favor of the legality of anticipatory self-defense is
that states faced with a perceived danger of immediate attack cannot be expected to await
the attack like ‘sitting duck’ but should be allowed to take the appropriate measures for
their defense.”41 According to Gazzini, advocates of anticipatory self-defense argue that
the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal indirectly admitted its lawfulness by
39
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considering and rejecting on the factual evidence the claim that Germany had been forced
to invade Norway in order to forestall an imminent Allied landing.42 In addition, there
are cases, such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the 1967 Israeli pre-emptive strike
against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and the 1981 Israeli air strike against the Iraqi nuclear
reactor, where the legality of using force in anticipatory self-defense has been asserted.43
However, many international lawyers deny the existence of a right of anticipatory
self-defense.44 First, the notion of anticipatory self-defense is not expressly contained in
Article 51 of the UN Charter. International lawyers also fear that anticipatory selfdefense will be open to abuses and subjective expansion of its parameters such that the
prohibition on the use of force becomes nearly meaningless. The Bush administration’s
advocacy for the legality of a right to use force in pre-emptive self-defense has provided
an example for critics of anticipatory self-defense to worry even more about the “slippery
slope” this doctrine would produce.
Second, states in their state practice are generally reluctant to invoke anticipatory
self-defense as a justification. Gray indicates that “[I]n practice states prefer to take a
wide view of armed attack rather than openly claim anticipatory self-defense … States
take care to try to secure the widest possible support; they do not invoke a doctrine that
they know will be unacceptable to the vast majority of states.”45 This reluctance of states
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to invoke anticipatory self-defense directly to justify their actions suggests that
anticipatory self-defense is not widely accepted.46
With regard to the collective security system in the UN, the right of the veto
conferred on the permanent members of the UNSC has been the major obstacle to UNSC
collective security actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.47 As noted earlier, the
difficulties experienced with the UN collective security system during and after the Cold
War directly affect how states perceive the scope and substance of the international legal
rules on the use of force. Even though post-Cold War use of the veto has not been as
debilitating as during the Cold War, the right of the veto still plays a critical role in
blocking possible actions by the UNSC.
Moreover, the right of the veto of the permanent members of the UNSC may
erode the original function of the UNSC by giving opportunities to other international
organizations, such as NATO, to take the initiative in managing threats to international
peace and security. The existence of the veto power by the five permanent members is
also directly related to concerns about the illegitimacy of the UNSC and arguments that
the UNSC must be reformed and enlarged.48 Another aspect of the issue of legitimacy is
lack of the transparency in how the UNSC makes important decisions. The major powers
conclude important decisions behind closed doors, which means how those decisions
were reached is beyond public scrutiny.49 In this context, a state which is adversely
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affected by decisions of the UNSC will be suspicious about the decisions of the UNSC
and their legality and legitimacy.

6.3 The Asian Perspective on the Use of Force
Given the importance of the international law on the use of force in international
relations, examining the potential impact on international law and global governance of
the rise of Asia in this realm is important. This section analyzes whether an Asian
perspective on the use of force rules in international law exists, and, if so, what
implications arise from this perspective. As explored in detail below, the Asian
perspective does not radically differ from the existing set of international legal rules on
the use of force. The importance of the Asian perspective is more apparent in how this
perspective weighs in on the debates about the scope and substance of the prohibition on
the use force, the right to use force in self-defense, and the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention.

6.3.1 The Confucian View on the Use of Force by States
The rules on the use of force by states examined in Section 6.2 have their origins
in the Just War tradition of Western religious and philosophical thought.50 To elucidate
50
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whether an Asian perspective on the use of force exists, an examination of Confucianism
on the use of force by states proves valuable. This analysis supplements the earlier
references to Confucianism in this thesis sketching how Confucian thinking approaches
the legitimacy of the use of force by states. Although similarities appear between the
existing rules of international law and the Confucian perspective, Confucianism contains
an approach to the use of force relevant to the controversies in international law on the
scope and substance of the right of self-defense and the legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention. As explored more in this chapter, the Confucian approach informs an Asian
perspective on the use of force in international relations.
Confucius argued that the goal for world order should be Ping (平). According to
Confucius, Ping can be understood as peace, harmony, evenness, equality, fairness,
justice and the like. For the achievement of Ping, Confucius believed that states and their
peoples needed a sense of peace and tranquility that transcended territorial borders.51 The
optimal world order, which is directed by Tian-Xia (which refers to an ideal moral and
political order admitting of no territorial boundaries), should be achieved according to the
principles of right, virtues, and aims of Ping. Thus, Confucius seemed to shut down any
possibility of a good war between sovereign states.52
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Conceptually, Confucianism does not recognize the inter-state system as a
foundation for Ping. Confucius was aware of inter-state systems in China during the
periods of the Spring and Autumn (722-476 B.C.) and the Warring States (476-221
B.C.).53 Confucius regarded the state-centric system as directed by greedy states and,
thus, was an obstacle to achieving Ping, a harmonious order the artificial boundaries of
states threaten. Thus, wars undertaken to expand state territory and power were not
legitimate under the philosophy of Confucius.
Moreover, Confucius argued that leaders should govern the people by means of
virtue and not by means of coercive political power. Hence, if a ruler or king engages in
aggression against other states, he cannot possibly be regarded as a sage leader because
he does not govern by the rule of virtue. Mencius also argued that the ideal ruler would
win the people’s hearts and support by his benevolence without relying on the use of
force.54 This approach would seem to rule out the use of force as an instrument for
53
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advancing any aspects of a country’s foreign and domestic policies. Confucius argued
that military aggression at home or abroad should not be connected with “the principle of
benevolent government.” In his book on the Spring and Autumn, Confucius condemned
some 400 wars during a period of 240 years for their inhumane character because these
wars were mainly driven by the desire of states to increase their territory and power. So
long as the goals of these wars are determined by the greed of states, from Confucius’
perspective, no justification could be made for any of these wars.55
Considering Confucius argument on the use of force, all wars of aggression are
bad, and pacifism would seem to be the only justifiable moral stance.56 But are
Confucius really pacifists? Although Confucius condemned the use of force to increase
the state’s territory and power, limited uses of force by states could be justified for
restoring Ping and Tian-Xia, which are severely damaged by wars of aggression.57
Confucius and his disciples recognized two exceptional cases for justified resort to war:
one is self-defense, and the other is the limited use of force against tyranny and
oppression in other states. Confucians would justify the use of force for self-defense,
both individual and collective.58 For the purpose of removing possible human casualties
driven by the use of force, Confucius emphasized establishment of national security and
defense systems, such as strong border defenses to deter and defend against aggression.
The main reason why Confucius justifies the use of force in self-defense can be found in
influence that causes bad moral character. Mencius is often compared to Plato for their theories
on human nature. Both have in common the affirmation of the innate moral goodness of all
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his emphasis on the protection of people and the effort to maintain Ping and Tian-Xia.
The justification for the limited use of force in self-defense is highlighted by Confucius
specifically with regard to the survival of small countries. If a small territory is ruled by
a capable and virtuous ruler who seeks to promote peace and benevolence, and if that
territory is attacked by an unjust would-be hegemon, then the ruler of that territory can
justifiably mobilize the people for military action.59
In the Book of Change, Confucius advised the rulers to build invincible forts to
protect the country from foreign aggression.60 Mencius also had the same view on use of
force in self-defense. For instance, the ruler of Teng, a small state that was situated
between two large and powerful neighbors, Chi and Chu, asked Mencius how to maintain
national security and survival. Mencius replied to this question: “I can only suggest one
thing. Dig deeper your moats, build higher your walls, and guard them with your people.
In case of attack, be prepared to die in your defense, and have the people so that they will
not leave you. This is a proper course.”61
Confucius also approved the use of force in collective self-defense. With the loss
of control by the Chou King, who was regarded as a Tian-Zi in ancient China, small
states could no longer depend on Chou’s power for the maintenance of order and they
then had to defend themselves. Facing the hegemonic ambition of Chu in the south and
increasing barbarian invasions from the north, the survival of many Chinese states was at
stake. In order to solve these problems, Duke Hwan, the ruler of Chi, supported by his
prime minister, Kwan Chung, summoned these states to establish an allied force. Under
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Duke Hwan’s leadership, the allied states were successful in turning back and keeping the
encroaching northern barbarians generally to the north of the Yellow River, thus
perpetuating the existence of the states of Yen, Hing, Wei, and their own. By means of a
combined invasion undertaken as the use of force in collective self-defense, the allies
were able to exact a covenant from the southern state of Chu.62
Confucius also argued that use of force might be legitimate when there was
tyranny in another country. In the Confucian sense, a tyrant is a ruler who challenged the
order of Ping and Tian-Xia. The order of Ping and Tian-Xia is hugely dependent on the
welfare of peoples in all states. The welfare of people in ancient China was understood
as securing the basic means of subsistence of the people by its ruler. Under Confucius
perspective, a ruler should be identical to a sage who governs the people by means of
virtue and wins people’s hearts and support by his benevolence. In addition, a ruler
should strive for peace. The main criteria for making a ruler a sage are determined by the
capability of a ruler to increase the welfare conditions of his people.
Thus, a ruler who oppresses his people and sacrifices the people’s welfare by
driving them into war in order to increase his territory and power is regarded as a tyrant
from the perspective of Confucius.63 The existence of a tyrant who maintains tyranny is
understood as a direct threat to the ideal order of Ping and Tian-Xia. Thus, although the
use of force for expelling a tyrant from another country undoubtedly triggers human
casualties, this sacrifice might be necessary for the restoration of Ping and Tian-Xia as
higher goals for entire world.64 The character of the use of force for expelling a tyrant
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from another country would be linked to the concept of “punitive expeditions” under the
Confucian perspective.65 Although protection of human rights of people in another
country was not part of the discourse on punitive expeditions under the Confucian
perspective, the justification for the use of force in punitive expeditions hinged upon
securing the material welfare of the people in another country directly endangered by its
ruler. The Confucian concept of a punitive expedition correlates in some respects to the
modern idea of humanitarian intervention.
Mencius also justified the necessity of wars waged as punitive expeditions against
tyrannical and oppressive rulers. Mencius repeatedly argued that wars of punitive
expeditions should not be employed for purposes other than re-establishing the conditions
for that foreign society to pursue the ideals of Ping and Tian-Xia. Mencius enumerated
the conditions that must exist for a punitive expedition to constitute a just use of military
force. First, the people of the foreign country in question must be suffering under the
oppression of tyrants. The people’s suffering in this sense meant that the people of
another country is not only deprived of their basic subsistence by their ruler but also is
forced to be employed as militants for unjustified war, such as a war for expanding the
ruler’s territory. In considering the people’s suffering in Yen, Mencius asked the ruler of
Chi to undertake a punitive expedition. Mencius said that “[N]ow the Prince of Yen
cruelly mistreated his own people and Your Majesty set out on a punitive expedition.
Yen’s people thought you were saving them from ‘flood and fire’.”66
Second, the country intervening with military force must take actions to win the
“hearts and minds” of the people suffering under tyranny. In other words, the people
65
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must welcome the foreign military force. Mencius described the example of a successful
punitive expedition by indicating that “[W]hen the King Wu attacked Yin, he said, ‘Do
not be afraid. I come to bring peace, I am not the enemy of the people.’ And the sound of
the people making big bows was like the toppling of the mountain.”67 Mencius believed
that the intervening power needed the support of the people to sustain the justness of the
punitive expedition. This task meant that the intervening military force must treat the
people with respect and dignity. Further, the welcome must be long lasting, not just
immediate. The welcome of the people in the target state can be explained by the
willingness of people in the target state to follow the interim policies of the foreign
intervening country. According to Bell, the real challenge is to maintain the support for
the invading forces after the initial enthusiasm because even punitive expeditions that
were initially justified easily can go bad under the interests of foreign powers.68
Third, Mencius required that the morality of the intervening rulers be superior to
the tyrants they attacked. Rulers that were tyrannical themselves could not wage punitive
expeditions. The morality test of intervening rulers should be made after the end of
punitive expeditions. After expelling the ruler of Yen from Yen, the ruler of Chi not only
behaved tyrannically to the Yen people but also annexed Yen to expand Chi’s territory.
Such actions are not legitimate for intervening rulers. Thus, the rulers of various states
deliberated together about aiding Yen and delivering it from Chi’s abusive power. Facing
this unexpected situation, Mencius condemned the ruler of Chi for his lack of virtue,
which is indispensable to maintaining the ideals of Ping and Tian-Xia. Mencius argued
that the annexation of Yen by Chi could only be justified on the ground that the people of
67
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Yen would be pleased with Chi’s annexation. In addition, Mencius demanded that the
ruler of Chi immediately order that all captives be released, removal of precious of
vessels stopped, and that Chi withdraw as soon as the new ruler was in place. Mencius
strongly argued that the use of force for punitive expedition must not end up in greater
misery through another tyrant imposed by the intervening forces.69
Fourth, rulers participating in wars of punitive expeditions must have some moral
claims to have the world’s support. Mencius points to the example of a justified punitive
expedition led by King Tang: “The Book of History says, ‘In his punitive expeditions
Tang began with Ge.’ The whole world was in sympathy with his cause. When he
marched on the east, western tribes complained. When he marched to the south, the
northern tribes complained. They said, ‘Why does he not come to us first?’”
The main reason that rules for participating in punitive expeditions require that
the intervening leader should win the world’s support can be found in the ideals of Ping
and Tian-Xia. Confucianism generally regarded the support of the world as a basic
element constituting the ideals of Tian-Xia. Under Confucianism, the will of people is
the will of heaven. Put differently, the holy orders from the heaven (Tian) that should not
be violated in the whole world (Tian-Xia) are ultimately identical to the accumulation of
peoples’ wishes. Thus, winning the hearts and minds of people in the target state and the
support of any other states means that a punitive expedition is legitimately approved by
the whole world (Tian-Xia).
In short, according to Mencius, the use of punitive expeditions is justified only if
virtuous rulers use military force to punish tyrants with the support of the suffering
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people and to restore peace and benevolence to that foreign society so that it can continue
to strive for Tian-Xia and Ping. 70

6.3.2 Confucianism and International Law on the Use of Force
Although Confucians had a clear view on the use of force by states, any attempt to
relate this view directly to the modern international law on the use of force needs to be
done with care and perspective. Unlike the Western Just War tradition, Confucianism has
no systematic code on the use of force, including detailed provisions on jus ad bellum and
jus in bello. Classical Confucians generally warned about the terrible results caused by
war between states and tried to persuade the rulers of states not to wage war against other
states for the sake of increasing their territories and powers.
However, similarities and differences between Confucian thinking on the use of
forces and rules of international law on the use of force exist and are worth exploring.
Similarities can be found in the broad prohibition on the use of force by states, except the
use of force for self-defense and in situations to relieve great suffering on the part of
other people. Differences between the Confucian perspective on the use of force and
contemporary international law on the use of force are also present.
Despite admitting the necessity of self-defense for maintaining Ping and Tian-Xia,
Confucians rejected attempts to broaden the scope of self-defense. Basically, Confucians
regarded the use of force for self-defense as an unavoidable option for maintaining Ping
and Tian-Xia within countries and for the entire world. In other words, the use of force
for self-defense is a necessary evil for rectifying injustice brought about by the attack of
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one state against another state. Under the Confucian perspective, the best way for a state
to rule out the possibility of attack by another state should be sought in fortifying the
national defense system. Although Confucius admitted the necessity of the use of force
for self-defense, Confucians took a negative view on the first strike of a state against
another state, except for the purpose of punitive expeditions as discussed above, because
this first strike undoubtedly leads to the escalation of violence between states and the
deterioration in the welfare of the people, which would undermine prospects of pursuing
Ping and Tian-Xia. In this sense, Confucians took a negative view on what we today call
anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense.
With regard to contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention, there are
some differences between the punitive expeditions discussed by Confucians and
arguments about humanitarian intervention under modern international law. First,
unilateral punitive expeditions could occur in the Confucian perspective without the need
for a state to clear any procedural hurdles (e.g., authorization by a collectivity of states).
Under international law, humanitarian intervention without the authorization of the
UNSC remains very controversial which heightens the importance of the UNSC as a
procedural requirement for engaging in humanitarian intervention. Of course, Confucius
and Mencius developed their ideas long before institutions such as the UN were
conceived. The closest analogy in Confucian thinking is the need for the punitive
expeditions to find favor with the wider world, but this favor was not something sought in
advance or over which a small number of great powers had disproportionate say. Thus, it
was open to any state to satisfy the conditions for a legitimate punitive expedition.
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Although Confucians did not require formal authorization for punitive expeditions
from the wider community of states, Confucians required that states undertaking punitive
expeditions should have informal, post hoc authorization in the form of the support of the
world and the welcome of the people in the target state. The Confucian perspective set
very high thresholds for punitive expeditions to meet before they could be considered
legitimate, and these thresholds echo the purpose of the criteria (e.g., necessity,
proportionality, action limited to helping end the atrocities) proponents of humanitarian
intervention apply to the right to use force to relieve great human suffering in other states.
In the end, the Confucian perspective on the use of force by states shares key
substantive similarities with the content of modern international law and the debates in
international law about the right of self-defense and humanitarian intervention. The
differences more often than not relate to procedural or institutional issues (e.g., the role of
the UNSC) than to substantive principles and concepts of legitimacy. We can see in
Confucian thinking the very spaces over which international lawyers argue about the
meaning of the rules of international law on the use of force, and we can also see in the
Confucian approach deep skepticism about expanding justifications for the use of force
and high thresholds for determining the legitimacy of actions.

6.3.3 The Confucian Perspective Applied to the First and Second Gulf Wars
To help illuminate how the Confucian perspective relates to contemporary debates
about the morality and legality of the use of force, this section applies the Confucian
approach to the First and Second Gulf Wars. The First Gulf War provides an example of
the exercise of individual and collective self-defense against aggression, and the Second
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Gulf War provides material to analyze the Confucian view on pre-emptive self-defense
and humanitarian intervention.

The First Gulf War: Individual and Collective Self-Defense
As noted above, Confucianism recognized that the use of force in self-defense
against aggression is legitimate. When attacked by Iraq in August 1990, Kuwait had a
right of self-defense, including the right to call on other countries to help it respond to
Iraqi aggression and Iraq’s desire to annex Kuwait and have access to its oil resources.
Other features of the First Gulf War also resonate with the Confucian approach to the use
of force by states. To begin, the use of force in self-defense certainly had the support of
the Kuwaiti people, who were liberated from Iraqi occupation. The United States and its
allies also fought a limited conflict directed at expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait and did
not attempt to occupy or annex Iraqi territory, overthrow the government of Iraq, or
exploit Iraqi oil resources for selfish ends. The military action allowed the Kuwaiti
government to return, thus re-establishing peace and the prospects for benevolence in that
country. Finally, the use of force to defend Kuwaiti had characteristics of justified
punitive expeditions to punish a ruler who blatantly violated the principle of Tian-Xia and
Ping.
The role of the UN in the First Gulf War proves more difficult from the Confucian
perspective. In the Confucian approach, the UN does not play the role of Tian-Zi, who,
as an individual ruler, has the duty to realize Tian-Xia and Ping. The UN’s authorization
of the use of force in self-defense by Kuwait and its allies added, however, to the
legitimacy of the use of force in the Confucian view because such authorization was a
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sign of the peaceful and benevolence intent of the military action with respect to Kuwait
and the wider Middle East. 71 The UNSC authorization also, in the Confucian perspective,
acts as a surrogate for the support of the wider world that uses of force need to resonate
with Ping and Tian-Xia.

The Second Gulf War: Pre-Emptive Self-Defense and Humanitarian Intervention
The Confucian perspective on the use of force in self-defense is consistent with
the lack of controversy in contemporary international law about the legitimacy of using
force in individual and collective self-defense against external aggression. More
problematical in international law are the issues of the scope of the right to use force in
self-defense and whether there is a right to engage in humanitarian intervention. Both
these issues arose in the Second Gulf War, launched by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in
March 2003. Applying Confucianism’s views on the use of force by states to the Second
Gulf War provide insights into the Confucian perspective on these burning contemporary
questions in international law and international relations.

The Second Gulf War and the Question of Pre-Emptive Self-Defense
From a Confucian perspective, the Second Gulf War cannot be considered a
legitimate use of force in self-defense. Among the U.S. justifications for its invasion of
Iraq was that it acted under a doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense, which represents an
expansive reading of a right of anticipatory self-defense.72 The United States argued that
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it had a right under international law to use force pre-emptively against a tyrannical
regime that threatened U.S. security through its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction
and its support for terrorism.73 This assertion has proved very controversial under
international law and by no means represents an accepted part of international legal
doctrine on the right to use of force in self-defense. In fact, the United States was the
only country that participated in, or supported, the invasion that justified it on the basis of
a right of pre-emptive self-defense.
The Confucian perspective supports the opponents of a broad right to anticipatory
self-defense as articulated by the United States in connection with the invasion of Iraq.
Confucians acknowledge the necessity of the use of force for self-defense, both
individual and collective. However, Confucius placed limits on what the use of force in
self-defense justifies. Confucians interpret the right to self-defense very narrowly as a
justification for using military force. Broadening the ability of using force in self-defense
simply creates more opportunities for states to use force for purposes not related to
protecting their territories from military attack. In the case of the invasion of Iraq, the
United States could not achieve its objective without occupying the country and effecting
“regime change,” two objectives the Confucian perspective cannot accommodate with its
narrow interpretation of the right to use force in self-defense.
More generally, Confucians frown on expansive notions of self-defense because
such notions would simply tempt rulers to use military power in ways that more broadly
threaten the pursuit of Tina-Xia and Ping. Further, broad readings of the right to use
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force in self-defense really only benefit strong powers with the military capabilities to
wage war beyond their own territories. Countries with weaker or smaller militaries have
no effective ability to take advantage of an expanded concept of anticipatory self-defense.
The presence of a right that is not really reciprocal in terms of rulers and states does not
find favor in Confucian thinking.

The Second Gulf War and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention
The Second Gulf War can also be interpreted as a humanitarian invasion, one that
liberated the suffering people of Iraq from a tyrannical government. In fact, after the
United States failed to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, it began to use
justifications that appealed to the humanitarian nature of the invasion. Justifying the
invasion of Iraq as a humanitarian intervention is also controversial, and the Confucian
perspective would add its weight to those who believe that the invasion cannot be
considered a legitimate use of force for humanitarian purposes.
To begin, the Confucian perspective would not support the argument that Iraq
qualified as a case in which foreign military intervention for humanitarian purposes was
justified. As with the right of self-defense, Confucianism has a narrow view of the
grounds that justify humanitarian intervention. According to Mencius, the most
important obligation of a state is to feed its people. In ancient China, the main threat to
peace and security was the anger and violence of a starving people. Hence the good ruler
made securing the basic means of subsistence of the people the most significant goal that
the state has to achieve.74
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This proposition recalls the Confucian-influenced preference in Asia for
emphasizing the material needs of the people over protecting civil and political rights and
achieving democratic governments. For all its problems, the Iraqi government was not
systematically depriving the Iraqi people of basic subsistence needs. From a Confucian
perspective, the Iraqi government’s failure to accord the Iraqi people civil and political
rights of the kind emphasized in the West was not a justification for military
intervention.75 Under the Confucian approach, humanitarian intervention is justified in
cases in which a foreign ruler or state deliberately denies its population the basic means
of subsistence (e.g., intentional starvation) or in which a state has collapsed, exposing the
population to widespread famine and starvation.76 For instance, if true, the North Korean
government’s deliberate starvation of its people would trigger a Confucian sense that
humanitarian intervention would be justified.
The second problem with viewing the Second Gulf War as a humanitarian
intervention from the Confucian perspective involves the failure of the United States and
its allies to improve significantly peace and benevolence in Iraq. The problems that have
afflicted Iraq after the initial successful invasion are well known and need not be detailed
here,77 but the levels of violence and insecurity that developed in the wake of the invasion
raise the concerns Confucianism has with humanitarian interventions. According to
Mencius, rulers engaging in military interventions in other states should liberate and win
the hearts of the people in concrete ways. Winning the hearts of the people in concrete
ways can be found in the willingness of the people to follow and support the policies of
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intervening foreign states. Thus, if there is significant resistance to the policies of
intervening foreign states by people in the target state, the intervening foreign states
cannot be regarded as winning the hearts of the people in concrete ways. The failure of
the U.S. military occupation of Iraq produced the violent insurgency that has plagued Iraq
since the summer of 2003, and a Confucian perspective would fault the United States for
not securing peace and benevolence for Iraqis. This failure taints the legitimacy of the
invasion and occupation as a humanitarian intervention.
Finally, the Confucian perspective would highlight that the dubious reasons for
the invasion of Iraq and the tragic mishandling of the invasion’s aftermath raise questions
about the morality of the rulers who launched the Second Gulf War. According to
Mencius, rulers that engage in punitive expeditions for humanitarian reasons must clearly
have a superior moral basis for using force than the tyrants being attacked. The lack of
strong legal basis for the invasion, and the absence of direct UNSC authorization of the
military action, focuses the spotlight more intensely on the reasons why the United States
and its allies resorted to force against Iraq, and, as illustrated in this analysis, the reasons
for the invasion differed according to the needs and problems of the invaders not the
needs and problems of the Iraqi people. Such a tarnished moral basis for the invasion
matters in Confucian thinking about humanitarian intervention and leads to the Confucian
conclusion that the invasion of Iraqi was not a legitimate humanitarian action.
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The Second Gulf War and the Question of UN Security Council Authorization
Unlike the First Gulf War, the Second Gulf War came under attack for its
illegitimacy because the UNSC had not expressly approved the military attack.78
Countries participating in the invasion, such as the United States and the United Kingdom,
argued that UNSC had authorized the military action because the authorization to use
force against Iraq from the First Gulf War (Resolution 678) had never technically been
terminated, and Iraq’s intransigence on weapons inspections (Resolutions 687 and 1441)
constituted a material breach of the cease-fire (Resolution 687), which brought the
authorization to use force back to life. Even though the UNSC Resolution 1441 passed
unanimously, Russia, China, and France issued a joint statement declaring that
Resolution1441 did not authorize any “automaticity” in the use of force against Iraq, and
that a further the UNSC resolution was needed to authorize the use of force.79 Moreover,
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the United States and the United Kingdom came under fierce attack for failing to get
explicit UNSC approval for military action against Iraq.80
Confucius did not require the prior authorization of the use of force by a higher
entity to legitimize the use of force by states for restoring Ping and Tian-Xia. Thus, the
attempt to criticize the allied invasion forces for failing to get the authorization of the
UNSC does not directly make sense under the Confucian perspective. Confucians
emphasized that the support of world is indispensable to determining legitimacy of
punitive expeditions by foreign states, but it would not be accurate to equate this
Confucian idea with UNSC authorization of a use of force, especially in light of the
myriad concerns surrounding the legitimacy of the UNSC as the body mandated to
maintain international peace and security.

6.3.4 The Asian Perspective on Humanitarian Intervention
The Asian perspective on humanitarian intervention is not only informed by the
Confucian philosophical position but also by Asian countries’ various experiences as
victims of military intervention by foreign powers. As noted earlier in this thesis, the
historical experiences of Asian countries with imperial countries inform these countries’
strong embrace of the international legal principles of sovereignty and non-interference in
the domestic affairs of other states. The historical experiences of Asian countries with
imperial powers and their manipulation of rules of international law (e.g., the standard of
civilization) has encouraged Asian countries to adopt a strict attitude towards
80
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interpretation of existing fundamental rules and principles of international law in order to
prevent the great powers from using international law as an excuse for pursuing their
selfish interests. Thus, with regard to humanitarian intervention, Asian countries
generally oppose reading international law as allowing countries to engage in
humanitarian intervention without the direct authorization of the UNSC.81
Many Asian countries, such as most of the members of ASEAN and China, have
in principle and practice opposed any outside interference in their domestic affairs,
especially their political or security affairs. Drawing on the UN Charter, ASEAN
countries have made non-intervention in each other’s internal affairs a cardinal principle
of intraregional relations.82 Although they recognize the legitimacy of international
community’s concerns over gross violation of human rights, Asian countries fear that a
doctrine of humanitarian intervention may be used as an excuse by great powers to
intervene in the affairs of weak states for reasons unrelated to humanitarian impulses.
For the purpose of preventing abusive humanitarian intervention, Asian countries assert
that any humanitarian intervention against a state should be based on clear and objective
criteria, undertaken without discrimination, and in a manner that fully respects the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state concerned.83 For instance,
former foreign minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia noted the increasing international focus
on human security has triggered humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and
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Kosovo, but he warned that such interventions were dangerous and illegitimate without
clear criteria accepted by the international community and approved by the UNSC.84
There are at least three reasons that help explain Asian countries’ opposition to a
doctrine of humanitarian intervention in international law, especially a doctrine that
permits unilateral humanitarian intervention without the authorization of the UNSC. First,
Asian countries have argued that the UN Charter provides no basis for recognizing the
right to use force for humanitarian intervention in situations not involving self-defense or
authorization by the UNSC. Although the UN Charter recognizes the promotion of
human rights as one of the UN’s purposes, this recognition does not trump the other
purposes and principles of the UN, including respecting state sovereignty and the equality
of sovereign states. Mani indicates that sovereignty means a shield that allows countries
to protect themselves from more powerful states and that permits countries the policy
space to protect and develop their right of self-determination and political independence,
their socio-economic systems, and their national identities and personalities.85 The strong
embrace of the principles of sovereign and non-intervention not only reflect Asian
acceptance of these key tenets of the traditional Westphalian international system but also
Asian political and philosophical skepticism about humanitarian intervention as a positive
force in world affairs. In short, for Asian countries, humanitarian intervention is based on
questionable political and moral grounds, often causes more harm to people than good,
and threatens to undermine rules and principles that sustain inter-state relations.86
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Second, Asian countries warn that the use of force for humanitarian intervention
is dangerous because it both cloaks ulterior political motives and advances a particular
moral perspective not necessarily shared by all countries. The history of Asian countries
with imperial powers makes them very skeptical of great power claims that certain
actions are required to protect humanity and advance civilization.87 Typically, these
humanitarian protestations obscure more base motives for wanting to take action, motives
that have little if anything to do with humanitarian interests. In terms of moral
perspectives, Asian countries also tend to be skeptical that human rights arguments justify
humanitarian intervention at the point of a gun. Asian countries are not generally
convinced that the “international community” has achieved sufficient integration of
values to warrant a militarized enforcement mechanism for international human rights
violations. The reality of human rights in international system is that the acceptance and
implementation of human rights varies greatly, which is not a strong platform on which to
build a doctrine of allowing force to be used for humanitarian purposes.88
In addition, Western countries often seem fixated on creating an effective right to
intervene for humanitarian purposes after a tragedy has started to unfold rather than on
accepting serious duties to provide economic and other forms of assistance to countries to
ensure that such tragedies do not occur. Advocacy for a doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, thus, seems to many in Asia as cynically reactive as opposed to
constructively proactive, which perhaps hides ulterior political motives in the desire to
intervene.89 The answer to the crisis that gives rise to calls for a doctrine of humanitarian
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intervention is not military intervention but more constructive cooperation and assistance
to support fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights, which might help re-orient
perspectives on what policies are in fact more humanitarian in nature and effect.
Third, according to Thakur, Asian countries take a negative view on humanitarian
intervention because of its inconsistent application, which reflects double standards and
the selective nature of Western powers’ interest in human rights protection.90 Asian
countries warn that humanitarian intervention should not be used as the pretext for
imposing external political preferences with regard to regimes and political and economic
systems. Thus, while acknowledging the need for humanitarian action in limited
situations, such as genocide, Asian countries generally oppose any more robust doctrine
of humanitarian intervention. When it is necessary, Asian countries maintain that
humanitarian intervention should be the option of last resort and should be temporary. In
addition, intervening forces must withdraw as soon as possible, and their actions while
inside the target country must be guided by political impartiality and neutrality between
the domestic political contenders as well as strict fidelity to international humanitarian
law.91
In sum, the Asian perspective on the controversy about humanitarian intervention
in international law shows consistency between philosophical and political influences.
As analyzed earlier, the Confucian perspective recognizes the potential need for the use
of force for humanitarian purposes, but Confucian thinking is skeptical about claims of
military actions driven by humanitarian motivation and, as a result, set very high and
difficult thresholds such intervention has to meet in order to be considered legitimate.
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Similarly, the historical experiences of Asian countries with imperialism and great power
politics have hardened them against calls for a robust doctrine of humanitarian
intervention in international law. In the narrow contexts where such intervention may be
needed, Asian countries emphasize the need to satisfy demanding criteria before (e.g.,
UNSC authorization) and after (e.g., political impartiality and temporary presence)
military action for humanitarian purposes.
The political and philosophical influences reflected in the Asian position do not
constitute a radical departure from, or challenge to, the existing discourse on
humanitarian intervention in international law. Many experts in the West are also highly
skeptical about calls for a stronger doctrine on humanitarian intervention, and existing
rules of international law are widely interpreted consistently with the general Asian
perspective. In that sense, Eastphalia does not look that different from Westphalia. The
key variable in this context, then, is not the political and philosophical influences that
shape the Asian perspective. Rather, it is the power the Asian countries now possess in
the international system. This power means that their perspective has to be taken more
seriously in the debates on cutting-edge issues, such as the scope and substance of the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

6.3.5 Asia and Humanitarian Intervention: The Troubling Problem of Myanmar
The consistency of the Asian perspective on humanitarian intervention from the
political and philosophical angles does not mean that this perspective is without problems
or critics, especially in an international system in which Asian countries have more
material power. Frustration in the West with Asian preferences for principles of near-
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absolute sovereignty and non-intervention partly arise because the Asian perspective does
not appear to contain any positive ideas on how states should deal with atrocities and
oppression taking place in other countries. If a robust doctrine of humanitarian
intervention is not accepted, what other approaches or strategies do Asian countries
suggest for addressing terrible problems of humanitarian abuses and disaster in the
international system? Does Eastphalia contain anything more than a warmed over
version of 19th century Westphalian principles of absolute sovereignty and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of states? Do Asian countries, with their growing
material and political importance in this era of globalization, have wider responsiblities
for working to establish conditions necessary to allow Ping and Tian-Xia to be fostered
not just in their own territories but in the global community?
The contrast between Western and Asian perspective on humanitarian intervention
are perhaps most stark in connection with Myanmar. Generally speaking, Western
countries have favored more interventionist policies for trying to address the nightmare
the junta in Myanmar is creating for its people, and increasingly for the region. Asian
countries have generally opposed interventionist strategies and have been unwilling to
engage the junta strongly to force it to change its policies. This contrast was again
present in the wake of the devastating cyclone that hit Myanmar in 2008. Thus, the
question of what to do about Myanmar provides a good case study of the challenges that
the Asian perspective on humanitarian intervention poses for Asian countries in the early
21st century.
The controversies over humanitarian intervention in Myanmar after the cyclone
raised significant questions about the approach Asian countries take to humanitarian
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needs in the international community.92 The post-cyclone devastation in Myanmar,
combined with the junta’s deliberate efforts not to allow foreign humanitarian assistance
to reach desperate populations, created a humanitarian crisis that Confucianism might
recognize as a candidate for outside intervention. The cyclone massively threatened the
ability of people in Myanmar to access basic survival goods (e.g., food, water, shelter),
and the junta deliberately prevented foreign humanitarian assistance from reaching
people facing death by disease and malnutrition. Confucian conceptions of good
governance would recognize nothing the junta did in the aftermath of the cyclone as
satisfying the rulers’ duties to ensure the basic subsistence needs of their peoples.
In addition, the humanitarian intervention needed to bring relief to the cyclone
victims in Myanmar did not require the use of force against the junta. The humanitarian
intervention required was disaster relief, which does not raise the same questions that
engaging in armed conflict for humanitarian purposes creates. Thus, the political
concerns for Asian countries about humanitarian intervention, and their concerns about
great power machinations in such interventions, should have been less significant. The
dangers that Confucianism and Asia’s experiences with interventions traditionally
identify were not, in post-cyclone Myanmar, an issue. Further, worries about a lack of
support from the people of Myanmar and the international community were also not a
concern because wider and faster delivery of humanitarian aid would have been
embraced within and beyond Myanmar as a peaceful and benevolent act. Finally, Asian
countries were well positioned materially and politically to engage Myanmar to persuade
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the junta to allow more foreign humanitarian assistance to reach the suffering people of
Myanmar.
Despite this conducive context, Asian countries generally stuck to their traditional
opposition to intervention that would impinge on the sovereignty of a state. The lack of
the willingness of Asian countries to engage Myanmar more effectively, combined with
the desire of some Western countries to use the UNSC to force Myanmar to accept
humanitarian assistance, forced the problem of relieving the suffering in Myanmar to be
overshadowed by maneuvering on both sides to prevent or establish, as the case may be,
a precedent of UNSC authorized, non-violent humanitarian intervention to provide
disaster relief. China’s UN ambassador argued that the humanitarian situation in
Myanmar was not an issue for the UNSC.93 He also asserted that current problem in
Myanmar was a natural disaster, which should not be politicized.94 The Southeast Asian
countries and India agreed with the position of China.95
What was not clear from Asian positions taken in this incident was whether any
Asian countries developed a positive agenda for engaging Myanmar in disaster relief and
working to widen the distribution of foreign aid to suffering people. The Asian
perspective, at least as played out in the international media, was one that seemed fixated
on defending sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention at all costs. Undoubtedly,
Asian countries offered Myanmar support and disaster relief supplies, but there is no
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evidence of a concerted effort made by Asian countries to prod Myanmar to perform
more effectively in responding to this disaster. No Asian version of a “responsibility to
protect” principle or duty was present in this episode.96 Neither the Confucian heritage of
many Asian nations nor the historical experience of Asian countries with imperialism
provides support for this passivity from countries in a region of growing global power
and leadership. Whether Asian countries want their response to the disaster in Myanmar
to be the face of an Eastphalian contribution to international law and global governance is
an important question for Asian countries to consider.

6.4. Human Security with an Asian Face? The Asian Approach to the Emerging
Concept of Human Security
6.4.1 The Concept of Human Security
Traditional notions of security, shaped largely by structure and dynamics of the
Cold War, were concerned mainly with a state’s ability to counter external military threats
from rival states. After the end of the Cold War and the impact of a new phase of
globalization, the traditional perspective on security, with its focus on the survival of
states, has been challenged by the rise of new types of security threats, such as the
dangers of environmental pollution, transnational terrorism, massive population
movements, and infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS.97 These new security threats
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pose dangers not only to the security of the state (e.g., national security) but also to the
security of individuals and communities (e.g., human security). Behind the perceived rise
of these new security threats is the idea that the security of individuals cannot be
protected by the military capabilities of states because these capabilities do not provide
defenses against transnational dangers accelerated by globalization. In these
circumstances, the security conditions of individual human beings are more vulnerable to
newly emerging security threats, creating the need to think about security policy in very
different ways.

Overview of the Human Security Concept
The idea of human security was most famously introduced in the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) Report of 1994.98 According to the UNDP Report:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security
of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in
foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust.
Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought
security in their daily lives.99

The UNDP asserted that human security has two main elements: protection from
(1) threats, such as hunger, disease, and repression; and (2) sudden and harmful
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disruptions in the patterns of daily life.100 The UNDP also asserted that globalization
creates the need to think about security in human rather than state-centric terms: “In the
globalizing world of shrinking time, shrinking space and disappearing borders, people are
confronting new threats to human security—sudden and harmful disruption in the pattern
of daily life.”101 According to the UNDP, there are seven specific elements that comprise
human security: (1) economic security; (2) food security; (3) health security; (4)
environmental security; (5) personal security; (6) community security; and (7) political
security.102
Human security seeks to reorient the pursuit of security by placing individual
human beings at the center of security concerns.103 Tigerstrom indicates that the humancentered focus of the concept of human security demands explicit attention to the needs
and interests of individuals, and gives analytical and moral priority to individuals’ needs
and interest over those of states.104 She also points out that the core of the humancentered approach in human security is the normative priority of people’s security,
especially in relation to states’ security.105 According to Fidler, the theoretical foundation
of human security is rooted in the theory of social constructivism.106 Fidler notes that
“[S]ocial constructivists generally focus on the ideational move away from the narrow,
realist concept of national security toward more expansive notion of security, such as
100
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human security, a shift that illustrates the power of ideas to shape how humans socially
construct their relations globally.”107
There are three different understandings about how best to understand and
promote human security.108 The first understanding is a rights-based approach to human
security, which focuses on the rule of law and treaty-based solutions to human security.
This approach seeks to strengthen normative legal frameworks at both international and
regional levels while also deepening and strengthening human rights law and legal and
judicial systems at the national level.109 The second understanding is centered primarily
on a humanitarian conception of human security where the “safety of people” is the
paramount objective behind international relations. This approach sees war as one of the
principal threats to human security and identifies a need to go beyond the provision of
emergency and humanitarian relief in war-torn societies and conflict settings by
addressing the underlying causes of conflict and violence.110 The third understanding is
the “sustainable human development” approach that takes a comprehensive view of what
is required to produce human security. This approach is associated with the UNDP’s
multi-faceted definition of human security described above.111
Under each of these approaches, human security broadens the scope of threats that
should be considered security priorities. Under human security, a security can be
construed as any menace to “the quality of life of individuals.”112 Thus, human security
regards the problems of hunger, poverty, environmental degradation, underdevelopment,
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infectious diseases, and even natural disasters, such as tsunamis, as the most urgent
security threats to daily life of individuals.113 Human security highlights the
interdependence of these various security concerns. For instance, if one group or
individual is threatened, many other communities are also likely at risk. Violations of
human rights in a state cannot be contained in that one state alone. This perspective
reveals an intrinsic aspect of human security: to a certain extent, all human kind is
inextricably connected.114

Challenging Dominant Concepts of Security
Human security represents a challenge to the traditional notion of security, which
has been dominated by a realpolitik security perspective, by placing individual human
beings at the center of security concerns. Theoretically, realpolitik security flows from
the theory of realism, which emphasizes four features of international relations: (1)
statism; (2) anarchy; (3) survival of states; and (4) the self-help system.115 Statism means
that the state is the pre-eminent actor and all other actors in international politics are of
lesser significance.116 In terms of anarchy, anarchy does not imply chaos in international
politics. Anarchy means that no higher authority directs states’ behavior.117 Because
states are the only pre-eminent actors in international politics, the primary objective of all
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states is their own survival.118 The survival of states is held to be a precondition for
attaining all other goals. Because anarchy means that no higher authority exists to
prevent and counter the use or threat of force, state security can only be realized through
self-help.119 In this context, states cannot guarantee their own absolute security under the
anarchical structure of international politics. Therefore, realism focuses on the
importance of states increasing their material capabilities, especially military power, in
order to reduce their insecurity.120
Under realism, state competition for material power brings about the security
dilemma from which none can escape.121 The security dilemma occurs when two or more
states each feel insecure vis-à-vis other states that they do not trust. Under anarchy and
the self-help system, no states feel secure, and no states trust other states not to take
aggressive actions. Thus, states make considerable efforts to strengthen their security
needs through increasing their military forces. This effort by one state increases
insecurity for other states, and this security dilemma easily leads to tensions, conflict, and
war.122 Although this dilemma can be mitigated (e.g., through balance of power
alliances), it cannot be surmounted, as long as states possess ultimate military and
material power in a political context characterized by anarchy. Consequently, states have
no choice but to pursue power as an overriding imperative.123
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In this context, the military and material power that a state has play a crucial role
in the perspective of realpolitik security. In addition, because the balance of power is the
central mechanism for international order under realism, states often ally with other states
in order to preserve the balance of power among competing states.124 Because military
and material capabilities of states have paramount importance in realpolitik security, this
approach takes seriously neither non-military nor non-material capabilities of states, such
as human rights, the rule of law, and democratic government.125 In this context, nonmilitary or non-material capabilities or attributes of states only matter in realpolitik
security to the extent that these capabilities directly affect military or material capabilities
of states.
However, under the impact of globalization, material capabilities, especially
military capabilities, do not necessarily enhance the security of states. In other words, no
matter how much states fortify military capabilities and reinforce alliances with other
states for the protection of their security, their efforts may be ineffective against new
threats driven by globalization.126 These globalized threats directly make realpolitk
security obsolete as a perspective on security issues. In addition, realpolitik security has
little conceptually or practically to offer in terms of policies for addressing the new
transnational security concerns fueled by globalization. In this sense, the attempt of
human security to place the protection of individual human beings before that of state
directly challenges just about everything found in realpolitk security.
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Globalization + Human Rights = Human Security
The rise of human security as a concept in international relations and international
law has been fueled by the convergence of the latest phase of globalization and the
strengthening of the global human rights movement. First, the loss of power by states
and intergovernmental organizations caused by the turbulence of globalization creates or
exacerbates potential new threats to individual lives. Many individuals are exposed to
various threats that have become increasingly transnationalized, such as corruption,
repression, discrimination, extreme poverty and communicable and non-communicable
diseases that cannot be addressed effectively within the traditional structure and dynamics
of the Westphalian state system, especially its myopic perspective on what constitutes a
security threat.127 Thus, there is an urgent necessity to reconsider globalized security
concerns that directly affect the daily life of individuals.
Second, the human rights movement has made a critical contribution to the
emergence of the idea of human security. The concept of human rights contains a
fundamental belief in the indivisibility of security and human rights.128 This belief well
suits the insecurities individuals face in a world of globalized problems. Under the
indivisibility of security and human rights, there can be no security for individuals if their
right to life is endangered. Similarly, security is also absent when individuals are denied
the right to subsistence, such as through the denial of food, clothing, and housing. If
security is defined as protection from harm, then the infringement of fundamental rights
creates insecurity.129 In this context, the expanding activities of NGOs, such as Amnesty
127
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International, Médecins Sans Frontières, and the International Committee of the Red
Cross, reflect this linkage between security and human rights. In sum, the indivisibility
of security and human rights, stimulated by the human rights movement, can be
considered an essential factor contributing to the rise of human security.

Concerns and Controversies about the Concept of Human Security
Although human security represents a powerful perspective in the age of
globalization, there are debates about the definition, applicability, and relevance of
human security in international relations today.130 The most powerful critique of human
security is that it is an overly broad and obscure concept of security.131 The lack of a
precise scope and definition of human security makes the tenets of human security appear
meaningless. There is no apparent objective analytical criterion that determines whether
a problem is or is not a human security issue. Moreover, even scholars who claim that
human security has relevance do not suggest that the human security approach embodies
a unified approach to security.132 Paris notes, for example, that “[T]he existing definition
of human security tends to be extraordinary expansive and vague, encompassing
everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides
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policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and
academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied.”133
Human security comes under sharp critique because of its skepticism about states
and the role of state-centric international organizations in security concerns. Although
human security’s emphasis on the importance of non-state actors may be relevant given
globalization’s impacts and the growing power of human rights thinking, it has a
somewhat skeptical view of the potential for cooperation among states and
intergovernmental organizations. However, states and intergovernmental organizations
still play an essential role in managing global security, however defined, because states
still remain enormous material power.134 In fact, the elaboration and development of
human security policies need multidimensional cooperation among states and
intergovernmental organizations. For instance, official development assistance from
developed countries to developing countries plays a huge role in reducing extreme
poverty.135 Non-state actors, no matter how wealthy, simply do not have the scale of
material resources that states can marshal to achieve their domestic and international
interests. Moreover, considering the efforts of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
economic growth and poverty reduction, the UN Secretary-General has advocated close
and more productive cooperation between the UN and the WTO.136
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Despite the controversies surrounding the concept of human security, the concept
has arrived as an important aspect of the dialogue in contemporary international relations
and international law, and global governance. Problems and skepticism typically stalk
ideas on the cutting edge of global politics, and human security is no different in having
its fair share of detractors and opponents. The idea of human security is, without
question, one of the leading normative ideas confronting policy makers in the 21st century,
which makes understanding how this concept relates to the potential emergence of an
Eastphalian perspective on international law and global governance worth exploring.

6.4.2 Human Security and the Asian Perspective
The rise of the concept of human security in international relations and
international law and the rise of Asia in world affairs have happened simultaneously
within the past 20 years. Thinking about human security from the perspective of Asian
countries is, thus, more than an academic exercise because whether and how Asian
nations accept this concept will have significant impact on the trajectory of this
normative re-framing of the security debate in national and global governance. The
question this section explores is whether the aspects of the Asian perspective explored in
this thesis offer prospects for Asian countries to become leaders in the development and
refinement of the human security concept. In short, the human security debate offers an
opportunity to peer into what an Eastphalian worldview for the early 21st century might
contain.
The premise of the analysis in this section is not that, at present, Asian countries
have a unitary perspective on human security and its implications for international law
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and global governance. Not surprisingly, Asian countries have been participating in the
arguments about what human security means. Differences among Asian countries can be
seen through viewing attitudes towards human security’s close relationship with two
kinds of freedom: freedom from fear and freedom from want. Connecting the goal of
freedom from want with human security, the former UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Kofi
Annan, emphasized that men and women should be free from want, so that threats such
as extreme poverty and infectious diseases are lifted from their lives.137 With respect to
freedom from fear, the UNSG notes that “[T]he threats to peace and security in the 21st
century include not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime,
terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious
disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic
consequences.”138 In terms of freedom from fear, the UNSG stresses that all men and
women should be free from fear, so that their lives and livelihood are not ripped apart by
violence, war and other forces destructive of individual and social safety and security.139
The freedom from fear and freedom from want lenses circulate in Asian debates
about human security. Anwar notes that “[A]lthough the two dimensions of human
security—freedom from needs and freedom from fear—have been emphasized equally in
official documents, it is no secret that for most NGOs and observers in Asia the main
focus of interest is freedom from fear. Although overcoming poverty is important, there
has been very little debate about the subject at either the national and regional level.”140
Contrary to Anwar’s observation, some Asian states have criticized linking human
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security too closely with freedom from fear. For instance, while acknowledging two
elements of human security, Japan criticizes those who focus solely on freedom from fear.
One Japanese official notes that “[H]uman security is a much broader concept. We
believe that freedom from want is no less critical than freedom from fear. So long as its
objectives are to ensure the survival and dignity of individuals as human beings, it is
necessary to go beyond thinking of human security solely in terms of protecting human
life in conflict situations.”141
More important analytically than such differences over where the emphasis in
human security ought to be placed is whether the Asian perspective on international
relations is conducive or receptive to either the freedom from fear or freedom from want
aspects of the human security concept. As explored in the last section, the human
security concept involves a radical challenge to traditional ways of thinking about
security. Human security changes the focus of the security debate away from the state
and towards the individual. Almost by definition, human security looks past sovereignty
to peer inside the state and assess how the state secures freedom from fear and freedom
from want. The human security concept is heavily influenced by human rights principles,
so the substantive content of human security has a universal quality across nations and
cultures.
Finally, the human security project seems interested in holding states accountable
for how they secure freedom from fear and want for their citizens. In short, pursuing
141
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human security involves the need to intervene into the domestic affairs of states to assess,
admonish, or assist efforts to increase each individual’s freedom from fear and want.
When human security is gravely endangered within a state, human security policies
embrace the right for other countries to intervene, perhaps even by military force, under
the principle of the responsibility to protect. The responsibility to protect expressly
indicates that the foundation of this principle lies in obligations inherent in the concept of
sovereignty.142 Furthermore, the responsibility to protect principle asserts that, where a
population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the
principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.143
In all these respects, the human security concept is quintessentially postWestphalian because it challenges the traditional notion of sovereignty, tests sovereignty
against a universal standard of treatment of humans, and advocates for intervention into
the domestic affairs of states that do not work toward providing their peoples freedom
from fear and freedoms from want.
The elements of the Asian perspective analyzed in this thesis do not, overall,
combine in a manner receptive to the prevailing content of the human security concept.
Philosophically, the Confucian perspective contains features that resonate with the human
security idea, particularly the emphasis Confucius and Mencius placed on the ruler’s duty
to secure his people’s physical safety (e.g., freedom from fear) and basic material needs
(e.g., freedom from want). Confucianism even contained the idea that one state could
intervene with military force in another state whose rulers failed to secure such basic
142
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levels of individual security and subsistence. We can, thus, find in Confucian thought
features that resemble, if only in a rudimentary way, human security’s universal scope, its
concern with holding leaders accountable, and its integration of mechanisms to intervene
when human security is threatened.
The elements of Confucian thinking that may resonate with human security
concept are, however, overwhelmed by aspects of the Asian perspective that contradict or
oppose the substantive content and policy implications of human security. To begin, the
“Asian values” debate examined in Chapter 5 indicates that many in Asia reject value
universality as a premise for international law and global governance. This attitude
extends back to Asian participation in efforts of developing countries during the Cold
War to stress the importance of peaceful co-existence (e.g., China’s Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence and the Bandung Spirit144), an approach based on respecting the
differences that exist among states. However problematical, advocacy for “Asian values”
reveals a skepticism about and opposition to viewing the values of the West as the
template for governance in other societies with different civilizational and political
histories. Approaching human security should, therefore, be a more conservative
undertaking that respects different traditions and conceptions of the good society.
Two other elements of the Asian perspective augment this more conservative take
on human security. First, the skepticism about universal values connects directly back to
the political experience of Asian peoples being the victims of Western imperial power and
prejudice. The Asian perspective stands as a warning of the dangers of pretending that
power and principle are not two sides of the same coin in international affairs. Second,
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the Asian perspective focused heightened attention on economic, social, and cultural
rights, which, by their very nature and design in international law, are relative to a
country’s level of political, economic, and social development. In short, beyond perhaps
some minimal core content, economic, social, and cultural rights lack clear universally
applicable meaning, unlike most Western-backed civil and political rights.
The Asian perspective also proves difficult for advancing the project of human
security because Asian countries’ tendency to support strongly the principle of
sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. As noted above,
the concept of human security looks past sovereignty and has little patience with states
arguing that sovereignty prevents outsiders from assessing their behavior within their
own territories. The still robust emphasis of Asian countries on the principle of
sovereignty and non-intervention blunt this critical aspect of human security because the
emphasis values sovereignty more than transnational efforts to develop better human
security in all countries. In this respect, Asian countries tend to be consistent because
they oppose outside interference in their own affairs and they refrain from criticizing and
intervening in each other’s domestic affairs. This consistency stands as an obstacle to the
need within the human security project for mechanisms to probe the performance of
states and intervene when states fail to protect and promote freedom from fear and
freedom from want.
Measured against the quintessentially post-Westphalian concept of human security,
the Eastphalian approach looks rather Westphalian in comparison because of its
continued emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention into the domestic affairs of
states. The Asian perspective raises, however, questions about the post-Westphalian
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conception on human security. The most important of these questions is whether the
prevailing concept of human security, and its corollary the principle of the responsibility
to protect, constitutes in fact the best approach for states and the international community
to achieve freedom from fear and freedom from want. From the Asian perspective, the
concept of human security looks like another “one size fits all” solution advocated by
Western countries and human rights advocates that ignores the progress Asia as a region
has made in advancing freedom from fear and freedom from want.
For example, the United Nations reported that Asia’s economic growth
dramatically reduced extreme poverty and hunger, which is the first goal of the
Millennium Development Goals.145 Progress on reducing extreme poverty and hunger
qualifies as progress on increasing freedom from want within the region. Despite
tensions and differences, Asian countries have also avoided becoming engaged in interstate wars as the region has grown in economic and political significance. The absence of
such wars strengthens freedom from fear within the region. These achievements in Asia
are, of course, linked to global phenomena, such as the foundation for global trade
provided by the WTO, and to active Asian participation in the workings of international
and regional governance, such as the United Nations and ASEAN. Nevertheless,
avoiding large-scale wars, significantly increasing economic growth, and reducing
extreme poverty and hunger are noteworthy human security achievements within the
Asian region.
In short, the dissonance between the prevailing concept of human security and
elements of the Asian perspective on international relations should not imply that Asian
145

United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report (2005), p. 6, available at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/pdf/MDG%20Book.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2008).
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countries have made no gains in improving human security. These gains have been made,
however, by following a different approach than the one found in the human security
project associated with the continued attempt to universalize Western liberalism. The
gains made in Asia do not mean that human security problems are few and far between in
Asian countries. As noted earlier in this thesis, Asia today contains the best of the First
World and the worst of the Third World, which makes the region such a fascinating
potential laboratory for global governance on human security.
The Eastphalian recipe for dealing with human security problems is, however,
more conservative and Westphalian than the prevailing concept of human security pushed
in the West. More specifically, at the macro-political level, this recipe involves robust
national engagement with the global economic and financial system as means of
increasing national and regional economic and material wealth and strenuous efforts to
avoid inter-state war and conflict. These strategies require no radical revisions of
existing bodies of international law on the use of force and international economic
cooperation. In terms of how each country internally manages its economic and political
affairs, the Eastphalian approach stresses the need for each government to understand and
faithfully honor the duty it owes to provide security and subsistence for its people, and, in
the Eastphalian context, this duty is informed more by the importance of economic, social,
and cultural rights than Western practices.
However specifically any individual government fulfills its duty is not a basis for
foreign interference and intervention into its domestic affairs. The Eastphalian approach
is tolerant of differences in governmental regimes, economic systems, and cultural
traditions. Changes to such regimes, systems, and traditions will occur, particularly in a
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context of intensifying globalization, but the changes should be as indigenous as possible
and flow from within the country rather than being imposed from without. Both the
philosophical heritage and historical political experiences of Asian countries tend to
equate foreign intolerance of differences with the arrogant ambition of superior power.
Thus, the Eastphalian perspective can embrace human security as an objective but differ
from Western champions of this idea in how state and societies should pursue this
objective.

6.5 The China Factor: China’s Rise, Asian Concepts on Security, and the Future of
International Law
A final issue to consider in this chapter’s analysis of the Asian perspective on
security and its implications for international law is the rise of China as a great power.
Historically, China played a major role in shaping international relations in Asia, and
Western imperialism interrupted Chinese influence by destroying the old Sinocentric
system. Japan, rather than China, was the first Asian great power to emerge after the
Sinocentric system collapsed, but Japan’s day in the sun as the dominant Asian economic
and military power produced tragedy for the region in the 1930s and during the World
War II. China’s recent rise to the status of a new great power is a development of great
magnitude for not only Asia but also the entire international system. For better or worse,
China’s power will permeate almost everything about Asia and the Asian perspective on
international law and global governance. The China factor will be particularly important
in the realm of regional, global, and human security.

182

Although the rise of Chinese power has so far been peaceful, China’s great power
status has the potential to create security problems and conflicts in the Asian region.
Foremost as a possible source of war in Asia is the tense situation between China and
Taiwan, a situation that implicates the security interests of the United States and other
regional powers, including Japan and South Korea. The growing visibility of Chinese
nationalism also raises security concerns in Japan because of the history of tense relations
between the two countries flowing from Japanese aggression against China and other
Asian countries in the 1930s and 1940s. The restoration of Japanese power after World
War II remained confined largely to the economic sphere because of the security umbrella
provided by the United States. But China’s rise as a great power contains a potential
military component not feared in Japan’s post-World War II resurrection.
Even given these worries in the traditional realms of national and international
security, the rise of China is unlikely to create serious challenges to the prevailing system
of international legal rules applicable to the maintenance of international peace and
security. Apart from the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, countries in the
region do not seriously fear military attack by China, which suggests China is not likely
to challenge the existing content of the international legal rules on the use of force
discussed earlier in this chapter, and certainly not in ways the United States attempted in
advocating for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense as a justification for its invasion
of Iraq. China’s power and influence in Asia largely meant that it, rather than the United
States, determined the diplomatic approach the six-country talks took in dealing with the
security problem North Korea’s nuclear weapons program presented. China’s presence on
the UNSC, and its skepticism about the use of force for humanitarian interventions, will
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likely mean that the UNSC does not become active in mandating humanitarian
interventions and advancing the principle of the responsibility to protect. China’s
opposition to UNSC mandates against Myanmar illustrates the likely Chinese approach to
the UNSC’s role in addressing threats to international peace and security.
The China factor in the security area is likely to be more interesting and
controversial beyond the traditional realms of security addressed by the international
legal rules on the use of force in the UN Charter. China’s power and interests are now
truly global, and how China approaches its relations with other countries will be the most
visible projection of an Eastphalian attitude towards international relations in the first part
of the 21st century. The best example of the potential significance of China’s out-of-Asia
impact on the nature of inter-state relations, international law, and global governance
comes from China’s extensive involvement in diplomatic and economic activities in
Africa.146
Unlike the Western approach taken with African countries after the end of the
Cold War, which sought to change radically the nature of African political and economic
governance along Western models (e.g., in the form of structural adjustment policies and
demands for democratic reforms), China is engaging African countries diplomatically and
economically without making demands for serious macro-political and macro-economic
changes in African governance. This approach applies to Chinese relations with such
notorious governments as those in control of the Sudan and Zimbabwe. Although
radically different from the Western post-Cold War approach to Africa, the Chinese
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P. Lyman, China’s Rising Role in Africa, Testimony, Council on Foreign Relations, July 21,
2005, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8436/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008).
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approach is quintessentially Asian in engaging with other countries diplomatically and
economically without directly intervening in the domestic affairs of other states.
As criticism of China’s deepening involvement in Africa from human rights
groups and democracy advocates suggests, the Chinese approach to Africa significantly
narrows the room international human rights law can play in shaping Chinese-African
relations and negates the possibility that expansion notions of human security will
influence diplomatic and economic initiatives between China and African countries.
Instead, the Chinese approach heightens the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention in international law without having such an emphasis prevent China from
massively extending its influence and activities in Africa’s development.
As the growing controversy and concern about China’s involvement in Africa
illustrates, the Chinese approach presents Western countries and their more
interventionist proclivities with a serious challenge. Although experts with a realpolitik
perspective will see in China’s behavior the classic signs of a great power seeking to
augment its material power at the expense of rival states, realpolitik analysis gives no
credence to rules of international law in any context. Those concerned with the future
direction of international law, and its role in global governance, may well be
uncomfortable with the nature of China’s engagement of Africa because it does not
reflect international legal principles other than very strong principles of sovereignty and
non-intervention. Some of the most cutting edge areas of post-Cold War international law,
such as advocacy for human rights, the promotion of democracy, and justifications for
forcible humanitarian intervention, have in theory and practice sought to cut back the
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention found in classical international law.
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An understanding of the Asian perspective on international relations and
international law, as this thesis has tried to provide, suggests that the nature of China’s
approach to Africa should not be as surprising as it seems to many critics to be. This
observation is not intended to express support or agreement with China’s behavior in its
relations with Africa countries; rather, it is meant to underscore that China may be
exporting aspects of the Eastphalian approach as it becomes a global power. China’s
expanding international interests and presence may, therefore, become the global face of
the Eastphalian strategy towards international relations in the first part of the 21st century.
This global face, backed by Chinese power, may set itself against robust continuation of
the post-Cold War trends in international law, which challenged traditional notions of
sovereignty, demanded more accountability from governments, fostered the sovereigntypenetrating processes of globalization, and sought to empower directly individuals and
communities within states and across nations. Whether the globalization of the
Eastphalian approach through Chinese power contributes to the same kind of security and
economic results this approach has garnered within Asia remains, at this time, very
unclear.

6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the Asian perspective on the international law
addressing security issues, particularly the international legal rules relevant to the use of
force, humanitarian intervention, and the concept of human security. This analysis
revealed that the Asian perspective resonated well with traditional interpretations of the
broad prohibition of the use of force by states and a narrow reading of the right to use
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force in self-defense. The Asian perspective weighs in against using humanitarian
intervention as a justification for the use of force by states, at least in the absence of
authorization from the UNSC. In these regards, the Asian perspective does not represent a
radical challenge to existing understandings of international law in these areas because
many Western experts and governments hold similar views. Perhaps more important in
this context is the rise of Asia’s political and economic importance, which gives the views
of Asian countries more traction in international politics. Especially noteworthy in this
sense is China’s emergence as a recognized and more assertive great power in the
international system.
The Asian perspective on security matters in international relations also is
important for the relevance and content of the concept of human security, which has
emerged in the post-Cold War context as a leading normative development with deep
implications for international law and global governance. As this chapter demonstrated,
the Asian approach to international relations and the prevailing manner of explaining the
human security concept do not share much, if any, common ground. In short, the Asian
perspective offers little for advocates of human security to embrace. This fundamental
divergence is not about the governance importance of working towards freedom from
fear and freedom from want; rather, the divergence appears in how states should go about
engaging each other in the pursuit of these objectives. Asian countries can claim that their
approach can lead to gains in human security, as illustrated by the absence of inter-state
wars among Asian countries and the significant reductions in extreme poverty and hunger
Asian countries have made through economic growth. All the attention on the rise of
Asia must mean that Asian countries have more to offer human security than empty
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incantations about the absolute nature of the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention.
The Asian perspective on security explored in this chapter will be significantly
influenced by China’s emergence as a great power in global affairs. China’s increasing
global interests, involvement, and initiatives may well be the mechanisms through which
the Eastphalian approach to international law and relations becomes globalized. China’s
great power status will, if nothing else, create an alternative approach to the more
interventionist Western perspective refined after the end of the Cold War. The nature of
this competition between the Eastphalian and the post-Westphalian perspectives is not yet
clear, and predicting the future is always a dangerous game. The last chapter of this thesis
will, however, probe the prospects for the globalizing Eastphalian perspective in the hope
of casting some dim light toward the uncertain future.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: Eastphalia Rising?
Asia, International Law, and Global Governance

7.1 Introduction
The previous chapters of this thesis explored whether and how the rise of Asia’s
importance strategically, politically, and economically may affect international law and
global governance as the 21st century progresses. These chapters attempted to push
beyond the superficial conclusion that Asia’s increased prominence would be a factor in
shaping the future of international law and global governance. Political power is, of
course, relevant to how states, international organizations, and non-state actors will
operate international legal and global governance mechanisms in the future. This thesis
has probed whether the manner in which Asian countries engage in international relations
may reflect more than material power and help shape global affairs in ways that project
ideas and approaches different from the dominant post-Westphalian trends seen since the
end of the Cold War.
This line of enquiry has proved daunting and difficult, often raising more
questions than answers. The notion that an “Asian perspective” can be culled from the
diversity of the Asian region still may strike some as fanciful, but the idea and the attempt
to analyze it has proved useful in highlighting features of Asian thinking and practice that
may not otherwise have been considered in on-going debates about the future trajectories
of international law and global governance. Part of the deeper hypothesis with this
analysis is that ideas and historical traditions shape international law in addition to the
disequilibrium of power that exists in any international system.
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Part of the historical story of international law involves the “clash of civilizations”
that took place when West met East, especially during the march of Western imperialism
into Asia in the 19th century. The Asian attitude to international relations and international
law has long been colored by the subordination of Asian culture and civilization to
Western power and practices. The search for an Eastphalian approach to global affairs
undertaken in this thesis was not a search for, or prediction of, another clash of
civilizations. The contours of an Eastphalian approach have proven more subtle and, thus,
more difficult to tease out clearly. This lingering ambiguity offers a target for criticism,
but criticism would reflect stimulation of dialogue and debate about developments that
are controversial but potentially of profound significance.
This concluding chapter reviews the major arguments of the thesis, explores the
strengths and weaknesses of the discernable features of an Eastphalian approach, and
offers some thoughts on the problems the Eastphalian perspective may present to efforts
in international law and global governance to advance important normative agendas in
world affairs.

7.2 Pillars of the Eastphalian Approach to International Relations
This thesis built its search for an Asian perspective on three analytical pillars—
philosophy, politics, and power. In terms of philosophy, the thesis explored various
aspects of Confucian thinking that have had wide impact and influence in many Asian
countries, particularly those in East Asia.1 This approach is consistent with analyses of
international law and global governance that draw on Western philosophical traditions,

1

See Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6, which contain analysis of various aspects of Confucian thinking.
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especially the tradition of political liberalism in the post-Cold War period. The Confucian
heritage does not encompass all philosophical traditions in Asia, but, for purposes of this
thesis, it represents a tradition that has had wide impact and relevance, especially for
China and other East Asian countries at the forefront of Asia’s rise to prominence in the
early 21st century.
The political pillar of the Eastphalian approach represents the political
perspectives Asian countries developed during their unfortunate experiences as targets of
Western imperialism. These experiences continue to make Asian countries uncomfortable
with Western-led initiatives to penetrate the sovereignty of Asian states in order to
implement political, economic, and governance reforms.2 This political perspective is
palpable when one compares the emphasis on sovereignty seen in Asian intra-regional
organizations, such as ASEAN, with the more aggressive approach to sovereignty taken
by the project of economic and political integration found in the European Union. The
distinctiveness of the Asian approach remains vibrant, as illustrated by a fairly uniform
Asian resistance to forcing Myanmar to accept humanitarian assistance in the wake of the
devastating cyclone in 2008. Eastphalian sensibilities about sovereignty and nonintervention are also be on display with respect to China’s approach to its political and
economic engagement with countries and regions outside Asia, such as Africa.3
The final pillar of the Asian perspective is power—Asia’s growing power and
importance in the international system. But for Asia’s rise in political significance in
world affairs, the philosophical heritage and historical political experiences of Asian
2

See Chapters 3, 4, and 5, which contain analysis on the impact of Western imperialism on Asian
perspectives on international politics.
3
See discussion of China’s approach to political and economic engagement with Africa in
Chapter 6.

191

countries would not matter as much in thinking about the future of global politics,
international law, and global governance. In short, Asia matters today in ways that it did
not matter in earlier historical periods, and a key element of this difference is the
emergence of Asian countries as more substantial political and economic actors in their
own rights in international affairs. Topping the power aspect of the Asian perspective is
the development of China into a great power with global interests and global reach.4
The claim in this thesis is not that these pillars of the Asian perspective merge
seamlessly and harmoniously into a unified attitude towards all issues percolating in
international relations. Rather, the thesis demonstrates that understanding these three
influences on Asian countries helps bring into focus some features of Asian attitudes
towards international politics. These attitudes have potentially significant implications for
the future of international law and global governance, as discussed more below. In the
past, these features existed but without much impact on the trajectory of world politics
because the Asian region was more an object of action by outside powers than a region
that could influence international affairs independently. Asian countries can no longer
simply influence world affairs by re-playing the trauma of the victim of imperialism and
choosing sides in larger geo-political power struggles. Asian countries have emerged
sufficiently from that sordid past and are now confronted with the task of looking
forwards not just backwards in how they think about international politics and
international law.

4

See Chapter 6 for analysis of the importance of China’s emergence as a great power.
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7.3 Potential Eastphalian Impact on International Law and Global Governance
Throughout this thesis, the features of an Eastphalian approach to international
relations have contrasted starkly with much of the content and thrust of international law
and global governance in the post-Cold War period. In short, we do not have much of a
meeting of the minds between the post-Westphalian trajectory witnessed in international
law and global governance over the past two decades and the Eastphalian emphasis on
strong principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states.
The post-Westphalian trajectory, particularly in the areas of human rights, humanitarian
intervention, and human security, limits and pressures the classical Westphalian principles
of sovereignty and non-intervention. As a result, the post-Westphalian approach creates
more space for international law, both as a normative guide to political action and reform
and as source of devising practical governance regimes to meet new challenges the
globalized world faces.
The Eastphalian embrace of robust principles of sovereignty and non-intervention
has the opposite effect because it defends and extends the governance space that these
principles can occupy in the relations between states. The thesis has explored the
implications of the Eastphalian perspective for the international legal rules on human
rights5 and the use of force,6 and these implications do not track where post-Westphalian
moves in international law would take global governance. For example, the Eastphalian
approach is not likely to support initiatives in international law to strengthen the
international justiciability and enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights and to
grant countries the legal right to intervene with military force under the principle of the
5
6

See Chapter 5.
See Chapter 6.
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responsibility to protect. In terms of substance, the Eastphalian approach would reduce
the influence of ideology in international law, a phenomenon stimulated by the American
approach to international law and international relations during and after the Cold War. In
terms of process, the Eastphalian perspective would subject changes in international law
to more deliberate, state-centric processes and reduce the ability of non-state actors, such
as NGOs, to influence the development of international law.
As a result, global governance activities would be more conservative by
respecting differences among states and societies and by being more state-centered in
how governance arrangements were negotiated and implemented. The Eastphalian
approach to global governance would prefer ad hoc, informal, and political solutions to
shared collective action problems to more legalized and binding strategies often
emphasized in post-Westphalian international legal discourse. The Eastphalian
perspective recognizes the need for collective action among states, but its preference for
the political over the legal would curtail more direct, expansive, and innovative uses of
international law in global governance mechanisms.

7.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Eastphalian Perspective
As delineated in this thesis, the Eastphalian perspective offers a different vision of
the future of international law and global governance, and the vision is sufficiently
different to spark controversy and opposition because it challenges the continuation of the
post-Westphalian future for international law and global governance. In this context,
probing the strengths and weaknesses of the Eastphalian approach proves worthwhile. In
terms of possible strengths of the Eastphalian perspective, it is important to note that this
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perspective does not radically challenge fundamental elements of the international system
and basic principles of international law that support this system. In other words,
Eastphalia is not a revolutionary mindset.
For example, Asian countries support traditional interpretations and applications
of the international law on the use of force found in the UN Charter. At a time when
Western governments (e.g., U.S. advocacy for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense)
and non-state actors (e.g., NGO support for the principle of the responsibility to protect)
often push for expanding the legitimate bases for using force in international relations,
the Eastphalian outlook is less radical and threatening to international order. Similarly,
Asian countries acknowledge the existence and importance of economic, social, and
cultural human rights, as many Western countries do, and they connect these rights to
their cultural understandings of the importance of communitarian duty and responsibility.
The Eastphalian approach to economic, social, and cultural rights is fairly mainstream.
The frustration of human rights advocates with the mainstream approach to economic,
social, and cultural rights is not a frustration specific to an Eastphalian worldview.
Recognition of the importance of raising standards of living through economic
growth contributes to significant Asian participation in and commitment to international
legal regimes encouraging trade and foreign direct investment. Asian countries are,
therefore, willing and able participants in the governance regimes that attempt to stabilize
and expand world economic activity, which most political leaders and economic experts
believe is critical for preserving order and stability in international relations. Combined
with its opposition to tinkering with the international law on the use of force, the Asian
embrace of global economic interdependence gives the Eastphalian perspective on
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international relations excellent credentials for supporting order, stability, prosperity, and
peace among nations.
Presented in its most positive light, the Eastphalian perspective urges leaders to
manage cooperatively the systemic, structural aspects of international relations—
preventing war and promoting prosperity among states and peoples. How countries
internally manage the political problems and possibilities that arise in a stable and orderly
international system is more a matter of each state’s autonomy, and respecting that
autonomy reduces inter-state frictions and heightens the duty of the nation’s leaders to
secure the domestic safety and subsistence of their people.
Presented in a more negative light, critics of Eastphalia would argue that its return
to strong principles of sovereignty and non-intervention represents little more than an
excuse for the continuation of undemocratic regimes and corrupt politics and for
shielding illegitimate behavior from external scrutiny. Put more colorfully, Eastphalia
looks like the worst bits of the old Westphalian system dressed in Asian clothing. There is
nothing particularly Asian about acknowledging that war is bad and economic wealth is
good. International law and global governance have moved normatively beyond these
obvious objectives because achieving these objectives in a sustainable way requires
digging into how states organize themselves internally and how they function as
governance units in an increasingly interdependent world. The Eastphalian perspective
rejects the need for, and legitimacy of, this process of scrutinizing governance at all
levels against dynamic principles of international law.
In this respect, the Eastphalian approach is entirely backwards looking and has no
positive, future-oriented agenda beyond chanting the virtues of sovereignty and respect
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for political and cultural differences. Without such an agenda, Eastphalia has nothing
normatively novel or constructive to contribute to efforts to improve human dignity in a
world in which globalization is increasing inequalities and deepening inequities.
Repeatedly genuflecting before the altar of sovereignty is neither new nor specifically
Asian because many states in every region have engaged in this ritual, usually with
adverse consequences for international and human security.
The Asian interest in this ritual is supposedly to protect something “Asian” from
further depredation at the hands of outside powers in the West. Eastphalia is empty in not
articulating what the Asian “something” is and demonstrating that those outside Asia
should accord it respect and space in the competition of ideas globalization fosters.

7.5 Asia as a Laboratory for Human Security: Global Governance Looks East
In reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the Eastphalian perspective on
international relations, this perspective seems poised at a historic transition point—it has
arrived sufficiently to be taken into account, but has not yet clearly signaled where it will
be going. Sufficient features of an Asian approach are discernable, particularly in light of
Asia’s growing prominence and the increasing attention the region receives. This
approach, and its proximate causes (philosophy, political experience, and power), cannot,
with prudence, be dismissed as irrelevant merely because it does not mirror the postWestphalian vision of the future of international law and global governance. This vision
does not universally hold sway in the West either, so it should not hold pride of place in
assessing the Eastphalian worldview.
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Recognizing basic features of the Eastphalian perspective is, however, also not
sufficient to give this perspective lasting importance in international relations. The real
test for Eastphalia is whether it can inform the responses Asian countries and other
nations develop for improving human security. Whether Asian countries desire it or not,
the rest of the world will be watching how Asian governments approach the plethora of
human security challenges remaining in the region. The recognition of the progress Asia
has made in reducing extreme poverty and hunger demonstrates that the global
governance spotlight will shine on Asia. Asia’s political prominence means that how
Asian countries respond to this attention will have global significance.
In this context, Asian countries will have to supplement the basic outlines of the
Eastphalian perspective sketched in this thesis with more specific blueprints for
effectively tackling human security challenges, including environmental degradation,
transnational organized crime, terrorism, and the spread of infectious diseases. In keeping
with the Eastphalian approach, these governance blueprints may not be influenced or
connected with principles of international law. Any lack of international legal texture to
policy approaches to human security threats will only become politically salient if the
approaches taken manifestly fail to improve human security. Successful management of
human security problems underneath the emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention
will go a long way toward making Eastphalia a more credible global template for political
and governance action.
In this light, the Eastphalian perspective may prove more valuable as an influence
on global governance than on international law. The nature of the Eastphalian outlook
means that Asian countries will develop various policy responses to similar human
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security challenges, which will make Asia something of a global laboratory for
governance of human security threats. Asian political and economic development has
proceeded sufficiently to warrant seeing Asia in this light, whereas viewing Africa in the
same light would be unhelpful and unfair. Eastphalia could advance if Asian countries
can move beyond defensively proclaiming “Asian values” to move towards proactively
creating “Asian solutions.”7
As analyzed in this thesis, the Eastphalian perspective does not contain sufficient
features to provide strong hints about what Asian solutions to human security threats
might be. More research and analysis would be necessary to flesh out whether the
outlines of such solutions are emerging across the range of human security problems Asia
faces. Such exploration would likely produce areas in which Asian solutions are found
wanting, and Asian governmental responses to such findings that simply parrot the
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention will not be impressive. Eastphalia should
not be the expedient haven of Westphalian concepts long ago discredited as rather
unhelpful in improving the human condition. At the end of the day, in the era of 21st
century globalization, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention will not provide

7

Recognition of the need for Asian solutions, and their importance beyond Asia, is revealed in
this announcement of a forthcoming January 2009 conference in Singapore: “Asia’s growing
economic and geopolitical importance has led to increased interest in its social protection and
social welfare programs. How do these diverse countries deal with aging, disability, drug and
alcohol abuse, housing, income supports and welfare, health care coverage, old-age pensions,
single mothers, social services, unemployment, and the working poor? How can we encourage
cross-national exchanges among researchers, academics, practitioners, and government officials?
The Lee Kuan Yew school of Public Policy and the University of Maryland School of Public
Policy in association with the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management will hold a
conference to explore these and other topics in Singapore, January 7 through January 9. The
conference will highlight scholarly—but policy-oriented—papers on these and similar
topics. . . .The conference will close with a panel on ‘Implications Beyond Asia’” Asian Social
Protection in Comparative Perspective, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National
University of Singapore, January 7-9, 2009.
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much political cover. What Asian countries do with the policy space the principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention provide will be the critical global governance question.
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